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ABSTRACT
Josephson, Anna PhD, Purdue University, December 2017. Household Decision Making Under Stress: Three Essays on Agricultural Production in Southern Africa.
Major Professor: Gerald Shively.
Rural households in Southern Africa face numerous economic challenges, arising
from a range of idiosyncratic and covariate risks. This research seeks to understand
strategies employed by households to cope with diﬀerent types of shocks, in the context of Zimbabwe and Malawi. I focus on several techniques used to cope with risk
and shocks in an uncertain environment, including intra-household resource, land, and
crop, as well as labor allocations. To provide insight on household decision making, I
expand and adapt theoretical models. This helps me to better understand household
decision making in the complex and risky environments in which they reside and to
more broadly grasp the dynamics of small households in the developing world.
This research is comprised of four chapters, including an introduction and three
distinct essays. I consider three topics relevant to agricultural households: (1) intrahousehold dynamics, (2) crop choice decisions, and (3) labor allocations. I consider
these three topics, and the way in which households treat them in their increasingly
risky, complex, and changing environments.
In the ﬁrst essay, I extend the typical considerations of intra-household dynamics
by examining joint income: income that is earned and shared by men and women
working together. Using data from 693 households in Malawi, I empirically test the
assumption that all household income is pooled, when joint income, as well as income earned individually by men and women, is accounted for in the analysis. I
develop an intra-household collective model which explicitly includes joint and individual relationships to explain income allocation. To evaluate changes in income and

xiii
expenditure, I use rainfall variation, as diﬀerent levels of rainfall will have diﬀerent
impacts on the production by diﬀerent households members. Ultimately, I reject the
hypothesis of complete income pooling and full insurance within the household. However, I ﬁnd evidence that household members pool income and insure one another for
expenditures on essential goods and thus I conclude that there is strategic income
pooling behavior with respect to particular types of expenditure, resulting in partial
insurance for the household.
In the second essay, I investigate the decision to grow and allocate area to sorghum,
a long-promoted, drought resistant crop in Southern Africa. Sorghum, though tolerant to extreme weather conditions, is not considered to be delicious or worth eating to
many individuals in Zimbabwe. Using a panel of 355 households located across Southern Zimbabwe, I employ a behavioral model, which explicitly accounts for households’
own preferences and characteristics, as well as the perceived and inherent traits of
crops. In a context in which households are largely producers and consumers of their
own food, I ﬁnd that own household preferences dominate the decision to allocate
area to sorghum. The inherent drought resistant traits of sorghum are relevant when
households are faced with variable and low average rainfall. Additionally, participation in oﬀ-farm labor drives planting behavior, serving as an alternative strategy
for households facing drought and the complexities of cultivating crops in a more
arid environment; households which have members working oﬀ-farm are less likely
to plant sorghum, suggesting that they purchase food with income earned oﬀ-farm,
should their maize crop be insuﬃcient. These results indicate that preferences must
be considered when examining households’ planting behavior.
Finally, in the third essay, I investigate ex post labor reallocation as a household
strategy for coping with unanticipated events. The study spans a period of extreme
unrest and stress: I measure the responses of 355 households to death and rainfall
shocks in Zimbabwe, during the country’s long-term economic crisis with data from
2005 and 2013. In this strained environment, shocks compound existing stresses. I
ﬁnd that, as relative returns to agriculture fall, households are pushed out of the farm
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sector into oﬀ-farm work and shocks tend to exacerbate household responses to these
pushes. There is also strong heterogeneity in responses, in part related to household
characteristics. Wealthier and larger households are more likely to return to on-farm
labor following a shock than their poorer and smaller cohorts, who instead diversify (or
are forced to diversify) the household labor portfolio through migration and reliance
on oﬀ-farm earnings. Taken together, these results suggest that household strategies
diﬀer depending on household characteristics and individual traits.
Central within all of these essays is the examination of questions about how households cope with unanticipated events, experienced risk, and unexpected shocks. When
their conditions change and new situations arise, households must ﬁnd a way to adapt,
within the constraints imposed by the circumstances of their context. My ultimate
ambition with this research is to better understand these contexts and constraints,
and thus the microeconomic challenges facing rural households in developing nations
in Southern Africa.

1

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Human development, as an
approach, is concerned with what I
take to be the basic development
idea: namely, advancing the
richness of human life, rather than
the richness of the economy in
which human beings live, which is
only a part of it.
Amartya Sen

Human beings are elements in a complex system: we are born, we grow, we
interact, we love, we work, we struggle, we try, we fail, we succeed, and ultimately, we
die. As economists, we often reduce this life cycle to mathematic explanations: beings
interacting in markets; utility maximizers making calculated and reasoned decisions;
homo economicus existing in a vacuum devoid of irrationality. But, we, as humans
are much more than that. And while our perspectives and work as economists may
overlook this from time to time, this omission can result in us failing to fully conceive
the situations which we study: the circumstances in which people live, the markets
in which they interact, the decisions and choices they make. As Sen observes (quoted
in the epigraph), our work should look towards advancing the richness, complexity,
and diversity of human life – rather than just the economy in which humans interact.
In this dissertation, I aim to broaden my perspective in this way: I seek to understand humans and the households which they inhabit, as complex entities, living
within markets, making reasoned choices for their particular set of circumstances.
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I seek to understand these households in this way through the scope of economics,
using the theories and principles of the discipline as a lens to understand their perspectives and actions. Ultimately, by doing so, I hope to better comprehend human
actions and behavior, providing perspective on the choices we make every day, with
economics as an explanatory scope.
I approach my work with this question in mind: how do people actually act?1 In
this dissertation, I consider this query in the ever complicated environment of rural,
agricultural households in Southern Africa. The challenges posed by agricultural life
are well documented, as are the exigencies of life in poverty.2 Additionally, there
is near certainty of these challenges increasing3 climate change, political and social
unrest, macroeconomic ﬂuctuations all drive a world of increasing uncertainty. In
this dissertation, I attempt to understand and better describe how people cope with
these increasing stresses. In particular, I ask the question: how are households and
individuals adapting their behaviors, both on- and oﬀ-farm, in order to survive and
thrive in their changing environment?
To investigate this question, I consider three important components of life in an
agricultural household: (1) intra-household dynamics, (2) crop choice decisions, and
(3) labor allocations. In the three essays which comprise this dissertation, I consider
these three topics, and the way in which households treat them in their increasingly
risky, complex, and changing environments. The following bullets brieﬂy outline the
motivations, methods, and results of each of these essays:
1

Perhaps this idea, and so far this introduction, seem to simply describe the burgeoning ﬁeld of
behavioral economics. However, I would argue that this is a change in the mind and perspective
of the author and researcher disparate from the foundation of behavioral economics and the application of psychological insight to the discipline of economics. This does not mean that behavioral
literature and insights are not incorporated into my dissertation, but rather that this is not a piece
of behavioral research. I would argue that this is a way of thinking that helps to frame problems,
examine questions, and to understand solutions, not just a consideration of diﬀerent perspectives
from alternative disciplines.
2
For short list of some of the literature on this topic, consider: Schultz (1964); Keeble (1988); Gillis
et al. (1992); Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993); Dercon (2004); Banerjee et al. (2006); Banerjee
and Duﬂo (2007); Sachs (2008); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), among many others.
3
This is an increasingly common observation throughout popular culture, media, and academic
literature and research. Consider searching “disaster” or “risk” on your preferred search engine or
academic journal for a multitude of recently published articles or “think pieces”.
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• CHAPTER 2: Intra-Household Resource Allocation in Malawi: I extend the typical considerations of intra-household dynamics by examining joint
income: income that is earned and shared by men and women working together.
Many households, in the developed and developing world, include two members
working collaboratively. This interaction is an essential dynamic to examine in
order to better understand intra-household relationships. I empirically test the
assumption that all household income is pooled, when joint income, as well as
income earned individually by men and women, is accounted for in the analysis.
I develop an intra-household collective model which explicitly includes joint and
individual relationships to explain income allocation. To evaluate changes in
income and expenditure, I use rainfall variation, as diﬀerent levels of rainfall
will have disparate impacts on the production by diﬀerent households members.
Ultimately, I reject the hypothesis of complete income pooling and full insurance
within the household. However, I ﬁnd evidence that household members pool
income and insure one another for expenditures on essential goods. However,
they do not pool income and do not insure one another for luxury goods. I
conclude that there is strategic income pooling behavior with respect to particular types of expenditure, resulting in partial insurance for the household. This
suggests that many households behave as may be expected by lived experience:
sharing resources for important purchases, though not for luxury or recreational
goods.
• CHAPTER 3: Staple Crop Choice and Land Allocation in Zimbabwe:
To consider the importance and eﬀect of taste preferences on farming behavior
and crop choice, I investigate the decision to grow and allocate area to sorghum,
a long-promoted, drought resistant crop in Southern Africa. Sorghum, though
tolerant to extreme weather conditions, is not considered to be delicious or worth
eating to many individuals in Zimbabwe. To explore this dichotomy between
individual preferences and traits of the crop, I measure how household preferences as well as perceived and inherent crop traits impact crop choice and area
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allocation decisions. I employ a behavioral model, which explicitly accounts for
households’ own preferences and characteristics, as well as the perceived and
inherent traits of crops. I consider both sorghum and maize, as the latter is
the preferred staple crop of most rural farmers in the country. In a context
in which households are largely producers and consumers of their own food, I
ﬁnd that own household preferences dominate the decision to allocate area to
sorghum and maize. In particular, a stated preference for sorghum increases
area allocated to the crop, though, inherent crop traits and household characteristics are also important. The inherent drought resistant traits of sorghum
are relevant when households are faced with variable and low average rainfall.
Additionally, participation in oﬀ-farm labor drives planting behavior, serving
as an alternative strategy for households facing drought and the complexities of
cultivating crops in a more arid environment; households which have members
working oﬀ-farm are less likely to plant sorghum, suggesting that they purchase
food with income earned oﬀ-farm, should their maize crop be insuﬃcient. These
results indicate that preferences should be considered when examining households’ planting behavior, particularly in risky environments, where theory may
suggest a diﬀerent behavior than that which is observed.
• CHAPTER 4: Labor (Re-)Allocation in Zimbabwe: I consider one of the
most crucial and intimate aspects of individual behavior: how do people spend
their time? Speciﬁcally, I investigate ex post labor reallocation as a household
strategy for coping with unanticipated events. In doing so, I expand my results
from chapter 3, in an attempt to further understand how and why households
behave as they do, in response to shocks. The study spans a period of extreme
unrest and stress: I measure household responses to death and rainfall shocks
in Zimbabwe, during the country’s long-term economic crisis.4 In this strained
environment, shocks compound existing stresses. I ﬁnd that, as relative returns
to agriculture fall, households are pushed out of the farm sector into oﬀ-farm
4

The ultimate result of this was the collapse of the currency.
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work and shocks tend to exacerbate household responses to these pushes. There
is also strong heterogeneity in responses, in part related to household characteristics. Wealthier and larger households are more likely to return to on-farm
labor following a shock than their poorer and smaller cohorts, who instead diversify (or are forced to diversify) the household labor portfolio through migration
and reliance on oﬀ-farm earnings. Taken together, these results suggest that
household strategies diﬀer depending on household characteristics and individual traits. Even when the same shock is experienced by members of the same
region, tribe, cooperative group, or any other shared relationship responses may
diﬀer across households, based on the conditions and traits that characterize the
household.
Central within all of these papers is the examination of questions about how households cope with unanticipated events, experienced risk, and unexpected shocks. When
their conditions change and new situations arise, households must ﬁnd a way to adapt,
within the constraints imposed by their broader circumstances. I aim to provide insight on the decisions of households. To do so, I adapt theoretical models, relevant to
intra-household resource allocation, crop choice and land allocation, as well as labor
allocation and labor market participation. These models provide the foundation and
structure for my empirical work, but also serve as a useful framework for considering
the ﬁndings and implications of the studies, in other contexts, and for deriving policy,
generalizable to a series of environments. But, even in employing these models, expanding their frameworks, and considering their derived results, my work is motivated
by the desire to consider how households really behave and make decisions.
The contribution of this dissertation is twofold. First, I contribute to an ongoing
academic discussion, within the economics and applied economics literature, about
households within the developing world and how they cope with stress and risk.
The “whole household perspective” which I attempt to achieve in this dissertation
provides a broad view of the behavior of these rural, agricultural households, in
ways that have not previously been extensively considered. This makes my work
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a valuable contribution to the ﬁeld both from a point of perspective, as a well as
from the theoretical and empirical models and the resulting ﬁndings. Second, and of
equal importance, is that I aim for this this research to be used in order to inform
and build policy recommendations. Policy, though, not simply just for stakeholders
working in these communities in which this research takes place, but additionally for
researchers and academics who continue to work in these communities. That is, I
aim for this work to develop both policy perceptions for development organizations,
and also for it to guide best research framing and thought, particularly in how we
consider households.
My ultimate ambition with this research is to better understand the microeconomic challenges facing rural households in developing nations in Southern Africa,
but to do so, by considering the people which they involve as fully ﬂeshed humans –
rather than economic concepts applied in models and markets. I hope that my work
in this dissertation contributes to a people-focused, human-forward type of economic
research: in which the richness of human life, rather than simply the circumstances
and economies therein, are at the forefront of consideration.

7

CHAPTER 2. SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE: THE IMPACT OF RAINFALL ON
GENDERED INCOME ALLOCATION IN MALAWI

2.1 Introduction
Despite the ubiquity of collective household models, empirical evidence suggests that
in most households choices concerning income and spending are determined by individual decision makers.1 Much of the existing literature addresses this issue by
accounting for interactions between male and female household members.2 But for
many households, income earned jointly, by two or more household members, constitutes a large proportion of earned income. As an example, recent studies from
Southern Africa show that between 12 percent and 50 percent of household plots
are jointly managed, leading to a substantial amount of shared income (Kilic et al.,
2015; Slavchevska, 2015). The failure to consider these joint income-earning relationships has likely led to inaccuracies in studies of intra-household income and resource
allocation.
In this paper, I empirically test the assumption that all household income is
pooled, when joint income, as well as income earned individually by men and women,
is accounted for in the analysis. Expanding a model developed by Duﬂo and Udry
(2004), I explore the disparities in expenditure by diﬀerent income earners resulting
from exogenous variation in rainfall. My analysis focuses on three categories of income earned by households in rural Malawi: that earned exclusively by men, that
earned exclusively by women, and that earned jointly. I use these categories to test
the restriction that income from the three sources is always pooled. The central ob1

This evidence comes from Chiappori (1992); Browning et al. (1994); Browning and Chiappori
(1998); Chiappori et al. (2002), among others.
2
Udry (1996); Duﬂo and Udry (2004); Basu (2006); Bobonis (2009); Doss (2013) are examples from
this literature.
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servation underlying my methodological approach and empirical estimation is that if
households completely pool income, then household members fully insure one another
against short term ﬂuctuations in income. If this is the case, then non-persistent income variations will not result in changes to the allocation of resources within the
household.
I reject the hypothesis of complete income pooling and full insurance within the
household. However, I ﬁnd evidence that household members partially insure one
another for expenditure on essential goods, including food, clothing, education, and
healthcare. Conversely, households do not insure one another for luxury goods, including cigarettes and alcohol, recreation, and housing and utilities. I conclude that
observed income pooling is strategic, with respect to particular types of expenditure.
This behavior results in partial insurance for the household. These results are contrary to previous studies, which fail to ﬁnd even partial insurance within households
for essential goods.3
My results are driven by the inclusion of joint income in the analysis. When I omit
joint income and consider only income earned individually by men or women, I am
able to replicate the ﬁndings of previous studies which show that households do not
pool their income. This result suggests that, by omitting joint relationships, earlier
research has failed to account for an important dynamic in household analysis. An
additional driver of the observed strategic behavior appears to be the societal composition of rural Malawi. When I examine diﬀerences between income pooling behavior
in matrilineal and non-matrilineal societies, I ﬁnd that households in matrilineal societies completely pool income and fully insure one another against income variation.
Households in non-matrilineal societies do not. I similarly test household headship,
to examine if the societal diﬀerence is driven by the gender of the household head.
However, those results show that female-headed households are not diﬀerent from
3

Some work on income pooling and other intra-household cooperative behavior includes Duﬂo (2003);
Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003); Duﬂo and Udry (2004); Bobonis (2009); Antman (2015), among
others.
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male-headed households. I thus conclude that societal structures play an important
role in intra-household income allocation.
My identiﬁcation strategy relies on observing the impact of exogenous variation
in rainfall on income and expenditure. I examine short term variations in rainfall,
which are covariate at the household level. All members of a household experience
the same rainfall, but the pattern of rainfall may have diﬀerent impacts on individual
household members, due to discrepancies in input use, cultivated crops, and plot
quality. As previous literature has shown, women and men not only cultivate a
diﬀerent set of crops, but do so on plots of diﬀerent qualities (e.g. Doss and Morris
(2001); Karamba and Winters (2015)) and with diﬀerent quantities and qualities of
inputs (e.g. Udry et al. (1995); Udry (1996); Kilic et al. (2015); Oseni et al. (2015);
Slavchevska (2015)). Thus, rainfall may have diﬀerent impacts on the income of
diﬀerent household members. However, in a household with complete insurance from
pooled resources, the diﬀerent impacts of rainfall on income by earner, conditional on
total expenditure, should not translate into diﬀerences in the allocation of a particular
expenditure to diﬀerent purposes within the household. To test this, I consider broad
expenditure aggregates, including total expenditure, as well as more disaggregated
expenditure categories.
My study contributes to the body of literature that examines resource allocation
within households in the developing world, by including jointly earned income in the
analysis. I am the ﬁrst, to my knowledge, to explicitly incorporate jointly earned
income with individual income into the analysis of household income pooling.4 While
other areas of gender studies have included aspects of joint management (Bobonis,
4

There is a growing body of literature, centered in West Africa, which explores the concept of shared
plots, which are generally managed by men. Although this literature highlights income which, in
principle, may be classiﬁed as joint, it is not identiﬁed in this way, as the motivation is through
anthropological mechanisms (Doss, 2002; Duﬂo and Udry, 2004; Kazianga and Wahhaj, 2013). This
classiﬁcation provides an interesting debate surrounding this body of literature, in particular the
question: if authors have not identiﬁed their shared plots as joint plots, should I classify them as
joint, as they are quite similar? In this case, I have decided not to. The shared plots of this literature
seem disparate from the joint income and plots which are elsewhere identiﬁed. The decision of an
author to explicitly identify a plot as joint, rather than implicitly identify them as such (with a
classiﬁcation done, ultimately, by the reader) seems deliberate, and to overlook that choice seems
misguided. However, I can appreciate the debate that might surround this particular decision.
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2009; Kilic et al., 2015; Oseni et al., 2015; Slavchevska, 2015; McCarthy and Kilic,
2017), this consideration has been omitted from studies of gender-speciﬁc household
resource allocation.5 The evidence presented in this study supports the validity and
empirical relevance of including income earned jointly in intra-household analyses.
There is ample literature on the relationship between short term income ﬂuctuations and changes in expenditure. But previous work speciﬁcally addressing the
relationship between household weather variation and expenditure is more limited.
This research has shown incomplete income pooling and lack of insurance within the
household. In the presence of weather variability, Duﬂo and Udry (2004) fail to ﬁnd
support for complete income pooling in Côte D’Ivoire. Similarly, Akobeng (2016)
ﬁnds that female-headed households signiﬁcantly reduce per capita expenditure in
cases when agricultural income is reduced due to rainfall variation in Ghana.
By explicitly including joint relationships, this paper adds an additional extension
to previous ﬁndings. In some settings, joint relationships in intra-household behavior
may have important consequences for households in the developing world and, correspondingly, important implications for development policy. In the future, analysis of
the role of gender in the household will need to examine joint relationships in order
to make accurate policy recommendations, based on actual household behavior in the
developing world.

2.2 Country Context and Data

2.2.1 Country Context
Development strategies in Malawi have emphasized the critical nature of the agricultural sector in combating poverty (Chirwa and Muhome-Matita, 2013). As reported by Kilic et al. (2015), agricultural productivity has been erratic over the past
5

These papers include a discussion of joint collaboration explicitly, however, tend to focus on production and shared responsibilities, rather than shared decision making and collaborative behavior,
as is the subject of this study.
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two decades. Potential factors contributing to this inconsistency include weather variability, declining soil fertility, low adoption and use of agricultural technologies, as well
as poor infrastructure and market failures. Correspondingly, poverty is widespread.
In 1998, estimates showed that approximately 54 percent of Malawi’s population was
living below the poverty line, with rural poverty at about 58 percent. More recent
estimates show slight declines in rural poverty, to 56 percent and around 43 percent,
in 2004 and in 2009, respectively (Chirwa and Muhome-Matita, 2013). Despite these
decreases in overall poverty, the World Bank ﬁnds that inequality, as measured by
the Gini coeﬃcient, remains around 0.39 (WB, 2008).
Poverty rates diﬀer between female- and male-headed households. While poverty
rates for male-headed households declined to 49 percent by 2011, rates for femaleheaded households stood at 57 percent (Kilic et al., 2015). Kilic et al. (2015) ﬁnd that,
on average, female-managed plots are 25 percent less productive than male-managed
plots. This discrepancy in productivity may drive some of the gendered household
poverty gap.

2.2.2 Data
Data for this study comes from the ﬁrst two rounds of the Malawi Integrated
Household Panel Survey (IHPS) which was implemented by the National Statistical Oﬃce under the Living Standard Measurement Survey - Integrated Household
Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) program with the World Bank. In 2013, the
IHPS succeeded in tracking 3,246 households across 204 enumeration areas, which
were surveyed in the previous round in 2010. The original sample was designed to be
representative at the national-, urban/rural, and regional levels. Eﬀorts were made
to track resettled and split oﬀ households; as a result, attrition is low, at 3.8 percent
for households and 7.4 percent for individuals (McCarthy and Kilic, 2017). The data
set contains information on demographics, expenditure, and agriculture, as well as
household-speciﬁc rainfall measurements.
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I use a balanced panel of households collected in 2010 and 2013. Due to my
interest in income earned by rural households, I omit from my analysis households
which did not report income from crop sales. Each household included in my sample
has at least one household member who earned some income from the sale of crops.
In 2010, 1,771 individuals (35 percent of all individuals in the ﬁrst round) reported
selling some crops. In 2013, 2,146 individuals (35 percent of all individuals in the
second round) reported selling some crops. In total, 693 households appear in both
years, yielding a total of 1,386 observations. This provides the balanced panel for my
analysis. Because I focus on a subset of the population, one can no longer consider
my sample nationally representative of the entire population. However, it remains
representative of households who participate in crop markets.6
In addition to recording the amounts and values of crops sold, the survey indicates
the household member who is responsible for decisions about the income earned from
the sale of each crop. Respondents are asked to report the primary income manager
and, as appropriate, a secondary income manager. I ﬁrst consider only male and
female income: I consider only the primary manager and designate male and female
income based on the gender of the individual reported. Subsequent to this, I consider
joint income. I designate income as joint if a secondary income manager is identiﬁed.
My analysis is indiﬀerent about whether joint funds are controlled by multiple women,
multiple men, or both a man and a woman.7 If no secondary manager is identiﬁed,
income is classiﬁed as either male or female, following the gender of the primary man6

By restricting the sample in this way, I am considering only households which participate in a crop
market. Of course, this reduces the sample to households which engage in a particular behavior
and thus conclusions drawn should bear this in mind. At this time, I am attempting to value crop
production and expand the model to include not just income earned though sales, but also potential
income earned in production.
7
Of jointly managed income, in 2010, 1 percent is managed by individuals of the same gender, 1
percent a primary female manager and a secondary male manager, and the remaining 98 percent
has a primary male manager and a secondary female manager. In 2013, 2 percent is managed
by individuals of the same gender, 2 percent has a primary female manager and a secondary male
manager, and the remaining 96 percent has a primary male manager and a secondary female manager.
Excluding the 2-4 percent of households which are not male primary, female secondary managed has
no signiﬁcant impact on results. Therefore, in my analysis, I simply include them in and aggregate
all shared income as “joint”.
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ager. The primary diﬀerence when joint income is omitted is an over-attribution of
earned income to men. Women’s income remains approximately the same, regardless
of whether joint income is included. The percent diﬀerence between speciﬁcations
is approximately 25 percent (on average, 4,628 MK without joint, compared with
3,455 with joint). In contrast, men’s income is vastly diﬀerent when joint income is
included, with a percent diﬀerence of around 70 percent (on average, 48,731 without
joint, compared with 14,249 with joint). Table 2.1 presents summary statistics on
earned income, by gender, both when joint income is included and when joint income
omitted.
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics: Income
2010

2013

Total

Female Income (MK)
Male Income (MK)
Joint Income (MK)

Mean
2, 763
16, 268
22, 761

St. Dev
11, 778
61, 534
79, 699

Mean
4, 149
12, 432
46, 003

St. Dev
18, 461
60, 395
133, 824

Mean
3, 456
14, 350
34, 382

St. Dev
15, 494
60, 975
110, 710

Female Income (MK)
Male Income (MK)

3, 603
39, 029

14, 631
97, 102

5, 655
58, 435

24, 355
143, 220

4, 629
48, 732

20, 109
122, 694

Note: Calculations by the author.

My analysis also relies on expenditure data. An aggregate measure includes all
household expenditure, but I also include measures of disaggregated expenditure for
seven types of goods.8 I include measures of both essential and luxury goods to obtain
a broad perspective on overall household spending. Food comprises the largest share
of the household’s budget on average, followed by housing and utilities.9 Education
and recreation comprise the smallest budget shares. Table 2.2 reports the speciﬁc
average shares for each year, as well as the results of a t-test, for diﬀerences in each
type of expenditure, over time.
8

Households which have no expenditure for a particular good are designated with a zero.
This measure generally does not include rent. Of the 693 households included in my analysis, only
19 do not own their properties, and therefore pay rent on the building in which they live. Exclusion
does not signiﬁcantly inﬂuence results.
9
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Finally, Table 2.3 reports summary statistics for the rainfall measures used in the
analysis.10 Figure 2.1 maps the aggregate averages for the statistics in Table 2.3.
Rainfall is measured at the household level. The data provide a record of rainfall
variation across households within a village, although ﬂuctuations within a village for
a point in time are relatively small. I include three measures of rainfall: total rainfall, total rainfall in the wettest quarter, and average start of the wettest quarter.11
Using these three measurements gives a broad view of the varied impacts of rainfall.
Therefore, the analysis focuses not only on total rainfall experienced, but also on
the rainfall of the wettest quarter, due to the reliance of most Malawian households
on rain-fed ﬁelds for agricultural production. The onset of the rains is additionally
important as late onset of rains is associated with crop failures and low yields (Mugalavai et al., 2008). I also consider three time periods: the current year, the previous
year, and an average across the period of interest. These variables capture the various
pathways through which rainfall inﬂuences agricultural productivity, and thus earned
crop income.12

10

These rainfall data, as well as other climate and weather data in the LSMS, are collected in
conjunction with the University of California, at Berkeley, and their WorldClim database. WorldClim
is a set of global climate layers (gridded climate data), with spatial resolution of about one square
kilometer. Aggregates are created and distributed through the World Bank. Files are available
for download. I rely on the bioclimatic variables which are derived from monthly temperature and
rainfall variables, in order to generate more biologically meaningful variables. These variables are
intended to represent annual trends, seasonality, and extreme or limiting environmental factors.
More information can be found at the WorldClim database.
11
Average start of the wettest quarter is measured in dekads (1-36), where the ﬁrst week of July is
equal to one.
12
There is an ongoing debate about which measures “best” capture these dynamics. In the interest
of completeness, I have tested a broad range of measures, settling on these, due to an observation of
the desired eﬀects in the speciﬁcation of interest. However, I am also a co-investigator on a series of
projects which more deeply investigate the theoretical and empirical processes of estimating weather.
For more information, please contact the author.
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Figure 2.1.: Rainfall Maps for Malawi for 2010-2013

16
Table 2.2. Percent Expenditure on Particular Good of Total Expenditure

Food
Cigarettes and Alcohol
Clothing
Recreation
Education
Health
Housing and Utilities
Other

2010
62.92
2.51
3.31
0.37
1.33
1.74
13.58
14.24

2013
61.96
3.13
3.37
0.27
1.30
1.03
15.74
13.20

T-Test
0.144
0.045∗∗
0.755
0.003∗∗∗
0.800
0.000∗∗∗
0.000∗∗∗
0.014∗∗

Note: Values are calculated as a percent of each good, with respect
to aggregate expenditure, calculated by the author. Signiﬁcant ttest values designated by ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.

Table 2.3. Summary Statistics: Rainfall Variables
2010

Average Total Rainfall
Average Rainfall of Wettest Quarter
Average Start of Wettest Quarter
Past Year’s Total Rainfall
Past Year’s Rainfall of Wettest Quarter
Past Year’s Start of Wettest Quarter
Current Year’s Total Rainfall
Current Year’s Rainfall of Wettest Quarter
Current Year’s Start of Wettest Quarter

2013

Total

Mean

St. Dev

Median

Mean

St. Dev

Median

Mean

St. Dev

Median

857.834
649.963
16.466
915.976
663.711
16.609
784.202
594.438
16.974

95.988
53.038
0.635
185.574
141.764
1.815
127.122
103.207
0.696

831.000
645.000
16.300
859.000
625.000
17.000
754.000
584.000
17.000

852.303
644.450
16.636
825.033
577.895
18.124
825.362
662.892
16.434

92.274
48.728
0.643
77.959
62.567
1.233
135.132
71.013
0.579

828.000
639.000
17.000
821.000
578.000
19.000
819.000
663.000
16.000

855.069
647.206
16.551
870.505
620.803
17.366
804.782
628.665
16.704

91.156
50.985
0.645
149.372
117.642
1.726
132.747
94.942
0.695

829.000
640.000
16.400
828.000
597.000
18.000
785.000
634.000
17.000

Note: Calculations by the author

2.3 Theoretical Model

2.3.1 Theory
Collective household models are widely used in the development literature, but
Udry (1996) was one of the ﬁrst to question the fundamental assumption that households in developing countries must be Pareto eﬃcient. Though Udry argues for the
rationality of Pareto eﬃciency, largely due to the long-term stable nature of intrahousehold relationships and the existence of relatively good information about one
another’s actions, he posits that it is not mandatory, and demonstrates empirically
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that for farming households in Burkina Faso, Pareto eﬃcient allocation of resources is
not achieved. Subsequent literature has upheld Udry’s ﬁndings, demonstrating that
most households do not pool income and are not Pareto eﬃcient. This is because the
allocation of resources depends on individual income earners.13 Similar behavior is
also observed in the literature on gender relations and bargaining.14
In order to examine these issues more closely, I expand a model developed by
Duﬂo and Udry (2004) to include jointly earned income. I use a one-period model of
intra-household resource allocation in a risky environment.15 To simplify notation, I
consider a household consisting of two individuals, each of whom produces one crop
on one plot and who together produce a joint crop on a shared plot (i ∈ {m, f, j}).
This generalizes in a straightforward way to a situation in which multiple types of
crops are produced on multiple plots.
Farms are cultivated using labor (Li ) which, for men (m) and women (f ), can be
traded in a competitive market at wage w. The agricultural production function for
0

individual i is fi (Li , r) where r ≡ (r1 , r2 ) is a vector of two measures of rainfall which
impact cultivation on the plot each individual i.16
After rainfall is realized, each individual i ∈ {m, f } consumes a vector of private
goods ci . Individual i’s preferences are summarized by the expected utility function
Eui (ci ), where expectations are taken over potential realizations of rainfall. Rainfall
inﬂuences the eﬃcient allocation of resources only through its impact on cultivation.17
Any ex ante eﬃcient allocation of resources can be characterized as a solution to:
13

This is demonstrated in Duﬂo (2003); Duﬂo and Udry (2004); Antman (2015), among others.
Evidence from Udry et al. (1995); Agarwal (1997); Basu (2006); Doss (2013); Fiala and He (2016);
McCarthy and Kilic (2017), as well as others.
15
Duﬂo and Udry (2004) demonstrate that the model is generalizable to a dynamic multi-period
model.
16
As an example, r1 might represent onset of rainfall and r2 may represent total rainfall.
17
This is a strong assumption, following Duﬂo and Udry (2004). I explore this assumption and some
related limitations later in section 2.4.4.
14
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max Euf (cf ) + λEum (cm )
ci ,Li

s.t.

(2.1)
p · (cm + cf ) ≤ ff (Lf , r) + fm (Lm , r) + fj (Lj , r) − w(Lf + Lm ).

where λ represents some Pareto weight, which depends on the observable and unobservable attributes of household members. This Pareto weight does not depend on r,
as with an eﬃcient allocation of resources, risk is pooled.18
Denoting expenditure as: x ≡ p · (cm + cf ):

ci = ci (λ, p, x)

∀ i ∈ {m, f }

(2.2)

Consumption of any particular good is independent of the rainfall realization r, conditional on expenditures, prices, preferences, and the Pareto weight parameter. Consumption include only private goods and thus, jointly managed plots contribute to
expenditure, though joint consumption is not a component of equation (2.2).19
Equation (2.2) implies that the impact of rainfall realizations on expenditure for
any particular commodity depends only on the expenditure elasticity of demand for
that commodity and on the eﬀect of rainfall on overall expenditure. For simplicity, I
assume that the relative prices of consumption are not related to rainfall realizations
∂p
= 0).20
( ∂r
i

For any individual i and period t ∈ {1, 2} and any good k:
dck dx
dcki
= i ·
.
dx drt
drt

(2.3)

Equation (2.3) the eﬀect of rainfall in period t on consumption of good k by individual
i and its impact on total expenditure should be equal across all rainfall realizations:
18

If risk is pooled, households insure one another against rainfall variation and over the period of
interest and thus there is no a change in bargaining power.
19
That is, public goods, are omitted.
20
This follows assumptions made in the original model (Duﬂo and Udry, 2004). This assumption is
also discussed in section 2.4.4.

19

dcki
dr1
dx
dr1

=

dcki
dr2
dx
dr2

.

(2.4)

The crucial aspect of equation (2.4) is that dri impacts collective household decision
making through its inﬂuence on the household’s budget constraint.21
Equation (2.4) serves as an overidentifying restriction, which I test in my empirical analysis. The restriction speciﬁes that realized rainfall inﬂuences demand for a
particular good in proportion to its impact on expenditure.

2.3.2 Empirical Implementation
Several necessary assumptions are required to implement the overidentifying restriction test in equation (2.4). The ﬁrst assumes a particular form of commodity
demand for a certain commodity c by household i in period t. Let:

log(cit ) = α · log(xit ) + f (λi ) + Zit β + vi + νit

(2.5)

where xit again denotes expenditure, while Zit represents region indicators (and year,
as appropriate), vi represents a household ﬁxed eﬀect, and νit represents an error
term. In this, I assume that markets are regionally integrated, where rainfall varies
across region. Any impact of rainfall on prices is captured in the region indicators.
The shortcoming of this assumption is that it does not allow for prices to vary by
household.22
Using this form, I can test the assumption of income pooling and complete insurance. That is, I test the hypothesis that, conditional on total expenditure and a
household ﬁxed eﬀect, demand for a good does not depend on rainfall.23
21

Only data on rainfall and expenditures are required to estimate equations (2.2) and (2.4).
ff (Lf , r) + fm (Lm , r) + fj (Lj , r) − w(Lf + Lm ) are not observed and, therefore, such data is not
required for empirical analysis.
22
Duﬂo and Udry (2004) highlight two additional assumptions implied by equation (2.5). These are
that commodity demands are multiplicatively separable between the Pareto weight and household
expenditure as well as that commodity demands are log-linear in form.
23
This test is subject to several potential issues. First, there may be measurement error in the
expenditure variables, such that the relationship between total expenditure and speciﬁc expenditure
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Combining equations (2.4) and (2.5), I specify a relationship between rainfall and
total household expenditure such that:

log(xit ) = Rit α + Zit β + it ,

(2.6)

where I assume that rainfall (Rit ) impacts individual and joint income and therefore
inﬂuences households’ expenditures. Zit denotes region indicators and it represents
an error term.
Next, I specify a relationship between demand for a particular good and rainfall:

log(cit ) = Rit π + f (λi ) + Zit β + vi + νit

(2.7)

where Rit denotes rainfall and λ represents a Pareto weight, while Zit represents
region indicators, vi represents a household ﬁxed eﬀect, and νit represents an error
term.
Next, equation (2.6) and (2.7) are diﬀerenced, providing reduced form equations
for estimation:

Δ log(xit ) = ΔRit α + ΔZit β + Δit

(2.8)

Δ log(cit ) = ΔRit π + ΔZit β + Δνit

(2.9)

where all terms are as previously deﬁned.
Diﬀerencing allows me to analyze changes over time, as well as to control for
unobserved household heterogeneity, which, if neglected, could bias the coeﬃcient
estimates.24
of a single good may be over- or under-stated. Second, variations which result in changes to expenditure may be caused by events which would also inﬂuence preferences overall, such as the death of
a family member. While these problems do not impact implementation, it is necessary to be aware
of these shortcomings.
24
As my empirical analysis includes only two years of data, this diﬀerence is equivalent to the
ﬁxed eﬀect estimator. Thus, the year indicators and household ﬁxed eﬀects from equation (2.5) are
omitted in implementation.
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In order to actually test the restriction proposed in equation (2.4), I employ an
overidentiﬁcation test:

ff (Lf , r) + fm (Lm , r) + fj (Lj , r) − w(Lf + Lm ) = χα

(2.10)

for some scalar χ. To test this empirically, I use a proportional non-linear Wald test.
However, this test is limited as it does not explicitly link variation in income with its
respective gendered or joint origin.
To address this limitation, I generate linear diﬀerences in rainfall for each of the
income earners within a household. I estimate each ﬁrst diﬀerenced regression, for
household i, individual s, at time t:

Δlog(yist ) = ΔRit ψys + ΔZit δys + Δγst .

(2.11)

From each I calculate the predicted values: ΔRit ψ̂ys . All terms are as previously
deﬁned. Then I estimate:

Δ log(xit ) =

S
X

ΔRit ψ̂ys + ΔZit β + Δit ,

(2.12)

ΔRit ψ̂ys + ΔZit β + Δνit ,

(2.13)

s=1

Δ log(cit ) =

S
X
s=1

where terms are as previously deﬁned. Equations (2.12) and (2.13) allow me to
test the impact of rainfall on expenditure, distinguished by diﬀerent income sources.
Instead of broadly considering rainfall’s impact on expenditure, I am able to test
its impact while simultaneously testing the assumption of a collective household, in
which standard assumptions dictate that all income is pooled.
In implementing this analysis, I control for heteroskedasticity and correlation
within households using a clustered bootstrap procedure at the household level, running 1,000 repetitions.
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2.4 Results and Discussion
I begin this section by considering the results when only male and female income
is considered, as in much of the previous literature (section 2.4.1). I follow this with
the results of interest, which consider male, female, and joint income, and how these
diﬀerent categories inﬂuence expenditure (section 2.4.2). I conclude the section with
several robustness checks (section 2.4.3).

2.4.1 Rainfall and Expenditure: Male and Female Only
Panel 1 in Table 2.4 reports the ﬁrst stage results from equation (2.11), considering
only male and female income. These results indicate no diﬀerence across income
source and, in fact, no signiﬁcant relationship between rainfall and income. A F-test
of joint signiﬁcance conﬁrms this.25
I use the predicted values to estimate my restricted test, identifying the relationship between predicted income changes and expenditure. These results are reported
in Panel 1 of Table 2.5. As I am interested in whether household income is pooled, I
focus my discussion on the Wald test of overidentiﬁcation. This tests the hypothesis
that the coeﬃcients in each regression are proportional to their corresponding coeﬃcient in column (1). The diﬀerent impacts on income by earner, measured conditional
on total expenditure, determine any diﬀerences in the allocation of a particular expenditure to disparate purposes within the household.
I fail to reject equality for the case of cigarettes and alcohol, clothing, recreation,
education, and healthcare. Failure to reject equality means that income is pooled for
these expenditures and that household members insure one another for expenditure on
these goods. However I reject equality in the case of food expenditure and expenditure
on housing and utilities. Rejection of equality means that income is not pooled
for these expenditures and that household members do not insure one another for
expenditure on these goods.
25

This lack of signiﬁcance suggests a potentially problematic speciﬁcation. As this is not my result
of interest, I proceed with estimation.
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Table 2.4. First Stage: Rainfall Estimates
Panel 1: Male and Female Only

Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
Joint Signiﬁcance - F-Test
R2

Female Income

Male Income

0.012
(0.021)
−0.040
(0.040)
−0.737
(0.457)
0.005
(0.003)
−0.007
(0.005)
0.133
(0.084)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.005
(0.003)
−0.187
(0.228)

0.010
(0.018)
0.029
(0.035)
0.081
(0.434)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.004)
−0.090
(0.083)
−0.003
(0.003)
0.002
(0.003)
0.235
(0.212)

1.17
0.291
0.031

0.81
0.663
0.039

Female Income

Male Income

Panel 2: Male, Female, and Joint
Joint Income
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
Joint Signiﬁcance - F-Test
R2

−0.046
(0.043)
0.106∗
(0.060)
1.231∗
(0.734)
0.008
(0.007)
−0.010
(0.008)
0.058
(0.152)
−0.006
(0.006)
−0.000
(0.006)
−0.277
(0.396)

0.007
(0.022)
−0.041
(0.041)
−0.888∗
(0.480)
0.005
(0.004)
−0.009∗
(0.005)
0.219∗∗∗
(0.085)
−0.008∗∗
(0.003)
0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.024
(0.232)

0.037
(0.034)
−0.066
(0.055)
−1.220∗
(0.662)
−0.009
(0.006)
0.011
(0.008)
−0.171
(0.139)
0.005
(0.005)
−0.001
(0.006)
0.452
(0.358)

1.78∗∗
0.034
0.025

1.61∗
0.065
0.047

1.69∗∗
0.048
0.023

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses. (∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01). Regressions also include agro-ecological zone indicators.

∗∗

p < 0.05,
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These results are largely in line with previous ﬁndings regarding intra-household
resource allocation. As in Duﬂo and Udry (2004), changes in income from rainfall
variation result in changes in expenditure on food, while expenditure on other goods,
including alcohol and tobacco do not change, as these expenditures are insured by
other household members. Similarly, Akobeng (2016) also ﬁnds evidence of no insurance for food expenditure due to ﬂuctuations in rainfall. Broadly, my ﬁndings with
this speciﬁcation are supported by literature which suggests a lack of income pooling
in households (Duﬂo, 2003; Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003; Bobonis, 2009). Further,
these results indicate that if joint income is omitted from analysis, rural Malawian
households exhibit much of the same income pooling behavior as has been reported
throughout much of the previous literature.

Table 2.5. Restricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests: Log of Consumption
(1)
Aggregate

(2)
Food

(3)
Cigarettes and Alcohol

(4)
Clothing

(5)
Recreation

(6)
Education

0.193
(0.704)
0.301
(0.604)

0.480
(0.440)
−0.231
(0.377)

0.667
(0.410)
0.811∗∗
(0.351)

(7)
Health

(8)
Housing and Utilities

Panel 1: Male and Female Only
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income

0.126∗
(0.074)
0.168∗∗∗
(0.063)

−0.488
(0.784)
0.190
(0.672)

0.031

5.57∗
(0.062)
0.033

1.04
(0.594)
0.008

0.05
(0.974)
0.005

3.93
(0.140)
0.017

−0.022
(0.073)
0.096∗∗
(0.039)
0.012
(0.068)

−0.032
(0.084)
0.115∗∗∗
(0.045)
−0.024
(0.079)

−1.060
(0.769)
0.422
(0.409)
−0.497
(0.724)

0.115
(0.694)
0.044
(0.369)
−0.111
(0.653)

−0.090
(0.432)
−0.056
(0.230)
0.342
(0.407)

0.037

3.21
(0.360)
0.022

6.90∗
(0.075)
0.011

1.16
(0.762)
0.007

7.61∗
(0.055)
0.026

Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.081
(0.085)
0.215∗∗∗
(0.073)

3.59
(0.166)
0.024

−0.395
(0.670)
−0.307
(0.574)
0.86
(0.650)
0.039

0.044
(0.095)
−0.122
(0.081)
13.77∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.013

Panel 2: Male, Female, and Joint
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income
Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.567
(0.403)
0.543∗∗
(0.215)
0.545
(0.380)
5.83
(0.120)
0.018

−0.108
(0.659)
−0.255
(0.351)
0.204
(0.621)

0.039
(0.093)
−0.028
(0.050)
0.106
(0.088)

2.79
(0.425)
0.046

10.87∗∗
(0.012)
0.029

Note: The table presents coeﬃcients of the diﬀerence in log consumption of each item on the diﬀerence in predicted log income, as obtained from Table A.2. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Regressions include agro-ecological zone indicators. Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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2.4.2 Rainfall and Expenditure: Male, Female, and Joint
Panel 2 in Table 2.4 reports the ﬁrst stage estimation results from equation (2.11),
considering male, female, and joint income. These results show diﬀerences across
income source. F-tests of joint signiﬁcance are also signiﬁcant. Further, there are
signiﬁcant relationships between each income source and rainfall.26 Average start of
the wettest quarter increases joint income, while average start of the wettest quarter
decreases female and male income. As average start of the wettest quarter is measured
in dekads, a greater value is associated with a later onset of rainfall. Thus, these
results suggest that plots cultivated jointly beneﬁt from a later start of the rains, while
plots individually cultivated by men and women do not. This may be a diﬀerence
in plot quality or in investment on plot, but may also be due to diﬀerences in crops
cultivated. If men and women individually grow staples for home consumption, these
crops may suﬀer more from a late onset of rain. Similarly, if shared plots primarily
contain cash crops, such as tobacco or various tree crops, there may be some beneﬁt
(or less relative cost) to a late onset of rain.27
Several additional signiﬁcant relationships can be seen between rainfall and female
income. These include past year’s rainfall in the wettest quarter, past year’s start
of the wettest quarter, current year’s total rainfall, and current year’s rainfall in
the wettest quarter. These results suggest that women’s plots and crops may be
more sensitive to changes in rainfall patterns than plots cultivated jointly or plots
cultivated by men. This may be due to the quality of plots, the availability and quality
of input and labor resources, or crop choice. Addressing crop choice speciﬁcally,
there is some evidence that women cultivate staple crops at greater rates than their
male counterparts (Doss, 2002; Doss and SOFA, 2011) and as these crops are more
26

As previously mentioned, a series of alternative measures of rainfall have been tested. These can
be obtained from the author upon request.
27
It may be observed that some of the coeﬃcients exhibit “weak” levels of statistical signiﬁcance.
Following McCloskey and Ziliak (2008), one might consider whether statistical signiﬁcance is, or
should it be, the end all and be all of academic economic discussion. As Zilak and McCloskey (2009)
state: “Fit is not the same thing as importance. Statistical signiﬁcance is not the same thing as
scientiﬁc importance or economic sense.” For the sake of observation, I concede that the statistical
signiﬁcant relationships presented could be classiﬁed as “weak”, but their broader importance is
additionally, and more crucially, evident.
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responsive to irregular and erratic rainfall, this may drives some of the observed
sensitivity of women’s income to rainfall variation.
Next, using the predicted values from the ﬁrst stage, I estimate my restricted
test, identifying the relationship between predicted income changes and expenditure.
These results are reported in Panel 2 of Table 2.5. Again, as I am interested in whether
household income is pooled, I focus my discussion on the overidentiﬁcation Wald test.
This tests the hypothesis that the coeﬃcients in each regression are proportional to
their coeﬃcient in column (1). I perform this test because the impacts on income
by earner, measured conditional on total expenditure, should determine potential
discrepancies in the allocation of a particular expenditure to diﬀerent purposes within
the household.
I fail to reject equality for the cases of food, clothing, education, and health expenditures. Failure to reject equality means that income is pooled for these expenditures
and household members insure one another for expenditure on these goods. However,
I reject equality for expenditure on cigarettes and alcohol, recreation, and housing
and utilities. Rejection of equality means that income is not pooled for these expenditures and household members do not insure one another for expenditure on these
goods.
These results are salient as they suggest households pool income for important
expenditures: food, clothing, education, and healthcare. The expenditures for which
I reject equality are for non-essential, and to some extent luxury, goods. Cigarettes
and alcohol as well as recreation are clearly luxury goods. Further, though some
maintenance on a residential property is an essential good, other housing and utilities
are less essential. Utilities remain a luxury for many rural households in Malawi. As
a result, this essential expenditure also includes a component of luxury. Although I
cannot conclude that households fully pool income and completely insure one another
against variations in income, evidence suggests some degree of strategic income pooling behavior with respect to particular types of expenditure. This suggests a type of
partial insurance for households that experience short term rainfall variations.
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These results are important as they empirically demonstrate the value of including
joint relationships in analyses of household behavior. They further call into question
the results of conclusions reached in previous studies, which fail to include joint
relationships. The implications of this study diﬀer from those of previous work,
which do not ﬁnd evidence of strategic resource pooling. Future analysis of gender
in the household will need to examine joint relationships in order to make better
informed policy recommendations, which better reﬂect the actual lived experiences
of rural households in developing countries.

2.4.3 Robustness Checks

2.4.3.1 Aggregation by Types of Goods

The results reported above suggest diﬀerences in income pooling behavior by types
of goods. In order to verify that this ﬁnding is not an artifact of individual expenditure measurement, I categorize consumption goods as either: essential goods or luxury
goods. I perform the same test as in section 2.4.2, but solely consider consumption
goods as either luxury or essential. I deﬁne essential goods as food, clothing, education, and healthcare expenditures, and deﬁne luxury goods as cigarettes, alcohol,
and recreation. As mentioned above, although housing and utilities have aspects of
essential goods, the measure also has traits of luxury goods. Thus, I consider two
additional speciﬁcations, wherein 1) housing and utilities is included as a component
of essential goods and 2) as a component of luxury goods. These results are reported
in Table 2.6.28

28

First stage rainfall results are not reported as they are the same as in Panel 2 in Table 2.4.

Table 2.6. Restricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests: Log of Pooled Consumption Aggregates - Male, Female, and Joint
(1)
Aggregate
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income

(3)
Luxury Goods

(4)
Necessary, with Maintenance

(5)
Luxury, with Maintenance

−0.022
(0.073)
0.096∗∗
(0.039)
0.012
(0.068)

−0.254
(0.348)
0.391∗∗
(0.185)
−0.139
(0.328)

−0.522
(0.592)
0.591∗
(0.315)
−0.001
(0.558)

−0.115
(0.297)
0.252
(0.158)
−0.035
(0.279)

−0.235
(0.386)
−0.183
(0.205)
0.135
(0.363)

0.037

5.53
(0.137)
0.015

10.18∗∗
(0.017)
0.027

2.29
(0.515)
0.010

7.57∗
(0.059)
0.027

Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

(2)
Necessary Goods

Note: The table presents coeﬃcients of the diﬀerence in log consumption of each item on the diﬀerence in predicted log income, as obtained from Table 2.4. Standard
errors are given in parentheses. Regressions include agro-ecological zone indicators. Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,
∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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These results indicate that my conclusions from section 2.4.2 are robust to this
alternative speciﬁcation. Regardless of whether essential goods include housing and
utilities, I fail to reject equality for the case of essential goods. Conversely, regardless
of whether luxury goods include housing and utilities, I reject equality for the case
of luxury goods. This conﬁrms that there is strategic income pooling occurs broadly
across types of expenditures.

2.4.3.2 Matriarchies and Female-Headed Households

Next I examine the possibility that there are behavioral diﬀerences driven by
societal characteristics As suggested by Walther (2016), there may be disparities in
cooperative decision making behavior in Malawi, depending on women’s status in the
household. Speciﬁcally, those residing in matrilineal societies may exhibit diﬀerent
behavior, due to women’s relatively strong bargaining power in these communities.
In order to explore this, I reanalyze the data considering whether the community
reports being matrilineal. The survey includes a question: “Do individuals in this
community trace their descent through their father, their mother, or are both kinds
of decent traced?” Communities which respond “their mother” are deemed to be
matrilineal.29
I focus my discussion on the restricted results, presented in Table 2.7.30 The
ﬁrst panel in the table reports non-matrilineal societies. In this case, I fail to reject
equality for food, clothing, recreation, and healthcare expenditure. I reject equality
for the case of cigarettes and alcohol, education, and housing and utilities. These
results are broadly similar to the pooled results shown in Panel 2 of Table 2.5. The
second panel presents results for matrilineal communities. In this case, I fail to reject
29

Less than 10 percent of respondents indicated “both” and so these communities were grouped with
those communities which trace lineage from their father. This entire group is simply classiﬁed as
“non-matrilineal”.
30
I report ﬁrst stage results in Table A.2, found in the Appendix.
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equality for all types of goods. I conclude that households in matrilineal societies
pool income and completely insure one another against income variations.
It may be the case, however, that the diﬀerence in matrilineal societies is unrelated
to social structure, but instead simply reﬂects diﬀerences in household headship: in
matrilineal societies there are more female-headed households. To test this, I also
report results for male- and female-headed households. Restricted results are reported
in Table 2.8.31 The ﬁrst panel shows male-headed households and the second panel
shows female-headed households. In both cases, I fail to reject equality in most cases,
except for education and housing and utilities for male-headed households and for
housing and utilities for female-headed households. As female-headed households are
ultimately not diﬀerent than male-headed households with respect to broad income
pooling behavior I conclude that it is not simply female household headship, but a
societal diﬀerence, which results in my observation of complete income pooling for
households in matrilineal communities.
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First stage results are reported in Table A.3, found in the Appendix.

Table 2.7. Restricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests: Log of Consumption - Matrilineal
(1)
Aggregate

(2)
Food

(3)
Cigarettes and Alcohol

(4)
Clothing

(5)
Recreation

0.143
(0.792)
−0.215
(0.625)
0.176
(0.640)

−0.629
(0.510)
0.150
(0.402)
−0.351
(0.412)

0.59
(0.900)
0.011

1.78
(0.620)
0.014

(6)
Education

(7)
Health

(8)
Housing and Utilities

Panel 1: Non-Matrilineal
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income

−0.028
(0.083)
0.185∗∗∗
(0.065)
−0.028
(0.067)

Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.063
(0.094)
0.191∗∗
(0.074)
0.033
(0.076)

−1.032
(0.795)
1.369∗∗
(0.627)
−0.551
(0.643)
13.01∗∗∗
(0.005)
0.015

0.034

4.32
(0.229)
0.032

−0.087
(0.059)
−0.003
(0.046)
−0.078
(0.063)

−0.134∗
(0.068)
−0.003
(0.054)
−0.128∗
(0.074)

−0.613
(0.655)
−0.179
(0.513)
−0.466
(0.706)

−0.692
(0.559)
−0.295
(0.438)
−0.977
(0.603)

0.058

3.71
(0.295)
0.077

1.02
(0.795)
0.020

3.58
(0.311)
0.052

1.224∗∗∗
(0.408)
0.523
(0.322)
0.981∗∗∗
(0.330)
10.91∗∗
(0.012)
0.025

−0.363
(0.735)
−0.584
(0.580)
−0.075
(0.594)
2.12
(0.547)
0.041

−0.228∗∗
(0.103)
−0.092
(0.081)
−0.076
(0.083)
11.31∗∗∗
(0.010)
0.016

Panel 2: Matrilineal
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income
Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.182
(0.340)
0.240
(0.266)
0.421
(0.366)
3.83
(0.281)
0.092

0.396
(0.345)
0.388
(0.270)
0.509
(0.372)
3.07
(0.380)
0.101

0.085
(0.547)
0.084
(0.429)
0.066
(0.590)
0.13
(0.987)
0.076

−0.069
(0.076)
−0.079
(0.060)
−0.082
(0.082)
3.16
(0.368)
0.076

Note: The table presents coeﬃcients of the diﬀerence in log consumption of each item on the diﬀerence in predicted log income, as obtained from Table A.2. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Regressions include agro-ecological zone indicators. Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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Table 2.8. Restricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests: Log of Consumption - Female-Headed
(1)
Aggregate

(2)
Food

(3)
Cigarettes and Alcohol

(4)
Clothing

(5)
Recreation

−0.927
(0.793)
0.235
(0.457)
−0.491
(0.756)

−0.021
(0.698)
0.134
(0.402)
−0.303
(0.665)

0.124
(0.441)
−0.022
(0.254)
0.393
(0.421)

0.034

2.10
(0.552)
0.032

4.31
(0.230)
0.015

2.41
(0.544)
0.011

3.59
(0.309)
0.014

−0.060
(0.088)
−0.016
(0.059)
−0.024
(0.095)

−0.171∗
(0.102)
−0.055
(0.068)
−0.130
(0.111)

0.783
(1.011)
−0.039
(0.677)
0.916
(1.096)

0.058

4.23
(0.238)
0.077

1.40
(0.705)
0.020

(6)
Education

(7)
Health

(8)
Housing and Utilities

Panel 1: Male-Headed
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income

0.044
(0.075)
0.116∗∗∗
(0.043)
0.062
(0.072)

Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.059
(0.087)
0.139∗∗∗
(0.050)
0.055
(0.083)

−0.316
(0.669)
−0.325
(0.385)
0.016
(0.638)

−0.008
(0.093)
−0.034
(0.054)
0.058
(0.089)

7.20∗
(0.066)
0.025

2.81
(0.422)
0.041

8.67∗∗
(0.034)
0.016

0.183
(0.498)
−0.121
(0.333)
−0.025
(0.540)

1.160
(0.915)
−0.352
(0.613)
1.140
(0.993)

1.91
(0.591)
0.101

3.81
(0.283)
0.076

0.560
(0.417)
0.723∗∗∗
(0.240)
0.514
(0.398)

Panel 2: Female-Headed
Predicted change in male income
Predicted change in female income
Predicted change in joint income
Overidentiﬁcation Wald-Test
R2

0.280
(0.994)
0.790
(0.666)
0.313
(1.078)
1.91
(0.592)
0.052

0.630
(0.588)
0.160
(0.394)
0.644
(0.638)
1.99
(0.574)
0.092

0.270∗∗
(0.135)
0.029
(0.090)
0.217
(0.146)
7.16∗
(0.067)
0.076

Note: The table presents coeﬃcients of the diﬀerence in log consumption of each item on the diﬀerence in predicted log income, as obtained from Table A.3. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Regressions include agro-ecological zone indicators. Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01).
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These results have important implications. First, the non-matrilineal results parallel the results which include joint income, with the entire sample. This suggests
that the dominant cultural behaviors in rural Malawi are in line with patriarchal societies, which result in incomplete income pooling and thus, at best, partial insurance
for households. Second, the results show that matrilineal societies pool income and
completely insure one another. This suggests that some elements of women’s status
and their ability to negotiate and bargain within the household is crucial in order to
ensure complete income pooling.

2.4.4 Prices and Price Stability
As referenced in the theoretical and empirical models (sections 2.3 and 2.3.2),
a strong assumption is implicit the model: that consumption is only impacted by
rainfall. Implicit in this is the assumption that consumption is not impacted by
prices. In this section, I brieﬂy explore this assumption, by considering some of the
relevant literature which supports this assumption.32
Several studies from Southern Africa have explored price stability, particularly
of maize, to various shifts which might otherwise be expected to change prices of
maize. Some research from this literature includes Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2013), which
considers the impact of fertilizer subsidy programs on maize price stability in Zambia
and Malawi, ﬁnding that even subsidy doubling results in only small price changes.
Some conclusions of the Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2013) study are supported by Denning
et al. (2009) which ﬁnds that input subsidies, and maize surpluses, have helped to
improve price stability in Malawi. Some additional work in this area highlights the
importance of regional considerations33 : Tostao and Brorsen (2005) determine that
32

While in earlier versions of this paper, an econometric test of this assumption was also included,
it is omitted in later versions. Ultimately, the author decided that the price data available, at the
community level, at which the test was conducted, was too thin, and that goods were not tied closely
enough to the relevant categories and classiﬁcations considered in the main empirical analysis of this
paper. For this reason, these tests are omitted from this version of the paper.
33
As measured in my analysis through regional controls.
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due to market bifurcation and spatial ineﬃciencies, within particular regions, it is not
possible to arbitrage maize, related to price stability.
Of course, eﬀorts have been made throughout Southern Africa to stabilize prices.
As Jayne et al. (2006) observe, price stability has been a objective of governments
across the continent for decades. Eﬀorts towards coordination, transparency, and
consultation between stakeholders has improved levels of price stability in recent
years. Some of this has come from the compiling of strategic grain reserves. Mason
and Myers (2013) discuss the program in Zambia used to stabilize maize prices in the
region. While the interest of the paper is in welfare eﬀects related to price stability,
one of the essential assumptions of the paper is the stability of prices throughout the
region.
This body of literature supports the assumption that consumption is only impacted by rainfall. While still a strong assumption it seems reasonable. In an environment in which prices, particularly those for staple crops, are stable, it is unlikely
that other factors drive changes in consumption.

2.5 Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this study I revisit the role of income earned by men and women in intrahousehold resource allocation. Using data from Malawi, I replicate previous results
which show that members fail to insure household expenditures after exogenous rainfall variation causes short term changes in income. However, when I account for jointly
earned income, which constitutes a signiﬁcant portion of total income in Southern
Africa, I ﬁnd evidence of strategic income pooling and partial insurance. Households
members partially insure one another for expenditure on essential goods, including
food, clothing, education, and healthcare, though they do not insure one another for
luxury goods, including cigarettes and alcohol, recreation, and housing and utilities.
The diﬀerences between speciﬁcations with and without jointly earned income clearly
indicate that failure to account for joint income biases results. My results suggest
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that previous studies which omitted jointly earned income have ignore the important
dynamic of shared work in household analyses.
The conclusions of this study have implications for a variety of policies relevant
across Sub-Saharan Africa. In particular, the results of this study support the growing body of literature on women’s status in the household and their ability to bargain
and negotiate in the developing world. Households in matrilineal communities fully
pool income and insure one another against short term, exogenous rainfall variations. Women in these communities typically have greater negotiations and bargaining power in their households, which likely drives this diﬀerence in behavior. Although
I can draw no deﬁnitive conclusions, it may be the case that as women’s bargaining
power increases in households over time, income pooling and complete insurance may
be observed in more households.34
The results presented here are important for future studies of gender in developing countries. It is imperative to include jointly earned income to obtain a complete
and realistic picture of the circumstances faced by rural households in the developing world. Inclusion of joint income in studies of intra-household behavior may have
broad consequences for the study of household behavior and development policy. In
the future, analysis of the role of gender in the household should include joint relationships, in order to make better policy recommendations, based on actual household
behavior in the developing world. Overall, the conclusions of this study support the
idea that households respond to changes in the environment in ways that do not correspond to the predictions of simple household collective models. To understand the
impact of these changes, it is necessary to consider the entire household: accounting
for individual and joint decision makers.

34

It is an objective in future versions of this work to include household bargaining dynamics when
the bargaining powers between individuals are not considered to be equal.

37

CHAPTER 3. DROUGHT RESISTANT CROPS AND RAINFALL
VARIABILITY: A STUDY ON THE INFLUENCES OF SORGHUM CROP
TRAITS AND SMALLHOLDER FARMER PREFERENCES

3.1 Introduction
2016 brought severe, El Nie
no driven drought to Southern Africa. Although climate change has increased weather variability throughout the region in recent years
(Fauchereau et al., 2003), the 2015-2016 growing season was characterized by an acute
shortage of rain. The drought resulted in widespread crop failure and the deaths of
hundreds of thousands of livestock (Anyadike, 2017; WFP, nd). Throughout the region, droughts are increasingly common (Dai, 2013; USAID, 2016) and in order to
ensure food security and reduce poverty, it has become imperative to improve the
resilience of farmers to such shocks to agricultural production. One policy has been
the promotion of drought resistant, native crops, such as cowpea, yam, millet, and
sorghum. By introducing improved, high-yielding varieties of these indigenous crops,
policymakers hope that farmers will shift their cropping behavior away from more water intensive crops, like maize. Whether farmers have embraced new varieties remains
a question.
In fact, at a time when climate and agricultural policy encourage growth of drought
resistant crops, farmers in Southern Africa seem to be doing just the opposite: allocating large areas of land to maize. Though in semi-arid environments, sorghum has
long been an essential crop, cultivated by millions of farmers, it has recently fallen
out of favor. In traditional, low-input systems, it is grown with the dual purpose
of feeding both humans and livestock. Sorghum is well suited to hot and dry areas,
where production of other crops may be diﬃcult (Blum and Ebercon, 1975; Stout and
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Simpson, 1978; Blum et al., 1989; Blum, 2005). However, despite the crop’s ability to
withstand adverse weather conditions, smallholder farming households in Southern
Africa allocate relatively little area to it (Armah et al., 2010; Orr et al., 2016).
This presents a paradox: why are more households not growing drought resistant
crops, such as sorghum? While previous literature has explored market and risk
based explanations (Jansen et al., 1990; Adesina and Baidu-Forson, 1997; Mulatu
and Belete, 2001; Monyo et al., 2002; Wubeneh and Sanders, 2006; Cavatassi et al.,
2011), household consumption preferences and crop production traits have largely
been omitted from the conversation. In this paper, I explore how farmer behavior and
preferences drive allocation of land to sorghum and maize. In doing so, I modify my
question of interest from a general query of adoption to one of preferences, speciﬁcally:
how do household preferences as well as perceived and inherent crop traits impact
crop choice and area allocation decisions?
To explore this question, I expand a behavioral model developed by Useche et al.
(2009), which explicitly accounts for household’s own preferences and characteristics,
as well as the perceived and inherent traits of crops. The model allows me to consider
how these factors inﬂuence household decisions and choices, with respect to crop
area allocation. I use data from Zimbabwe, where allocation of land to sorghum
has remained low, despite eﬀorts to promote the crop. Using household panel data
collected in 2005 and 2013, I consider how preferences and traits drive both the choice
to grow sorghum and the subsequent choice of how much area to allocate to sorghum.
As a comparison, I also consider maize, the preferred staple crop of most households.
I ﬁnd that farmers who grow sorghum do so due to a preference to consume it.
Dominating my results is the conclusion that the desire to consume a food increases
the probability of growing, and the area grown to, it. Conversely, only minor support
is given to the importance of inherent crop traits, in particular drought resistance.
However, there is some evidence to support for using sorghum as a drought resistance
crop for households of average (not poor, nor rich) wealth. This is only evident for
a narrow band of experienced rainfall, for those of moderate wealth, though. Ulti-
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mately, allocating labor to oﬀ-farm activities emerges as an essential coping strategy
for households, providing income to purchase food, as well as a possible safety net,
should shocks be experienced by the household. Taken together, the results highlight
the importance of preferences, for food and labor, speciﬁcally, in determining crop
cultivation.
My results are driven by the explicit consideration of preferences and traits in
my model. Rather than relying on market explanations, such as availability of local
markets or ﬂuctuations of regional prices, I consider the observed behavior of farmers, based on their demonstrated and stated preferences, as well as their reactions
to inherent and perceived crop traits. In the context of Zimbabwe, where markets
are largely absent and price signals are inaccurate and highly variable, preferences
are likely to dominate behavior. I delve further into these ﬁndings, by examining
disparities in levels of oﬀ-farm labor participation and wealth. These analyses follow
Sesmaro et al. (nd) and Dercon and Christiaensen (2011), each of which consider
diﬀerences in technology adoption by wealth and livestock holdings, respectively.
My identiﬁcation strategy relies on a missing market context, on which an explicit
consideration of farmer preferences and crop traits is built, based on demonstrated
and stated preferences, as well as inherent and perceived crop traits. Using these
characteristics as variables in my analysis, I employ a double hurdle (DH) model
using a Mundlak-Chamberlain device. Doing so allows me to address concerns of heterogeneity and corner solutions in dependent variables, while modeling the behavior
of farmers when making decisions to grow to sorghum and maize.
This paper contributes to existing literature by building the link between behavioral economics and the economics of crop choice and crop adoption. Few studies have
yet to account for explicit preferences and traits in crop allocation decisions. While
some previous research considers adoption of hybrid, open pollinated, and traditional
varieties of speciﬁc crops and technologies (Edmeades et al., 2004; Edmeades and
Smale, 2006; Useche et al., 2009; Mzoughi, 2011), this approach has not been applied
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to multiple crops, in the presence of missing markets.1 I seek to contribute to these
bodies of literature by explicitly accounting for preferences and traits in the context
of multiple crop choice decisions.
By explaining why the uptake of drought resistant crops remains low through the
use of preferences and crop traits, I contribute both to the academic literature on
household behavior, as well as to the policy conversations focused on increasing food
security throughout the developing world. To the academic literature, I contribute a
new emphasis on the importance of farmer preferences and characteristics, as well as
inherent and perceived crops traits, on farmer behavior and crop choice in the developing world. Moving forward, explicit consideration of these factors should be included
in studies of household decision making and studies of crop choice behavior. To the
policy conversation, I contribute an explanation of alternative coping strategies, such
as oﬀ-farm labor, but also suggest a possible mechanism which might increase sorghum
growth in Southern Africa. In particular, re-breeding and re-branding sorghum will be
essential for its successful and widespread adoption in Zimbabwe. Although previous
strategies are sometimes perceived to have been unsuccessful, by readjusting methods
to emphasize preferences, there is the potential to both increase native crop adoption
and to improve food security outcomes. An evolution is needed in the conversation
about sorghum and the beginning of that discussion should be surrounding individual
and household preferences for crops, related particularly to taste and labor.

1

There is, of course, an extensive literature in a similar vein which considers adoption of maize
hybrids, compared with traditional varieties. A selection of literature in this area includes: Smale
et al. (1994), Heisey and Leathers (1995), Soleri and Cleveland (2001), Hintze et al. (2003), Feleke
and Zegeye (2006).
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3.2 Background and Literature Review

3.2.1 Sorghum in Sub-Saharan Africa
In semi-arid environments, sorghum is a traditional crop and has been cultivated
by generations of smallholder farmers. It is drought resistant and thus is ideal for
cultivation in hot and dry areas, where production of other crops may be diﬃcult.
Additionally, sorghum is also tolerant to soaking and extended periods of water exposure, which is particularly beneﬁcial in environments characterized by variable rainfall
patterns. Many new varieties of sorghum are early maturing and can succeed in a
wide planting window (Smelt, 2016). As Southern Africa becomes increasingly arid,
the potential value of these crops for mitigating food shortages and ensuring food
security has risen at the same time.
There is a varied literature on sorghum, though much of it is focused in semi-arid
areas and considers general analyses of adoption pathways. Wubeneh and Sanders
(2006) ﬁnd evidence of the importance of higher grain and biomass yields for sorghum
with Striga resistance in Ethiopia. Mulatu and Belete (2001) ﬁnd that improved access to farmers’ preferred sorghum varieties would result in more rapid diﬀusion,
through farmer-to-farmer seed exchanges. Cavatassi et al. (2011) ﬁnd that farmers
in Ethiopia use modern varieties of sorghum to mitigate moderate risks, while those
exposed to more severe weather events fail to adopt. Other relevant work compares
adoption of various types of cereals: Adesina and Baidu-Forson (1997) examine diﬀerential adoption for sorghum and rice in Burkina Faso and Guinea.2 Though these are
just a few samples, the conclusions from this body of work suggest that despite the
agronomic advantages of sorghum and its historic prevalence throughout semi-arid
environments, there may be other concerns that impact its adoption.
Turning to the speciﬁc case of Zimbabwe, broad evidence shows that land area
allocated to sorghum has been on the decline (Orr et al., 2016). In times of rainfall
2

This study is among the ﬁrst that ﬁnds support for inclusion of taste preferences in adoption studies.
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stress, yields of sorghum remain stable, relative to maize. Thus, it has been considered
a food security crop, which can ensure adequate food supply should households be
exposed to a shock resulting in a crop failure. Therefore, traditionally, total area
planted to sorghum was determined by the maize harvest of the previous year. If
maize failed in a particular year, households would consume their stock of sorghum
and in the following season would plant more sorghum to build their reserves for
consumption during a future shock. This custom has fallen out of both favor and
practice, with area allocated to sorghum steadily declining since the early 1980s (Orr
et al., 2016). Though the proximate causes are unclear, farmers are growing more
maize and less sorghum at a time when the climate and agricultural policy are telling
them to do the opposite.
Gender dynamics and labor preferences both play important roles in household
cropping decisions in Zimbabwe. This is particularly true for sorghum, which has
intensive labor requirements, which often result in an increased labor burden on
women. First, in the ﬁeld, sorghum is susceptible to losses from birds, as it does
not have an exterior husk, and therefore birds can simply eat the grain oﬀ the head,
if it is left unprotected in the ﬁeld. To combat these losses, a household member
must stand in the ﬁeld to scare away birds. This role is typically assigned to women
and children. Next, after harvest, before it can be eaten, sorghum has additional
processing requirements. In much of Southern Africa, the staple food is a grain
porridge called sadza.3 In order to create the porridge, milling or pounding of the
cereal is required, which is typically “women’s work.”4 While mechanization has eased
labor requirements for processing maize, the same has not happened for sorghum,
which still requires hand pounding. As a result, when possible, it may be that women
replace sorghum with maize, as a way to ease their labor burden, demonstrating a
preference for less labor intensive crops, like maize. This is one possible explanation
3

The grain porridge is alternatively known as nzima, pap, or ugali in other parts of the continent.
Much of labor for staple grain crops in Sub-Saharan Africa is considered to be “women’s work”
although this is strongly true for the case of sorghum in Zimbabwe. Women report moving away
from the crop, as much as possible, due to the increased labor requirements (Orr et al., 2016).
4
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for declining sorghum area. This is counterbalanced, however, with the traditional
arrangement in which households heads, usually men, are responsible for feeding the
household in times of drought or other diﬃculty (Orr et al., 2016). Thus men may
continue to grow sorghum as part of the household’s maize based farming system,
in order to ensure a minimum level of food security balancing out women’s general
aversion to the crop.5 However, households headed by women provide some disparity
from the behavior of women in households headed by men: those households headed
by women may practice food insecurity mitigation, by always allocating some amount
of area to sorghum.

3.2.2 Taste Preferences
Food preferences are crucial in determining crop choice, particularly in environments with thin or missing markets. Under these circumstances households must eat
instead of sell whatever crops they produce on-farm (Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry
et al., 1991; Fafchamps, 1992). Thus, households are assumed to grow what they like
to eat, from the set of crops which are feasible to produce in their area.
Food preferences are formed in early childhood and are often considered to be
set by adulthood (Birch, 1999). Although this may have consequences for long-term
health and food security (Pitt, 1983; Drewnowski et al., 1992; Drewnowski, 1997;
Birch, 1999), humans, broadly, tend to consume what they like to eat. For this reason, in this paper I consider each household to have a determined food preference,
which is demonstrated as their own trait preference for a particular crop. In the
absence of markets which may expose household members to new tastes or foods, the
consumption preferences of a household are likely to be nearly ﬁxed over time, previously determined by the childhood and youth consumption habits of older household
members.6
5

Men may also prefer to grow sorghum in order to produce sorghum beer.
This also has the eﬀect of setting the preferences of younger households members, so that food
preferences are perpetuated across families, over time.
6
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As evinced by the dominance of maize throughout Zimbabwe and Southern Africa,
it is the primary cereal grain preferred by most households. This is not only due to
taste, but also color. Sorghum produces a muddy colored porridge which is considered
to be lower quality and less desirable than the pure white porridge produced by maize.
This has contributed to sorghum’s reputation as a “poor man’s crop” or inferior good,
for which demand falls as income rises.7 Additionally, there may also be perceived
traits of maize which increase preference for maize, due to the crop’s association
with modernity and wealth. Thus, due to the preference to consume maize, most
households will allocate a large share of their available land area to maize. Conversely,
if a household has a preference for sorghum, it is likely that it will allocate more area
to the crop.

3.3 Theoretical Model

3.3.1 Model of Crop Traits and Producer Heterogeneity
Characteristics-based approaches have been widely used in various areas of economics (Muellbauer, 1974; Rosen, 1974; Gorman, 1980; Berry et al., 2004). These
applications are centered around a concept predominant in applied microeconomics:
individuals have preferences over the traits of goods, rather than the goods themselves. Applications of explicit preferences in a developing country context, however,
are more limited, and generally applied to preferences for technological traits (Useche
et al., 2009).8 I extend an existing model developed by Useche et al. (2009) for the
case of multiple crop types, in order to investigate how farmer preferences and charac7

The belief that sorghum is a “poor man’s crop” has exacerbated, as in times of crisis, sorghum has
often been distributed as food aid. This tradition has had the eﬀect of perpetuating the belief that
sorghum is only consumed by the poor.
8
Much of the development literature implicitly assumes that a household’s preferences, in particular
taste, will determine production, particularly in the context of missing markets (Singh et al., 1986;
de Janvry et al., 1991; Fafchamps, 1992).
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teristics, as well as inherent crop traits, drive farmers’ crop choice. My model extends
the application to the case of speciﬁc subsets of crop traits as well as to multiple crops.
The explicit consideration of the demand for traits requires a utility framework
which includes the farmers’ values of traits and how they are weighed, relative to
one another, in the perceptions of an individual farmer. The framework should also
be structured to accommodate farmer heterogeneity in a way that is consistent with
actual decision making behavior.9 Further, given the context of Zimbabwe, I assume
an environment with thin or missing markets in which household must eat instead of
sell whatever crops they produce on-farm (Singh et al., 1986; de Janvry et al., 1991;
Fafchamps, 1992).
I assume that farmers maximize their utility Vi by determining the utility provided
by a series of diﬀerent crops. The requirement for farmer to choose any crop j, over
6 j. Or, equivalently: ΔVij = Vij −Vik >
an alternative crop k, is that Vij > Vik , ∀ k =
0,

∀k=
6 j.
The indirect utility of an alternative crop is a linear function of its traits xij , such

that it can be expressed as:

Vij = βi xij .

(3.1)

This can be decomposed into inherent and perceived crops traits:

Vij = βi (xijh + xijp ) = βi

X

xij ,

(3.2)

where xijh represents inherent crop traits, such as drought resistance and presence of
an exterior husk, and xijp represents perceived crop traits, such as color.
Equations (3.1) and (3.2) imply the behavioral model:

ΔVik = βi
9

X

Δxij ,

(3.3)

Behavioral economists have shown that individuals make spending decisions from reference points
(Camerer, 1999). Although planting decisions and spending decisions are not perfect corollaries, I
can assume that a similar behavior is practiced in decisions to allocate land to particular crops.
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in which farmer select crops for which ΔVik > 0 and βi is a vector of preference
parameters. Equation (3.3) suggests that choices are driven by diﬀerences in traits
across crops and individual preferences, rather than by the absolute level of utility.
This implies that any individual-speciﬁc observable or unobservable elements, that
are constant across crops, and which enter the indirect utility in an additive manner,
will not impact a farmer’s choice.
Heterogeneity in farmer preferences suggests that the vector of preference parameters (βi ) can vary over individuals, according to observable (zi ) and unobservable
(ξi ) traits, of both farm and farmer. That is, preferences will depend on these traits:

βi = b + ψz1i + φξi .

(3.4)

This can be further decomposed as observed traits can be both stated (zs ), such as a
taste preference, as well demonstrated (zd ), such as labor preferences through oﬀ-farm
labor market participation and on-farm labor allocation. I write this:

βi = b + ψs z1is + +ψd z1id + φξi .

(3.5)

Perceived and intrinsic traits (xijh and xijp ), as well as preferences by farmers for a
speciﬁc crop j, can impact crop choices, if there is a distinct impact on the utility of
each of the alternative crops. That is, if some of the zi is such that:
X
xij ) + γj z2i ,
Vij = βi (

(3.6)

or:

ΔVij = βi

X

∗
Δxij + γjk
z2i ,

(3.7)

where:

∗
γjk
= γj − γk .

(3.8)
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Substituting equation (3.5) into equation (3.7) and equation (3.8) gives:

ΔVik = (b + ψs z1is + +ψd z1id + φξi )

X

∗
Δxjk + γjk
z2i .

(3.9)

This equation is a behavioral model for farmer crop choice, as a function of traits xijh
and xijp (which can vary across individuals i and across crops j) and given farmer’s
own trait preferences βi and the intrinsic preferences for a speciﬁc alternative γj , as
well as own farm and farmer traits zi . This can be written:
Vi = max Vij (xij | βi , zi , γi )
j

(3.10)
∀ i = 1, ..., I

j = 1, ..., J.

One beneﬁt of the model presented in equation (3.10) is that it is more ﬂexible than
traditional models, as it accounts for individual preferences.

3.3.2 Comparative Statics and Trait Valuation
To see how various traits inﬂuence utility take the ﬁrst order conditions from
equation 3.9, with respect to xij .10 This yields:
∂V
= (b + ψs z1is + +ψd z1id + φξi ) = βi .
∂x

(3.11)

This suggests, rather intuitively, that there is a positive relationship between preferences, utility, and traits. However, this reveals little about how a farmer’s valuation of
a particular trait will inﬂuence utility. Instead, I can investigate this idea by considering valuation for speciﬁc crop traits, using shadow prices for particular characteristics.
Any valuation of a trait by a farmer is likely to include both pecuniary and nonpecuniary elements. The relative eﬀects of these components will inﬂuence utility
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Piggott and Marra, 2008). Further, a farmer’s valua10

I present a general case, as both xijh and xijp yield the same general result.
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tion will also vary based on the degree to which the household participates in various
markets (e.g. staple crop, labor).
Following Useche et al. (2009), the trait based model can be used to estimate the
shadow price of a particular trait, which is deﬁned as its marginal utility, normalized
by the marginal utility of expenditure. To see this, I separate the shadow price (ρj )
from the other traits (xij ) in the utility expression.11 Obtaining:

V = αρ + βx + γz2 ,

(3.12)

where α represents the marginal utility of expenditure and β represents the preference
for a speciﬁc trait or set of speciﬁc traits. Taking the total diﬀerential yields:

dV = αdρ + βdx.

(3.13)

By evaluating the expression at a constant utility (dV = 0), I can express the shadow
price:
dp
β
=−
dx
α

(3.14)

This equation demonstrates the shift of a farmer’s shadow valuation for a single unit
change in the level of a trait, which otherwise leaves utility unchanged.
For simplicity, I assume that the preference trait coeﬃcient (β) will be equal to
one if there is no shadow eﬀect of traits on utility valuation. Therefore, when the
trait/price coeﬃcient ratio is greater than one, there is a positive shadow eﬀect for
that particular trait on utility. Similarly, when the trait/price coeﬃcient ratio is
smaller than one, negative shadow eﬀects are indicated.
It is useful to think of the price considered in the trait/price coeﬃcient as a linear
combination of the underlying shadow prices of each individual trait. Following this
idea, I can express, for M diﬀerent traits:
11

Following Useche et al. (2009), I omit individual- and variety-speciﬁc subscripts for simplicity.
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dp = (

β1
β2
βM
)dx1 + ( )dx2 + ... + (
)dxM .
α
α
α

(3.15)

If the valuation of a farmer or a household for a particular linear combination of traits
is insuﬃciently high, then a farmer or a household is unlikely to allocate area to the
particular crop associated with that linear combination of traits. Conversely, if the
combination of traits is suﬃciently high, then a farmer or a household is likely to allocate at least some area to the particular crop associated with that linear combination
of traits.

3.4 Empirical Estimation
My equation for estimation follows from equation (3.10), but is rewritten in a
reduced form as:

Yij = xijh αh + xijp αp + βi δ + γi µ + zis ψs + zid ψd + 

(3.16)

where Yij is a continuous variable of the share of area allocated by household i to crop
j. The remaining variables are as previously deﬁned: xijh represents inherent crop
traits, with αh as a corresponding parameter; xijp represents perceived crop traits,
with αp as a corresponding parameter; βi represents farmer trait preferences, with δ
as a corresponding parameter; γi represents intrinsic preferences for a speciﬁc variety,
with µ; zis represents stated farmer and farm characteristics, with ψs as a corresponding parameter; and zid represents demonstrated farmer and farm characteristics, with
ψd as a corresponding parameter. Finally,  is a compound error term, which is composed of unobserved time-invariant factors (ci ) and unobserved time-variant shocks
(νit ). This can be written:

it = ci + νit

(3.17)
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Estimation of equation (3.16) is complicated by several econometric issues which make
causal identiﬁcation diﬃcult. These include problems of unobserved heterogeneity
and a corner solution in the dependent variable. I address these issues using a doublehurdle model with a Mundlak-Chamberlain device.

3.4.1 Unobserved heterogeneity
As stated in my theoretical model, heterogeneity is crucial to consider in my estimation procedure. The unobserved eﬀect ci arises due to household heterogeneity
among unobserved factors which inﬂuence the decision to grow sorghum. Some households are simply more likely to grow sorghum than others for reasons not known to
the observer: this unobserved heterogeneity may create biased coeﬃcient estimates.
If I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time and not related to any of the other covariates (strict exogeneity), I can write the composite error
term as in equation (3.17) and estimate the regression using a random eﬀects model.
However, this a strong assumption, as there is no assurance that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the other covariates. To adjust for this, a ﬁxed eﬀects
model allows correlation between ci and other household variables, but application to
these data is hampered by the large number of households that do not grow sorghum.
Thus, as in Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011), Bezu et al. (2014), and Verkaat et al. (2017),
the data take on properties of a non-linear corner solution. To avoid problems of
incidental parameters which may be introduced with a ﬁxed eﬀects model, I use a
Mundlak-Chamberlain device (M-C device), ﬁrst developed by Mundlak (1978) and
Chamberlain (1984).
The M-C device estimator is based on the assumption that the unobserved heterogeneity can be approximated as:

ci = ω + z¯i λ + ui .

(3.18)

where z¯i is the time average of farmer and farm level characteristics, and where
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λ|zit ∼ N (O, σit2 ).

(3.19)

Thus, inclusion of z¯i addresses potential correlation between the history of explanatory variables and the random household eﬀects and should also control for possible
correlation between covariates in the model and time constant unobserved heterogeneity, which may bias my coeﬃcient estimates.12
The additional beneﬁt of the M-C device estimator is that it does not remove
time-constant covariates from the model, unlike a ﬁxed-eﬀects speciﬁcation. As some
of my variables of interest do not vary over time, the M-C device estimator allows me
to include these variables in the regressions.

3.4.2 Corner solution in dependent variable
A second estimation issue arises because my dependent variable is often a corner
solution. In the overall sample, 47 percent of households grow no sorghum. Even if I
were to simply restrict my sample to sorghum growing households, I would still face
a censored dependent variable, as my other variable of interest is the share of area
allocated to sorghum, which is censored at 0 and 1. The prevalence of households
which choose to exclude sorghum from their crop portfolio means my model can be
expressed as a non-linear corner solution:

Yij = max {0, xijh αh + xijp αp + βi δ + γi µ + zis ψs + zid ψd + }

(3.20)

This speciﬁcation allows for the decision to not grow sorghum to be optimal for some
households. As the observations of zero sorghum growth represent a choice to not
grow sorghum, and not a missing value resulting from truncation, the Tobit estimator
12

This is a stronger assumption than used in ﬁxed eﬀects, as equation (3.18) and (3.19) specify the
correlation between ci and my time-variant household variables. However, it is a weaker assumption
than used in the random eﬀects model, which assumes no correlation (Wooldridge, 2010).
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could be used.13 However, the Tobit estimator implies that the decision to adopt and
the degree of adoption are determined by the same process. As this need not be
the case, I again follow Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2011), Bezu et al. (2014), and Verkaat
et al. (2017) in using a double-hurdle model. The double-hurdle model was initially
developed by Cragg (1971) and relaxes the restrictions of the Tobit estimator. The
decision to grow sorghum is the ﬁrst hurdle and is estimated with a probit regression
(0/1: does the household grow sorghum?). The degree or intensity of sorghum growth
is the second hurdle and is estimated with a truncated normal regression (what share
of household crop area is allocated to sorghum?). In each hurdle I include my variables
of interest, a set of controls, as well as year indicators.
This speciﬁcation also allows me to control for decision making, with respect to
reference points (Camerer, 1999). Instead of simply asking for allocation of area, I
account for the multiple decision elements which contribute to constitute the crop
choice decision, including both the initial decision to plant, as well as ﬁnal area
allocation. In the ﬁrst stage of the DH I consider the choice to grow sorghum while
in the second stage of the DH I consider the area allocated to sorghum.

3.5 Data

3.5.1 Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is a landlocked nation in Southern Africa, with a population, as of 2016,
of approximately 14.15 million people. The economy relies heavily on agriculture and
mining, with about 65 percent of the workforce employed in farming. Historically the
nation had been considered the “breadbasket of Africa” and produced suﬃcient food
to feed its population, as well as exporting tobacco, cotton, grains, and other crops.
13

I test this speciﬁcation and include the results in the Appendix in Table B.3. I also perform
an LR test to verify that the DH is more appropriate. For the sorghum speciﬁcation, I ﬁnd a χ2
value of 753.27 and a p-value of 0.000. For the maize speciﬁcation I ﬁnd a χ2 value of 152.56 and
a p-value of 0.000. These results verify that the DH estimation provides an improvement over the
Tobit estimation.
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However, in recent decades, the country has been fraught with macroeconomic and
food insecurity. Until early 2009, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe printed money to
fund the budget deﬁcit, resulting in hyperinﬂation. Dollarization oﬃcially occurred in
2014. This made the United States dollar the country’s de facto currency. However,
the dollar, as well as the South African rand and Botswana pula, had been available to
some degree, and widely accepted since around 2009. Dollarization eﬀectively ended
hyperinﬂation.
During hyperinﬂation, many industries suﬀered and economic growth stagnated.
Agriculture, in particular, suﬀered extensively. Market liberalization led to increases
in input costs, due to the increased importation of many items. Land reform also
caused loss of knowledge from large-scale farmers, some of whom had their land
seized by the government and left the agricultural sector. From the early 1990s to
the early 2000s, maize production fell by 40 percent with other cereals falling another
20 percent (FAO, nda). These declines resulted in widespread food insecurity and
increases in poverty incidence. About 75 percent of the population now lives below
the poverty line (CIA, nd).
It was during this period of hyperinﬂation and rising food insecurity that my
data were collected. The ﬁrst round of data was collected before the worst period of
hyperinﬂation and the second was collected shortly afterward. Thus, careful attention
must be paid to certain aspects including prices for inputs, labor, and outputs, as well
as to institutions and participation in markets. In certain cases, data are unreliable
or unavailable. As these elements were often diﬃcult to discern, I account for these
constraints in my empirical model. Prices, in particular, which would be unknown
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for most farm households, are omitted from my analysis, despite standard practices,
as these were largely unavailable to farmers during this time period.14

3.5.2 Data Sources
The data used in this paper come from two sources. First, I use household
panel data from the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
(ICRISAT). These data were collected in the 2004/2005 and the 2012/2013 growing
seasons. Originally designed to measure the adoption of a sorghum variety developed
by ICRISAT, the survey also contains information on agricultural practices, household consumption, and preferences. 355 households were surveyed for both rounds
of the survey and so I use a panel of 710 observations in my analysis. The survey
spans three regions in Zimbabwe: Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, and
Masvingo. These areas are considered sorghum growing regions in Zimbabwe, though
maize remains the dominant crop in most households’ crop portfolios. Key informant
interviews were also held with extension staﬀ and farmers in each district to gain
qualitative data on district institutions, climate, and other relevant information.
Summary statistics for my dependent variables, the choice to grow sorghum or
maize and the share of area allocated to sorghum and maize, are reported in Table 3.1,
along with an alternative measure of land area. In my analysis, I am interested in
the share of area allocated to the each crop, in order to capture the importance of
farm size in determining crop portfolio.15 Crop choice often relies on risk preferences,
human capital, credit constraints, and labor requirements, among other factors, which
themselves rely on farm area (Feder et al., 1985).
14

Diﬃculties is ascertaining prices can be eﬀectively demonstrated by a story from the New York
Times on 2 May 2006: “Mother and daughter make as much as $10 in American money each week
by selling vegetables, from 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. daily. But the proﬁts are being consumed by rising
costs at the farmers’ market where they buy stock. ‘Like potatoes,’ Regai said. ‘I went last week,
and it was $500,000 for a packet. And when I went this weekend, it was $700,000.’ ” (Wines, 2006)
15
However, I do not conduct a total analysis of portfolio eﬀects, as in Chibwana et al. (2012) or
Coxhead et al. (2002).
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics: Outcome Variables
2005
Sorghum Grown (0/1)
Share of Area Allocated to Sorghum (%)
Maize Grown (0/1)
Share of Area Allocated to Maize (%)
Total Land Area (hectares)

Mean
0.508
0.121
0.937
0.568
2.000

St. Dev
0.501
0.180
0.243
0.315
1.746

2013
Median
1.000
0.024
1.000
0.625
1.613

Mean
0.541
0.162
0.889
0.429
1.573

St. Dev
0.499
0.199
0.315
0.277
1.453

Total
Median
1.000
0.107
1.000
0.406
1.296

Mean
0.525
0.142
0.913
0.497
1.782

St. Dev
0.499
0.191
0.283
0.304
1.616

Median
1.000
0.057
1.000
0.500
1.455

Note: Calculations by the author.

Additionally, I use a rich set of control variables, including household and farm
characteristics, inputs, and geographic location. These variables allow me to evaluate
the impact of the stated and demonstrated farmer and household characteristics.
Summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 3.2. The household
and farm characteristics include whether the household is female-headed, the age
and education of the head of household, the number of cattle owned, whether the
household owns a plough, whether the household received extension services, and
whether the household participated in a staple grain market. The inputs include the
use of manure and number of kilograms of fertilizer used. These variables help me
consider the households’ traits, including their wealth and experience. I also include
several measures of available labor to measure labor inputs. These include the number
of adult men and women in the household, as well as the number of children. I also
include the number of family members working oﬀ farm.16 These variables help me to
evaluate the labor preferences of households, as demonstrated through various types
of labor participation.17 Finally, I include indicator variables for the natural regions.
Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of natural regions in Zimbabwe. Regions 3-5 are
driest regions in the country and together they represent more than 75 percent of
Zimbabwe’s total land area (FAO, ndb). Regions 3, 4, and 5 are subject to erratic
rainfall, with annual rainfall varying from approximately 500-800 mm per year in
region 3 to less than 450 mm per year in region 5 (FAO, ndb).
16

As oﬀ-farm participation is likely determined before planting, particularly for migration labor, this
term is not likely to be endogenous with actual planting decisions.
17
These variables also help me to better understand any gender dynamics which may be at play in
planting and cropping decisions.

Table 3.2. Summary Statistics: Control Variables
2005
Mean
Household
Female-headed Household∗
Age of Head of Household (years)
Education of Head of Household (years)
Wealth Index
Number of Cattle
Received Extension∗
Sell Crops∗
Number of Oﬀ-Farm Labor Participants
Number of Female Household Members
Number of Male Household Members
Number of Children in Household
Use Manure∗
Fertilizer use (kilograms)
Natural Regions
NR3∗
NR4∗
NR5∗
Note:

∗

0.238
52.576
5.500
−0.019
3.262
0.266
0.489
0.912
2.034
1.690
2.803
0.320
12.512
0.097
0.439
0.464

St. Dev
0.4427
15.647
3.616
0.408
4.450
0.443
0.500
1.119
1.235
1.362
1.768
0.467
32.501
0.297
0.497
0.499

2013
Median

Mean

Total

St. Dev

Median

Mean

St. Dev

Median

0.000
52.000
6.500
−0.140
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
1.000
3.000
0.000
0.000

0.357
56.974
6.154
0.036
4.185
0.523
0.363
1.060
1.771
1.304
2.639
0.583
10.162

0.480
14.946
3.538
0.453
5.424
0.500
0.482
0.961
0.962
0.943
1.822
0.494
30.421

0.000
56.000
7.000
−0.085
3.000
1.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
1.000
3.000
1.000
0.000

0.299
54.872
5.841
0.008
3.728
0.397
0.425
0.988
1.900
1.493
2.719
0.454
11.312

0.458
15.430
3.587
0.431
4.983
0.490
0.495
1.041
1.117
1.184
1.796
0.498
31.453

0.000
54.500
7.000
−0.120
2.000
0.000
0.000
1.000
2.000
1.000
3.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.093
0.447
0.459

0.291
0.498
0.499

0.000
0.000
0.000

0.095
0.443
0.462

0.293
0.497
0.499

0.000
0.000
0.000

indicates binary variables. Calculations by the author.
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Figure 3.1.: Natural Regions of Zimbabwe

Table 3.3. Summary Statistics: Rainfall Variables
2005
Mean
Average
1, 032.613
27.920
Coeﬃcient of Variation
0.051
Shock

St. Dev
539.915
2.605
1.1586

2013
Median
Mean
678.390 1, 088.83
27.394
24.146
−0.052
−0.126

St. Dev
565.697
1.527
0.872

Total
Median
Mean
723.081 1, 061.325
23.590
25.992
−0.384
−0.039

St. Dev
553.524
1.527
1.026

Median
723.081
23.590
−0.114

Note: Calculations by the author.
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Further, I am particularly interested in measures of food preference and historic
rainfall, as these reﬂect a farmer’s stated preferences, and an evaluation of inherent
crop traits, respectively. In order to capture food preference I include a binary measure of the household’s stated staple grain preference for sorghum.18 Household staple
grain preference was either for maize (73 percent) or sorghum (6 percent). Households
are designated with a zero in this measure if they responded with a preference of maize
and are designated with a one if they responded with a preference for sorghum. Relevant summary statistics for these variables are reported in Table 3.3. Next, to proxy
for the inherent crop traits, I create a variable based on rainfall. I use the Climate
Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with Station (CHIRPS) data. CHIRPS is a
thirty year quasi-global rainfall dataset. It spans 50-degree-S to 50-degree-N, with all
longitudes. CHIRPS incorporates 0.05-degree resolution satellite imagery with in-situ
station data to create a gridded rainfall time series (Funk et al., 2015). I use three
measures. First I simply include average rainfall and the coeﬃcient of variation of
rainfall. These variables capture rainfall which will both be perceived by farmers, as
well as traits that are inﬂuential in successful cropping of sorghum and maize. Next,
following Ward and Shively (2015), I develop a measure of rainfall shock, based on the
distance from expectations of observed weather outcomes (Z-score). I use deviations
from average, as it is at the extremes of rainfall where the inherent traits of each crop
are best observed. Using community level rainfall, I calculate a rainfall shortage as:

λct =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨

rc,

⎪
⎪
⎩0

t−1 −r¯c

σrc

if rc,

t−1

< r¯c
(3.21)

otherwise

The rainfall measure is a function of rainfall (r) for community c in time period t and
σ is the standard deviation of rainfall for community c.
18

Millet is also included in the question about stated preferences in the ICRISAT survey. The
remaining respondents (21 percent of those surveyed) either responded with “millet” or “other”.
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Similarly rainfall excess can be calculated as:

λct =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨

rc,

⎪
⎪
⎩0

t−1 −r¯c

σrc

if rc,

t−1

> r¯c
(3.22)

otherwise

These terms are combined in a single variable, where a negative shock is less than
zero and a positive shock is greater than zero. The experience of no shock is equal to
zero.
I use 20 years of rainfall to calculate the mean (r¯c ) and standard deviation (σ).
For all three measures, deviations are considered for the previous cropping season
(t − 1). This term serves to proxy for the inherent crop traits. For completeness,
I also include average rainfall over 20 years and the coeﬃcient of variation over 20
years.19

3.6 Results and Discussion
I present results for the decision to grow sorghum in Table 3.4. In the same table,
I also present results where the dependent variable is maize, to better understand
the cropping behavior of households. Column (1) and column (3) of Table 3.4 report
coeﬃcient estimates of the ﬁrst stage of the DH, where the former is for sorghum
and the latter is for maize. These are reported as average partial eﬀects. Column (2)
and column (4) report coeﬃcient estimates of the second stage of the DH, where the
former is for sorghum and the latter is for maize. When considering maize, I analyze
the preference for sorghum, rather than changing the variable for each respective
crop. As I am primarily interested in sorghum, I want to know how the impact of the
preference for sorghum inﬂuences the area allocated to maize.20
19
20

The author also tested 5 and 10 year variations, without signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
A series of more parsimonious regressions are included in the Appendix in Tables B.1 through B.3.
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Table 3.4. DH Sorghum and Maize Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Grow Sorghum Share Sorghum Grow Maize Share Maize
preferred staple: sorghum
average rainfall
coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall
rainfall shock
female headed household
age of head of household
education of head of household
number of cattle owned
own plough
received extension services
sold crops at market
number of participants in oﬀ farm labor market
number of adult female members
number of adult male members
number of child members
manure used
fertilizer used

0.439∗∗∗
(0.114)
-0.0001
(0.001)
-0.041∗∗∗
(0.015)
0.022
(0.028)
0.063
(0.092)
0.005
(0.004)
0.024
(0.017)
-0.002
(0.009)
-0.085
(0.097)
0.029
(0.065)
0.050
(0.064)
0.0004
(0.031)
0.042
(0.032)
0.039
(0.031)
0.014
(0.022)

0.208∗∗∗
(0.051)
-0.002∗
(0.001)
0.021∗
(0.013)
-0.003
(0.022)
-0.051
(0.075)
0.005∗
(0.013)
0.010
(0.013)
0.003
(0.008)
-0.013
(0.074)
-0.022
(0.055)
0.065
(0.052)
-0.065∗∗∗
(0.025)
-0.038
(0.026)
0.002
(0.024)
0.010
(0.017)
-0.097∗
(0.058)
-0.001
(0.001)

-0.062∗
(0.037)
0.001
(0.001)
-0.009
(0.008)
0.025
(0.016)
-0.103∗
(0.054)
0.003
(0.002)
0.004
(0.009)
0.001
(0.005)
-0.055
(0.052)
-0.100∗∗
(0.039)
0.052
(0.034)
0.013
(0.020)
0.012
(0.017)
0.031∗
(0.019)
0.004
(0.012)

-0.134∗∗
(0.053)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.050∗∗∗
(0.009)
0.019
(0.015)
-0.060
(0.050)
-0.003
(0.002)
-0.015
(0.010)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.053)
-0.043
(0.036)
0.028
(0.036)
0.027∗
(0.016)
0.005
(0.017)
-0.017
(0.017)
-0.015
(0.012)
-0.004
(0.001)
-0.0001
(0.001)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses. Average partial eﬀects are reported in column (1)
and column (3). (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). A year indicator is also included, as well as natural region indicators, though
these are not reported.
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3.6.1 First Stage: Growing Sorghum
In column (1) of Table 3.4, I ﬁnd that a preference for sorghum increases the
probability of growing sorghum, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, at the 1 percent level,
by 43.9 percent. This indicates that those households which have stated preferences
to eat sorghum are also more likely to grow sorghum, suggesting that people grow
what they want to eat.
Additionally, one of the rainfall variables is also signiﬁcant: the coeﬃcient of
variation is negative correlated with growing sorghum (-4.1 percent at the 1 percent
level). This suggests that as rainfall variation increases, households are less likely to
grow sorghum. This is somewhat surprising as sorghum may provide more certain
production in the face of uncertain and variable rainfall, but may be part of broader
strategy of households to cultivate fewer crops in the face of a variable production
environment. However this result suggests that farmers and households do not value
sorghum’s inherent crop traits. Taken together, these results suggests a complicated
path forward for encouraging households to grow sorghum. It will be necessary to
overcome strong taste preferences, in order to encourage households to grow the crop,
even in the preference of variable rainfall conditions, which are ideal for sorghum.
This may be possible through education programs, which attempt to teach the value
of the inherent traits of sorghum, as well as successful cropping techniques, in an
attempt to overcome strong taste preferences for maize by instructing farmers on the
beneﬁts of sorghum.
No other variables are signiﬁcant in the ﬁrst stage. This suggests that the most important inﬂuences for households growing sorghum are own stated preferences about
the crop and, to a lesser extent, the inherent traits of the crop itself.

3.6.2 Second Stage: Share of Area Allocated to Sorghum
In column (2) of Table 3.4, I again see that a preference for sorghum is positively
and signiﬁcantly associated with allocating share of area to sorghum (0.208 hectares
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at the 1 percent level), suggesting that the importance of own stated preferences
persists when determining how much area to allocate to the crop.
Additionally, two rainfall variables are also signiﬁcant in this stage, including average rainfall and the coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall. As average rainfall increases,
households allocate less area to sorghum (0.022 hectares, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). Similarly, as the coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall increases, households
allocate more area to sorghum (0.021 hectares, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level).
These results are contrary to my ﬁrst stage results. Taken together, they lend moderate support for sorghum as a drought resistant crop and value of the inherent crop
traits by the household. Although households may be less likely to cultivate sorghum,
when experiencing variable rainfall, when they choose to do so, they allocate more
area to it. This ﬁnding is compounded by the eﬀect of low average rainfall, which
also increases the area allocated to sorghum.
In this speciﬁcation three other point estimates for variables are signiﬁcantly different from zero. First, the age of the head of household is positively and signiﬁcantly
associated with share of area allocated to sorghum (0.005 hectares, signiﬁcant at the
10 percent level). This result is likely driven by the fact that older farmers still
practice and participate in traditional sorghum cultivation styles, as discussed in section 3.2.1. Next, the use of manure decreases the share of area allocated to sorghum
(0.097 hectares, signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). This is likely because use of inputs is typically not associated with drought resistant crops. If households are making
such an investment, they are likely not cultivating a large amount of sorghum. There
may also be associated wealth eﬀects: a household wealthy enough to purchase inputs
may regard sorghum as a “poor man’s crop” and thus be un-interested in allocating
much area to it. Third, and ﬁnally, households with more members working oﬀ-farm
allocate less land to sorghum, by 0.065 hectares (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level).
This ﬁnding suggests an important coping strategy for households, related to demonstrated labor preferences: rather than growing sorghum, households may participate
in oﬀ-farm labor markets, earning income to purchase food, instead of growing it for

63
own consumption. Taken together, these results highlight the broader importance of
observed household traits, in addition to own stated preferences, when making area
allocation decisions.

3.6.3 First Stage: Growing Maize
From column (3) in Table 3.4, I ﬁnd that while a preference for sorghum decreases
the probability of growing maize (-6.2 percent at the 10 percent level), none of the
rainfall variables inﬂuence the choice to grow maize. Although maize is the preferred
staple across Zimbabwe, a preference for sorghum decreases the probability of growing
the crop. However, as maize is the preferred staple crop of most Zimbabweans,
households are likely to grow some maize, even when rainfall may be limited or
variable. Thus, the variables which measure inherent crop traits do not statistically
signiﬁcantly impact the choice to grow maize, because, regardless of rainfall level or
variability, households will always grow some amount of the crop. Again, this result
seems to suggest that when making planting decisions, farmers do not place much
emphasis on crops’ inherent traits.
However, three other variables are also signiﬁcant: whether the household received
extension services, whether the household is headed by a woman, and the number
of adult male members. Receipt of extension services decreases the probability of
growing maize, by 10.0 percent (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). This is an important result as it suggests that extension eﬀorts encouraging households to grow crops
alternative to maize (though not necessarily sorghum) have some success. This result
provides some evidence that education programs focusing on the about beneﬁts of
sorghum could have some success in attempting to overcome taste preferences. Next,
households that are headed by women were less likely to grow maize, by 10.3 percent
(signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). There is a prevalent idea in development that
female headed households may be more risk averse, and therefore may be less likely to
grow relatively riskier crops, like maize. This idea is supported again, as households
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with more male members are more likely to grow maize (3.1 percent, signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level). This is somewhat contrary to expectations about gender, as
discussed previously. However, these results are in line with more gendered literature
on cropping behavior, in which men tend to be more risk-loving, while women prefer
to grow staple crops with low risk Doss and Morris (2001).

3.6.4 Second Stage: Share of Area Allocated to Maize
Finally, in column (4) of Table 3.4, I consider the preference for sorghum, I ﬁnd
that area allocated to maize decreases with that preference, by 0.134 hectares (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level). This makes sense, as households which prefer to consume
sorghum are less likely to allocate area to maize, due to their own preference for a
diﬀerent crop. Further, as in the sorghum speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of variation of
rainfall is again signiﬁcant: a greater coeﬃcient of variation increases the area allocated to maize (0.050 hectares, signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level). This suggests that
households are not increasing their allocation of area, with variable rainfall, purely to
drought resistant crops. This indicates a value by farmers for their taste preferences,
over the inherent traits of crops. This result suggests that households which continue
to focus on cultivation in a risky, variable rainfall environment, do so by allocating
more area to all staples crop: including both sorghum and maize, rather than focusing
on a single crop.
One other variable is also signiﬁcant: the number of participants in the oﬀ-farm
labor market. This ﬁnding is much like the results for sorghum and support for previous conclusions. Households allocate more area to maize when there is participation
in oﬀ-farm labor: 0.027 hectares (signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level). This result
highlights the importance of oﬀ-farm labor: for households with an alternative source
of income, the focus returns to the less intensive, preferred, though more liable to
failure staple crop (maize), rather than the less preferred crop (sorghum). Further,
this ﬁnding suggests a labor preference for oﬀ-farm work, rather than for on-farm la-
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bor. As sorghum is more labor intensive than maize, this demonstrates that farmers
would rather forgo farm labor, participating in oﬀ-farm labor markets, than engage
in the more diﬃcult cropping involved with growing sorghum. This shows a clear
preference for oﬀ-farm, over on-farm, labor.

3.6.5 Diﬀerential Impacts
It may be the case that there are disparate impacts by diﬀerent household characteristics. Following Dercon and Christiaensen (2011) and Sesmaro et al. (nd), I
consider this possibility, by extending my analysis to consider the interaction eﬀects
between my variables of interest and wealth21 and oﬀ-farm labor behavior. Table 3.5
reports interactions between my ﬁve variables of interest (staple crop preference and
four rainfall measurements) and: 1) a wealth index and 2) oﬀ-farm labor participation.22 All regressors are included in the regression, though for the sake of parsimony
the table only reports the results relevant to the interaction terms.
The results indicate that there are diﬀerential impacts by both wealth and participation in oﬀ-farm labor. The interaction between experiencing a rainfall shock
and wealth is signiﬁcant and positively associated with the decision to grow sorghum.
The interaction between the coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall and oﬀ-farm labor participation is signiﬁcant and positively associated with the area allocated to sorghum.
It is essential to carefully interpret interaction terms. As recent work has suggested, an eﬀective method to do so is graphically (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton
et al., 2004; Williams, 2012). Therefore Figures 3.2 and 3.3 report the results in this
way. First, Figure 3.2 shows that at low levels of wealth and high levels of negative
rainfall shock, there is a low probability of growing sorghum. This is likely because
sorghum’s tolerance as a drought resistant crop has limited beneﬁts, when extreme
shocks are experienced the cultivation of any crop is relatively diﬃcult. However, as
21

Wealth is calculated as an index of possessions and cattle owned by the household.
In this case of oﬀ-farm labor participation, although in my analysis, I used amount of oﬀ-farm
labor, for ease of interpretation with the interaction terms, I instead use a binary term, where a
household with no oﬀ-farm labor = 0 and a household with any oﬀ-farm labor participation = 1.

22
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Table 3.5. Decision to Grow and Area Allocated, Wealth and Labor Interactions

interaction: sorghum pref. staple * wealth index
interaction: average rainfall * wealth index
interaction: rainfall coef. of variation * wealth index
interaction: rainfall shock * wealth index
interaction: sorghum pref. staple * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: average rainfall * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: rainfall coef. of variation * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: rainfall shock * oﬀ-farm labor

(1)
Grow Sorghum

(2)
Share of Sorghum

0.193
(0.728)
0.0001
(0.0001)
-0.003
(0.006)
0.120∗
(0.065)
2.314
(52.660)
0.00004
(0.0001)
-0.002
(0.005)
-0.055
(0.059)

-0.129
(0.199)
-0.0001
(0.001)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.025
(0.067)
0.002
(0.126)
-0.0001
(0.0001)
0.010∗∗
(0.004)
-0.017
(0.046)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01). All regressors from previous regressions are included, though not reported for parsimony. Average
partial eﬀects are reported in column (1).
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the rainfall shock goes towards zero, and toward a positive shock, and as wealth also
increases, the probability of sorghum slowly increases. This shows a downturn, at
high levels of wealth and larger positive rainfall shocks, at which point the probability of growing sorghum begins to fall again. This suggests that for households with
medium wealth, and relatively small rainfall shocks (in either direction) there is a
greater probability of growing sorghum. However, for households which are very poor
or very wealthy, and experience greater rainfall shocks (again, in either direction),
then there is a lower probability of growing sorghum. This indicates a coping pathway presented by drought resistant crops that is only successful in a narrow band of
experienced rainfall, and for households of a relatively moderate wealth level.
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Figure 3.2.: Rainfall Shock Interactions with Wealth - By Decision to Grow Sorghum

Next, Figure 3.3 shows somewhat similar results. At low levels of rainfall variation, without oﬀ-farm labor, households allocate a relatively small amount of area to
sorghum. This rises, to a point, as the variability of rainfall increases. However, there
comes a turning point at which the participation in oﬀ-farm labor begins to dominate,
and households allocate less area to sorghum. This supports my econometric ﬁndings
that households use oﬀ-farm labor participation as a coping strategy, when faced with
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variable rainfall: rather than cultivating more drought resistant crops, they instead
rely on oﬀ-farm labor income.
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Figure 3.3.: Coeﬃcient of Variation of Rainfall with Oﬀ-Farm Labor - By Share of
Area Allocated to Sorghum

3.6.6 Consideration of Results and Suggestions for Future Work
The results presented in this paper highlight the importance of farmer stated and
demonstrated preferences, related to taste and labor, as well as inherent crop traits.
The dominant result is that a taste for sorghum drives the decision to allocate land
to the crop. It is clear that wanting to consume something drives the propensity to
grow it and thus to allocate area to it. While this seems a logical point, previous work
has largely concentrated on characteristics such as high yields and open pollination
traits, rather than focus on preferences related to consumption. Thus, my results
provide a new perspective in the crop adoption literature, contributing to the ongoing
conversation by highlighting the importance of explicit farmer preferences in crop
choice decisions.
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Next, addressing one of the more commonly posited ideas in the adoption literature: there is some support is provided on the importance of inherent crop traits. My
results suggest that variability in rainfall increases the area grown to both sorghum
and maize, decreases the probability of growing sorghum. Similarly, greater average rainfall decreases the area allocated to sorghum. Taken together, these results
suggest that households do not grow drought resistant crops, such as sorghum, as a
way of mitigating rainfall shortage and variability. Although lower average rainfall
encourages sorghum growth, variable rainfall increases the area allocated to staple
crops broadly. This indicates a strategy of diversifying crop portfolios, in the face of
variability, rather than focusing on a pure, drought resistant crop. This suggests that
households do not take advantage of the inherent drought resistance. Instead they
value a broad set of traits, rather than simply preferring the traits of a single crop.
Additionally, several other preferences are revealed to be important: in particular,
own labor preferences and household characteristics. Female household headship and
male household members both drive the decision to grow sorghum. But, participation
in oﬀ-farm labor emerges as a crucial aspect of the crop choice story. Many households
have a preference for oﬀ-farm work, rather than to grow drought resistance crops, onfarm. The ability of households to cope with shocks by participating in oﬀ-farm
labor must be considered further as it may provide a vital coping mechanism when
households experience shocks.23 My analysis of diﬀerential impacts supports this
idea and suggests that these two strategies may be well paired for many households:
with those who are able to work oﬀ-farm allocating less area to sorghum, while those
who are unable to work oﬀ-farm growing relatively more sorghum, in the presence of
variable rainfall. This strategy, though, likely only works for households of moderate
wealth: those households which are very wealthy or very poor are unlikely to grow
sorghum, regardless of rainfall level experienced.
These results reveal a mixed story: while households that prefer to eat sorghum are
more likely to grow it, the beneﬁcial characteristics of the crop fail to overcome taste
23

This is explored in more detail in a working paper by Anna Josephson and Gerald Shively, available
upon request.
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preferences for households which do not prefer to eat it. This results in households
searching for alternative methods to cope with the increasingly variable cropping
environment. Some of these strategies vary by wealth: households of moderate wealth
are somewhat more likely than the rich and the poor to grow sorghum, but there is a
general preference for households to participate in oﬀ-farm labor. These alternative
methods are likely to be increasingly important for households which prefer to not
consume sorghum, unless educational, breeding, or branding methods can overcome
some of those preferences.24

3.7 Conclusion
At a time when climate and agricultural policy encourage growth of drought resistant crops, farmers in Zimbabwe are doing just the opposite: allocating large areas
of land to maize. In this paper, I sought to understand this empirical puzzle through
analysis of the factors which inﬂuence a household to grow sorghum. Unlike previous
research, I focus on stated and demonstrated preferences and household characteristics, as well as perceived and inherent crop traits, as explanations for observed crop
choice behaviors.
Farmers who grow sorghum do so due to a preference to consume it. Dominating
my results is that the food preferences for sorghum as a staple crop consumption
drives both the decision to grow it and the decision of how much area to allocate to
it. The result veriﬁes the importance of stated preferences and the idea that what one
grows is determined by the preference to consume it, in a context of missing prices
and/or absent markets.
Only minor support is provided for the importance of inherent crop traits: variability in rainfall increases the area cultivated to both sorghum and maize, while as
average rainfall increases, the area allocated to maize decreases. However, the probability of growing sorghum is negatively associated with rainfall variability. These
24

These particular strategies are discussed more in the conclusion.
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results suggest a strategy of diversifying crop portfolios, growing greater areas of any
type of staple crop, rather than focusing on a single drought resistant crop, with rainfall variability increases. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive, as it indicates
that households do not take advantage of the inherent drought resistance of sorghum.
But more broadly, the results suggest that, ultimately, other factors beyond crops’
inherent traits dominate a household’s decision to grow them. This further suggests
that a portfolio of multiple crop traits may be preferred only a single crop’s traits.
There is some evidence, though, that households of moderate wealth may mitigate
some risk with sorghum; however, this is only true is cases of moderate rainfall for
households of moderate wealth. Thus, this mechanism is hardly widespread as a risk
mitigation procedure.
However, one additional alternative coping strategy emerges in my results: rather
than growing sorghum, some households have members participate in oﬀ-farm labor.
This demonstrates the importance of own labor preferences and household characteristics in crop choice decisions. Oﬀ-farm labor provides an alternative source of income,
as well as a safety net, should a shock resulting in crop failure be experienced by a
household. As households are largely resistant to growing sorghum, the development
of strategies such as these will be essential. Beyond this particular adaptation though,
it is necessary to consider many additional, alternative strategies. Climate change is
likely to increase aridity of land as well as cause drought in Zimbabwe and across
Southern Africa, given the resistance of many households to the strategies currently
available through growing sorghum.25
One potential, alternative strategy of may be one of re-branding and re-breeding.
If sorghum could be posed as a food security crop but not “poor man’s crop”, it is
possible that more households might incorporate it into their crop portfolio. One,
perhaps obvious, solution would be to extend current educational campaigns. Such
25

One possible suggestion is that farmers are growing late season maize, should a crop failure be
experience with early season maize. However, of the 150 varieties of maize considered in the survey,
only two would be appropriate for a short, late season crop. Of these two varieties, in 2005, only 16
households grew them and in 2013, only 12 households grew them.
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programs could promote not only the large climatic range tolerated by sorghum,
but also the nutritional and agronomic beneﬁts. However, there is perhaps a limit
to the beneﬁts of educational and extension campaigns, and thus considering more
drastic strategies is also necessary. In particular, re-breeding sorghum should be
considered. Sorghum could be re-bred to create a white color and a husk may improve
its popularity. The husk would reduce labor costs for households and the white color
may increase people’s desire to consume it. While these latter suggestions are hardly
simple, and recommend a massive undertaking by plant breeders, they are hardly
quick ﬁxes suggested lightly. But, as maize has been bred for generations to improve
color, stature, and nutrient content, such actions are hardly unprecedented. A similar
evolution, as has been undertaken for decades for maize, concentrated on sorghum
may encourage its growth across Africa, improving food security in the presence of a
changing climate.
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CHAPTER 4. THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS DRIVING LABOR
ALLOCATION AND REALLOCATION IN ZIMBABWE

4.1 Introduction
Income risk is ubiquitous in rural Sub-Saharan Africa. Weather variability, economic
ﬂuctuations, and numerous other events can expose households to extreme, though
transitory, hardships. Risks can be deﬁned along a continuum ranging from covariate (common to all households in a village or region) to idiosyncratic (speciﬁc to
individuals or households). Covariate risks may include the vagaries of rainfall or
temperature, ﬂuctuations in prices, changes in macroeconomic and policy conditions,
and disease epidemics. Idiosyncratic shocks may include the death of a household
member, asset losses, or crop failures.
In order to manage these unanticipated events, households employ a variety of
ex ante and ex post coping strategies. Ex ante risk-pooling arrangements are well
documented by Townsend (1994), Udry (1994), Ligon et al. (2002) Fafchamps and
Lund (2003), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), among others. The strategies in this
set of literature include various insurance mechanisms, both formal and informal,
as well as familial sharing, gifts, and other network-based insurance arrangements.
Alternative methods of ex ante mitigation include generating precautionary savings
(Deaton, 1989; Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Paxon, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin,
1993; Udry, 1995), diversifying crop portfolios (Morduch, 1993; Dercon, 1996; Cavatassi et al., 2011; Michler and Josephson, 2017), and storing grain (Park, 2006;
Michler and Balagtas, 2016). To varying degrees, many rural households can be
found engaging in these ex ante risk mitigation techniques.
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Alternatively, ex post coping strategies are only undertaken when typical consumption is threatened, after the experience of some event. Such behaviors are sometimes
referred to as survival strategies, as they provide essential coping mechanisms for
families and households exposed to realized risks (Chamlee-Wright, 2002). These
methods often include accessing insurance or seeking credit, depleting assets (Ersado
et al., 2003; Ward and Shively, 2015). Börner et al. (2015) ﬁnd that households tend
to deplete ﬁnancial and durable assets in response to idiosyncratic losses, and reduce
consumption as an answer to deleterious covariate events. Another ex post potential
strategy is to reallocate household labor (Kochar, 1995, 1999; Berhanu and White,
2000; Rose, 2001; Debela et al., 2012). Engaging in oﬀ-farm activities or migrating
can diversify household income in the face of negative shocks. It is this strategy which
I study in this paper, examining how households reallocate labor, after the experience
of a set of idiosyncratic and covariate shocks.
The reallocation of labor resources is not unique to a shocked environment, however. Individuals and families may use oﬀ-farm and migration labor in order to
cope with existing and persistent constraints (Rief and Cochrane, 1990). Further, the
movement of resources out of agriculture is characteristic of structural transformation,
during which workers move labor oﬀ-farm and enter formal wage employment (Lewis,
1954; Kuznets, 1966; Todaro, 1969). Both technological and demographic changes
drive the process: workers tend to be simultaneously pushed out of agriculture and
pulled into the modern industrial sector. Workers exit agriculture in response to insuﬃcient land endowments, technological improvements that lower agricultural labor
requirements, or infrastructure shortcomings which limit labor productivity in agriculture. Workers enter the modern sector as improved technology and manufacturing
capabilities create new jobs, creating higher wages and improved working conditions
(Bhaumik et al., 2006).
However, shocks have the potential to exacerbate the push and pull factors driving
labor allocation. These shifts, though, are not necessarily in expected directions.
Insuﬃcient, excessive, or variable rainfall may push workers into the non-farm sector,
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or a rise in the wage outside agriculture may pull them away from the farm, but
family characteristics, aspirations or external situations attenuate these behavioral
responses. This set of relationships, in the context of an already stressed environment
is my subject of interest in this paper. In order to investigate, I use a structural model
of household labor allocation, building on recent eﬀorts to measure rural households’
labor responses to unanticipated events (Ward, 2011; Ward and Shively, 2015). I
extend previous work by jointly considering long-distance migration, local oﬀ-farm
work, and on-farm activity as competing ways to allocate and reallocate labor. This
allows us to investigate my main research question, namely: how do push and pull
factors inﬂuence the way households reallocate labor in response to unforeseen events?
Historically, economists have assumed that households reallocate labor from onfarm to oﬀ-farm activities in order to maximize utility (Huﬀman, 1980; Sumner,
1982). Households may also participate in oﬀ-farm activities to smooth consumption
and mitigate the impacts of shocks, either ex ante, ex post, or both (Lanjouw and
Lanjouw, 1995; Yang, 2006, 2008). Due to the ongoing relationships between push
and pull factors, many farm households participate in both on-farm and non-farm
employment (Bhaumik et al., 2006). In these cases, push and pull factors are not
solely driven by structural transformation and technological change. For example, in
a household with many members, weak land endowments, and low marginal productivity of labor in on-farm work, there may be an incentive, i.e. a push, to move labor
oﬀ farm. Simultaneously, higher oﬀ-farm wages or opportunities to reduce risk may
pull labor into oﬀ-farm activities (House and Rempel, 1978; Larson and Mundlak,
1997; Bhaumik et al., 2006). Much of the research in this area examines migration in
the context of a negative correlation between agricultural income and oﬀ-farm participation, determining that diversiﬁcation is an ex ante norm with respect to risk
reduction (Alderman and Paxson, 1992; Reardon et al., 1992, 1998; Barrett et al.,
2000). While there is a smaller body of literature which considers these strategies ex
post (Yang, 2003, 2006, 2008), less is said in this literature about the relative weight
of push and pull factors, after the experience of a shock, as motivation for labor re-
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allocation. I seek to contribute to this body of literature by ﬁlling the gap in the
conversation about push and pull factors in ex ante labor reallocation.
I also contribute to the literature comparing covariate and idiosyncratic shocks.
Evidence suggests that households cope diﬀerently with idiosyncratic and covariate
shocks, but most studies focus on only one type of shock or one speciﬁc event. Thus,
much previous literature has failed to compare household coping strategies across
events, within the same household. Though evidence exists on how households cope
with disease and death (Abegunde and Stanciole, 2008) and various natural disasters and weather ﬂuctuations (Yang and Choi, 2007; Yang, 2008), how these events
compare with one another, with respect to household coping methods, has not been
considered. I seek to contribute to this literature by investigating the varied impacts
of diﬀerent shocks on household labor reallocation.
In order to consider participation in multiple labor markets in the context of
multiple shocks ex post, I examine the impact of three types of shocks on labor
allocation in Zimbabwe. The three shocks of interest occur at diﬀerent levels, and
therefore I expect their impacts to be diﬀerent, both in the type and degree of eﬀect.
First, following Dercon (2002) and Yang (2008), I deﬁne as an idiosyncratic shock
the death of a household member between the ages of ﬁve and sixty-ﬁve. I assume
the death is unanticipated and uncorrelated with deaths in other households, which
is a strong assumption, but in line with the literature on idiosyncratic shocks. In the
interest of evaluating the impact of such a death on the household, I include it in my
analysis. Next, in recognition that a weaker assumption may be more appropriate,
and that any single death within a household may be correlated with other deaths in
the area due to high prevalence of communicable disease, I deﬁne my second shock
as a covariate measure of deaths within the broader community. Finally, my third
shock is a purely covariate event, namely: the distance of the realization of current
rainfall from the mean, scaled by the standard deviation.1 I examine the impact of
these shocks in a setting in which households are already stressed. This is because the
1

This is a Z-score, measured following standard notation as:

X−µ
σ .
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time period on which I focus, 2000-2015, straddles the stretch of Zimbabwe’s severe
hyperinﬂation and, ultimately, the collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar.2 Working in
this context allows us to evaluate an extrema of the household reactions: as households
are already stressed by this severe macroeconomic event, further labor reallocations
delineate the bounds of a household’s possible labor responses.3
I base my empirical investigation of these shocks and resulting labor responses on
a structural household model. Using this model, I derive a set of equations associated
with the shares of household members participating in (i) on-farm labor, (ii) oﬀ-farm
labor, and (iii) migration labor, as a function of sector-speciﬁc wages, household traits,
community characteristics, and the shocks experienced by the household. From this,
I am able to identify and measure how labor allocation decisions are driven by the
realization of shocks. I ﬁnd that households are largely pushed out of on-farm labor.
Exclusive of shocks, diﬃcult conditions within the household push labor into the nonfarm sector. These conditions include low education, low wealth, large household size,
and female headship. But, simultaneously, relatively higher wages outside agriculture
pull households into the non-farm sector. When shocks are considered, households
again respond to push and pull factors: they are pushed out of on-farm labor and
driven to migrate by rainfall shocks and deaths in the community. Ultimately, I ﬁnd
many eﬀects to be conditioned by speciﬁc household characteristics: wealthier and
larger households are more likely to allocate larger shares of resources to on-farm
labor, while other households participate with larger shares in both migration and
oﬀ-farm labor.
2

This period is well documented throughout the popular press, as well as in a number of books and
scholarly articles. In brief, due to a variety of factors, including printing of additional money and
large-scale land seizures which resulted in a massive reduction of exports, Zimbabwe experienced a
period of hyperinﬂation, beginning in the early 2000s. This reached its peak in late 2008, when inﬂation was a rate of 79,600,000,000 percent. This resulted in extreme problems for anyone attempting
to earn money or purchase anything in the country. The nation ultimately discontinued the use of
the Zimbabwean dollar, adopting the U.S. dollar, though South African rand and Botswanan pula
are also widely accepted.
3
Ersado et al. (2003) and Sunderlin and Pokam (2002) consider household behavior in the context
of large-scale macroeconomic events. Both conclude that this context is important to consider when
analyzing household behavior.
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With this paper, I make several contributions to the literature. First, I provide
further empirical support for oﬀ-farm work and migration as ex post mechanisms
for coping with realized negative shocks. Second, I am among the ﬁrst to examine
diﬀerent impacts of multiple types of shocks, rather than one single event, in order
to study how diﬀerent events compare with one another when experienced by the
same household across the same period, with respect to labor responses. Third, I
improve on the identiﬁcation mechanism used in estimating the impacts of economic
conditions on labor allocation activity and participation, through the use of panel
data and by exploiting the exogenous nature of my shocks of interest. Fourth and
ﬁnally, I am among the ﬁrst to consider household labor response in the context of
Zimbabwe’s hyperinﬂation and currency collapse.
With this paper I hope to inform public policy related to economic and environmental migration. Across the globe, environmental change and political instability
are undermining livelihoods and driving rural households from their communities,
changing population dynamics and labor markets throughout the developing world
(Reuveny, 2007; Locke, 2009; Tacoli, 2009; Renaud et al., 2011). A comprehensive
understanding of the push and pull factors inﬂuencing labor dynamics, after the realization of shocks and crises, will be imperative for avoiding and reacting to future
disruptions in labor markets.

4.2 Labor Allocation in the Presence of Shocks
To measure whether, and to what extent, households reallocate labor after experiencing an unanticipated negative shock I expand a model of labor allocation
developed by Ward and Shively (2015) for examining the impact of weather shocks
on migration decisions in China. Because many low-income households in Zimbabwe
are both producers and consumers of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, and because markets for these products are often weak or absent in rural areas, I approach
labor allocation by employing a structural model in which production decisions are
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inﬂuenced by consumption needs. Further, I assume that production decisions are
made jointly in response to changes in input and output prices (Singh et al., 1986).

4.2.1 Theoretical Model
I assume a risk averse household with a strictly concave utility function U (c, l; Zh , h ).
The household, with household-speciﬁc preference shifters (Zh ), derives utility from a
consumption good (c) and time spent on leisure (l). Preferences may be impacted by
household-level shocks (h ), which can be idiosyncratic to the household or covariate
among households.
A household is endowed with time (L̄) which can be used on agricultural production (Lf ) or to earn income in two possible oﬀ-farm activities: local employment (Lo )
or non-local employment, as a migrant (Lm ).4
The household maximizes utility, subject to labor (Lf , Lo , Lm ) and total farm
area (A):

max

U (c, l; Zh , h ).

Lf ,Lo ,Lm ,A

(4.1)

Consumption is constrained by agricultural production and earnings from oﬀ-farm
labor and migration:

c = g(Lf , A; Zf , f ) + wLo + h(Lm (t) − C)

(4.2)

where g is the production technology, Zf represents household-speciﬁc preference
shifters, related to farm production, and f represents farm shocks (such as extreme
weather events or the presence of disease or pests). Oﬀ-farm labor (Lo ) is employed
in wage-paying enterprises at an exogenously determined wage rate w. Income from
4

In my analysis, non-local migration includes domestic migration to other parts of Zimbabwe, as
well as international migration.
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migration (Lm ) is a function of the cost of migrating and the net present value of the
household’s labor allocated to that activity h(Lm (t) − C).5
The household maximizes utility subject to multiple constraints, given in equations (4.3) through (4.6).
Labor is constrained such that:

L̄ = Lf + Lo + Lm + l.

(4.3)

A household’s participation in non-farm labor activities is constrained by local
institutional rigidities (Zc ), such as minimum wages and other types of employment
protections, as well as actual employment opportunity availability (Friedmann and
Sullivan, 1974; Freeman, 2009; Fedderke, 2012).6 Thus,

Lo ≤ L̄o (Zc )

(4.4)

Lm ≤ L̄m (Zc )

(4.5)

where these constraints restrict the amount of migration and oﬀ-farm labor which
households provide.
Finally, non-negativity constraints restrict consumption, farm area, and total labor allocation to non-negative numbers:

c ≥ 0, A ≥ 0, Lf ≥ 0, Lo ≥ 0, Lm ≥ 0.
5

(4.6)

Migration is assumed to have two components: an upfront cost C paid before migration occurs, and
the net present value of earnings from migration, Lm (t), which depend on the timing and duration
of migration. Migrants balance these factors in order to determine whether to migrate (Yang, 2003).
This structure follows Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), as well as more recent migration
literature, including Yang (2008) and Kennan and Walker (2011).
6
This constraint allows us to control for some supply side limitations. Further, even if I were to
assume a perfectly competitive market, laissez-faire labor behavior has been shown to have its own
set of constraints (Richards and Martin, 1983).
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A Lagrangian function for the household’s optimization problem can be written by
substituting equation (4.2) into (4.1) and incorporating the constraints. Lagrangian
multipliers are designated λi where i = 1, 2.
L = U {g(Lf , A; Zf , f ) + wLo + h(Lm (t) − C), l; Zh , h }

(4.7)

−λ1 [Lo − L̄o (Zc )] − λ2 [Lm − L̄m (Zc )]
The solution of interest can be characterized by three ﬁrst-order conditions. Marginal
products and marginal utilities are conditioned on household characteristics (Zh and
Zc ) and shocks (h and f ).
First, I consider on-farm labor:

0

LLf : Uc (Zh , h )[−gL (Zf , f )] ≤ 0,

(4.8)

Due to my interest in measuring how labor is allocated to other non-farm activities,
my model focuses on considering oﬀ-farm and migration labor, which can be given
as:

LLo : Uc (Zh , h )[−gL (Zf , f ) + w] − λ1 ≤ 0

(4.9)

LLm : Uc (Zh , h )[−gL (Zf , f ) + h0 (Lm (t))] − λ2 ≤ 0.

(4.10)

and

82
These allocations are considered in more detail in the following section.

4.2.2 Model Cases
In this section, I consider ﬁve canonical cases for oﬀ-farm work and migration,
relative to on-farm activity.

4.2.2.1 Oﬀ-Farm Work

First, I consider the case of oﬀ-farm work. From equation (4.9), assuming an
interior solution, I can write:

gL (Zf , f ) = w −

λ1
.
Uc (Zh , h )

(4.11)

As a household may or may not experience a shock, I consider three general cases.
The ﬁrst I regard as an equilibrium base case, in which no shocks occur. In the other
cases, f or h are experienced by the household.
• Case I: No Shocks. In this case f = h = 0 and thus the marginal product
of labor and household preferences are conditioned on household traits. This
suggests that, if the constraint on oﬀ-farm labor is binding (λ1 > 0), then the
marginal value product of labor (i.e., the shadow wage of on-farm labor) onfarm is less than the oﬀ-farm wage. The household will increase labor allocated
to oﬀ-farm labor until all household labor is allocated to oﬀ-farm labor. In other
words, the household is pulled into the oﬀ-farm labor market.
If the assumption of f = h = 0 is relaxed, the shocks may be conditioned on
either the marginal product of labor or the marginal utility of consumption.
• Case II: A Shock to Labor Now f 6= 0 and h = 0 and so in this case, the
shock raises the marginal product of labor. Holding h = 0 and assuming that
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the marginal utility of consumption is ﬁxed, implies λ1 < 0. This indicates a
negative marginal utility of oﬀ-farm labor. There are two possible sub-cases:
– Case IIa. If λ1 is, relative to w, suﬃciently less than 0, then the household
will decrease its allocation of labor in oﬀ-farm markets in favor of on-farm
labor.
– Case IIb. If λ1 is, relative to w, not suﬃciently less than 0, then it will be
similar to the equilibrium base case where f = h = 0, where the marginal
value product of labor on-farm is less than the oﬀ-farm wage. Thus, the
household will increase time allocated to labor oﬀ-farm. This implies that if
the oﬀ-farm wage is suﬃciently large following the experience of the shock,
f , then the household may increase the amount of labor allocated oﬀ-farm;
the household is pulled into oﬀ-farm work by a relatively attractive wage.
• Case III: A Shock to Consumption. In this case f = 0 and h =
6 0, and any
eﬀect results from shifting a household’s utility response curve, such that, for
6 0) > Uc (h =
any level of consumption, marginal utilities are greater: Uc (h =
0). Assuming a negative shock, two cases are possible:
– Case IIIa. If Uc (h 6= 0) > Uc (h = 0), then the marginal product of onfarm labor is higher with the shock than without it. Thus, a household
6 0) is
will increase its supply of on-farm labor. This assumes that Uc (h =
large, relative to w.
– Case IIIb. If Uc (h 6= 0) is not suﬃciently large, relative to w, then the
household will increase its supply of oﬀ-farm labor. This case implies
that, if the oﬀ-farm wage is suﬃciently large, following the experience
of the shock h , the household may increase oﬀ-farm labor. Again, this
demonstrates a situation in which households are pulled into oﬀ-farm work,
in order to capture the higher wage.7
7
This does not necessarily imply an increase in wages following a shock, but instead that, after the
experience of a shock, the wages from labor participation seem relatively high to the household.
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4.2.2.2 Migration

Now, I consider the case of migration. Again, assuming an interior solution,
equation (4.10) can be written:

gL (Zf , f ) = h0 (Lm (t)) −

λ3
.
Uc (Zh , h )

(4.12)

And again, I consider three situations, demonstrated by two cases:
• Case IV: No Shock With f = h = 0, the change in income that results from
an additional unit of migrant labor is greater than the marginal value product
of on-farm labor, even when migration is constrained. So, in the absence of a
shock, a household will increase migration. In this case, a household is induced
to migrate by relatively attractive conditions.
• Case V: With Shocks. Parallel cases arise when f 6= 0 and h = 0 and when
6 0. The change in income that results from an additional unit of
f = 0 and h =
migrant labor is greater than the marginal value product of on-farm labor, even
when migration is constrained. So, in the absence of a shock, a household will
increase migration. In this case, a household is induced to migrate by relatively
attractive conditions. In each case, the marginal product of labor on the farm
will increase, which results in two possible sub-cases:
– Case Va. If the marginal product associated with on-farm labor increases,
then participation in migration will decrease. The decrease in labor will
0

result in a reduction in income (h (Lm (t)) < 0), which implies a reduction
in the marginal utility of migrant labor. Thus, a household will allocate
less labor to migration.
– Case Vb. If the marginal product associated with on-farm labor increases,
but the net present value of migration (less the cost of migration) is sufﬁciently large, then workers will be pulled into migration. The increase
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in labor allocated to this activity will result in an increase in income
0

(h (Lm (t)) > 0)), which implies an increase in the marginal utility of migrant labor. To beneﬁt from the higher value of labor associated with migration, households must allocate more workers to this activity, for longer
periods of time.8
Equations (4.11) and (4.12) suggest that, at the optimum, households will allocate labor so as to equate the marginal products of labor between on- and oﬀ-farm
activities. It is possible to rearrange these equations to equate the marginal values
with prices:

λ1
= w,
Uc (Zh , h )

(4.13)

λ3
= h0 (Lm (t)).
Uc (Zh , h )

(4.14)

gL (Zf , f ) +
gL (Zf , f ) +

From this I derive general equations for Lo and Lm as:

¯ A,
¯ w, Zc , h , f )
Lo = Lo (Zh , Zf , L,

(4.15)

¯ A,
¯ h, Zc , h , f ).
Lm = Lm (Zh , Zf , L,

(4.16)

Similarly, I write Lf :
¯ A,
¯ h , f ).
Lf = Lf (Zh , Zf , L,
8

(4.17)

This conclusion assumes that the cost of migration is ﬁxed, and that earnings from migration
increase over time due to experience, improved networks, and other general familiarity with the
process and/or experience (Yang, 2008).
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4.3 Empirical Strategy
My empirical model is a system of three jointly estimated labor share equations,
similar to a models employed by Skouﬁas (1994), Shively and Fisher (2004), and
Fisher et al. (2005). In order to estimate this system, I ﬁrst consider my general
structural labor allocation function, based on equations (4.15) through (4.17):
¯ A,
¯ W ; Zc , h , f )
L∗i = Li (Zh , Zf , L,

(4.18)

where i represents the labor activities, including on-farm labor, oﬀ-farm labor,
and migration. W is the returns of labor from each i activity.
The labor returns given in equation (4.18) that are relevant to labor allocation
functions are the shadow prices: the returns forgone by a household by participating
in diﬀerent labor activities. I assume that when a household participates in oﬀ-farm
activities or sends a household member into the migration market, their shadow price
for that activity equals the observed return. When they do not participate, however,
it is likely because their shadow price is greater than the potential return. This can
cause problems in estimation as either omitting the non-participants or imputing
returns at a given market return is not reliable; it may bias the estimates of the labor
allocation response. To eliminate this bias, I specify a system of equations, predicting
each household’s shadow price for each activity.
Any diﬀerence between the shadow prices derived from the observed market returns suggests non-participation in that activity. Therefore, shadow values and market participation are jointly determined. I estimate shadow value equations following
equations (4.13) and (4.14). I then use these predicted shadow prices in estimating the system of labor share equations determining the reallocation of labor. Using
predicted shadow prices for all households helps to avoid possible measurement er-
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ror and/or heterogeneity which may arise from using a combination of imputed and
observed prices (Fisher et al., 2005).

4.3.1 Estimating Shadow Prices and Labor Shares

4.3.1.1 Shadow Prices

First, addressing the estimation of the shadow prices, I separately estimate the
three values: (1) the value of on-farm labor, (2) the value of migration labor, and
(3) the value of oﬀ-farm labor. First, participation in on-farm production is observed
for all households in the sample and therefore the shadow value of on-farm labor
is computed following Skouﬁas (1994) and Shively and Fisher (2004). A farm-level
production function is estimated in logarithmic form, including independent variables
for labor, fertilizer and other inputs, and land area. Fitted values of output are
obtained for each household and combined with the observed level of labor inputs
and the estimated parameter for labor, in order to create a shadow wage of labor on
each farm in each year. This is computed using the following equation:
Yˆit
ˆ
Witf = βˆit · f
Lit

(4.19)

Next, I similarly estimate returns from migration participation. Over 30 percent
of households reported receiving migration remittances. Taking advantage of this, I
employ a method similar to that outlined by Skouﬁas (1994). Instead of a production
function, however, I estimate the equation using factors which would contribute to
the wage earned, including age and education of the migrant9 , as well as location
(domestic or international), the level of local participation in migration, whether the
9

These factors allow us to control for the diﬀerence in labor opportunities which may arise from
supply side factors, including demand for particular skills or qualities in workers.
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household has another migrant, and distance to the borders.10 As above, I use ﬁtted
values and the estimated parameter for labor to calculate the shadow wage, following
the equation:
Yˆit
Wˆitm = βˆit · m
Lit

(4.20)

Finally, it is more complex to estimate shadow wages for oﬀ-farm labor, as wages
are not reported in the data. I proxy for these earnings by creating a variable based
on Zimbabwe’s minimum wage rates and the prevalence of mining opportunities in a
community. Mining is one of the largest industries in Zimbabwe and accounts for a
substantial percentage of formal and informal oﬀ-farm labor participation. There is
a minimum wage in mining, approximately $200 per month.11 This is uniform across
Zimbabwe and across mine types. However, it is diﬃcult to evaluate whether this
minimum wage is uniformly enforced. From discussions with former mine workers, I
conclude that wages are often lower and mining is often done informally. Therefore,
in order to capture this variability, as well as introduce variation across locations, I
create an index, based on the number and type of mines in a region. This index is
then multiplied by the minimum wage. To create the index, I use gold and coal as
the base minerals. These earn the largest returns and are set in the index as equal
to one.12 Then, I assume that the other mineral mines earn some smaller fraction,
based on the respective market prices, during my period of interest. These mine types
include: tin, copper, iron, and lithium. By generating this index for each community,
I am able to create an oﬀ-farm wage unique to each of my areas of interest.
I then employ the same method as used for the migration shadow wage in order
to calculate the oﬀ-farm shadow wage. This time, I include the age and education
of oﬀ-farm workers, number of total mines, other household members involved in oﬀ10

In Zimbabwe, most major cities are also border cities. The exception is Harare, the capital.
Zimbabwe’s National Employment Council sets wages, which vary slightly by industry.
12
They earn the largest return both speciﬁcally in my period of interest, but also earn the greatest
returns generally.
11
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farm labor, and the community participation in oﬀ-farm labor markets as explanatory
variables. I again use the follow equation:
Ŵito = βˆit ·

Yˆit
Loit

(4.21)

In estimating my shadow wage equations, I employ a speciﬁcation using a MundlakChamberlain device in order to address potential household heterogeneity.13 This
method is described in more detail, for the case of the labor shares, in section 4.3.2.114

4.3.1.2 Labor Shares

Deﬁning the estimated shadow prices (Wj∗ ), I can specify the ﬁnal labor share
equations as:

L∗i = αi +

X
j

βij Wj∗ +

X
k

γik Xk +

X
c

δic Zc +

X

χie e + νikce

(4.22)

e

where i and j represents labor activities, including on-farm labor, oﬀ-farm labor, and
migration. k is given household, in community c. e represents the various types
of shocks f and h, as previously deﬁned in section 4.2.1. L∗i again represents labor
shares. αi is a constant. Wj∗ is the estimated shadow prices, with corresponding
coeﬃcient βij . Xk is a vector of time-varying household speciﬁc characteristics, with
corresponding parameter γik . Zc is a vector of time-varying community characteristics, with corresponding parameter δic . e represents the vector of exogenous shocks,
with corresponding parameter χie . Finally, νikce is an error term which summarizes
the eﬀects of unobserved household variation and household-speciﬁc shocks to labor.
Following Shively and Fisher (2004) and Fisher et al. (2005), my labor share model
is similar to typical models of commodity or factor demand. Using this structure, it
13

Alternatively known as the correlated random eﬀects model.
Although described for an alternative case, its application is the same in the context of shadow
wages. I avoid multiple descriptions for the sake of brevity.

14
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is necessary to impose constraints across equations. In order to ensure that predicted
labor shares sum to one, I impose:

X

βij = 0,

(4.23)

χie = 0,

(4.24)

j

X
i

βij = 0,

X
k

γik = 0,

X

δic and

c

X
e

X

αi = 1.

(4.25)

i

Constraint (4.23) requires homogeneity. Constraint (4.24) requires that individual
eﬀects on labor allocation changes in the given explanatory variable will be such
that the net eﬀect resulting from a given change will be equal to zero. Finally,
constraint (4.25), combined with the preceding restrictions, ensures that the estimated
labor shares sum to one. Altogether the constraints imply that the labor allocation
decisions are related across labor activities.
I estimate these equations as a system. This provides an eﬃciency gain over using
OLS or GLS, as I assume that errors are correlated across equations and as equations
are non-parallel, with respect to variables included.

4.3.2 Labor Allocation and Reallocation
I am interested in labor reallocation. However, it is imperative to ﬁrst understand
the initial allocation of labor. Thus, in order to distinguish between labor allocation
behavior (Cases I and IV in my theoretical model) and labor reallocation behavior,
inﬂuenced by shocks (Cases II, III, and V in my theoretical model), I test two speciﬁcations. First, I consider simply labor allocation, where push and pull factors, such as
wages as well as household and community characteristics drive participation in farm
and non-farm labor. Next, I re-specify my equation and consider labor reallocation to
the various labor activities, explicitly including my shocks of interest, as well as the
same push and pull factors. The two separate speciﬁcations allow us to consider both
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how households typically allocate labor, as well as how shocks disparately inﬂuence
these allocations. Further, I am able to determine, for each case, which factors are
most likely to push and pull workers into the diﬀerent types of labor in the various
labor markets.

4.3.2.1 Labor Allocation: Mundlak-Chamberlain Device

First, to examine initial labor allocation, I employ a Mundlak-Chamberlain device
to address potential household heterogeneity.15 In this speciﬁcation, I omit all shock
variables, and include only the push and pull factors believed to drive household labor
allocation.
I use a Mundlak-Chamberlain device, as an unobserved eﬀect (ci ) arises due to
household heterogeneity among unobserved factors which inﬂuence the decision to
participate in diﬀerent labor activities. Some households are simply more likely to
participate in particular activities than others, for reasons not known to the observer:
this unobserved heterogeneity may create biased coeﬃcient estimates if not properly
accounted for.
If I assume that the unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time and not related
to any of the other covariates (strict exogeneity), I can simply estimate the equations
using a random eﬀects model. However, this a strong assumption, as there is no
assurance that the unobserved heterogeneity is uncorrelated with the other covariates. To adjust for this, a ﬁxed eﬀects model allows correlation between ci and other
household variables, but application to these data is hampered by the large number
of households which do not participate in all labor activities. Thus, to avoid problems
of incidental parameters which may be introduced with a ﬁxed eﬀects model, I adopt
a Mundlak-Chamberlain device, ﬁrst developed by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain
(1984).
15

The shadow wage estimations also employ the Mundlak-Chamberlain device.
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The Mundlak-Chamberlain device is based on the assumption that the unobserved
heterogeneity can be approximated as:
ci = ω + Z¯i λ + µi ,

(4.26)

where Z¯i is the time average of household level characteristics and where:
λ|Z̄i N (O, σit2 )

(4.27)

Thus, inclusion of Z¯i addresses potential correlation between the history of explanatory variables and the random household eﬀects and should also control for possible
correlation between covariates in the model and time constant unobserved heterogeneity.16

4.3.2.2 Labor Reallocation: Diﬀerencing

Next, in order to examine the reallocation of household labor resources, I include
my shock variables. However, as I am interested in reallocation of resources, or
changes over time, instead of using a Mundlak-Chamberlain device, I now employ a
diﬀerence model. I diﬀerence equation (4.22), which can be simpliﬁed and rewritten
as:

ΔL∗i = βij ΔWj∗ + γik ΔXk + δic ΔZc + χie Δe + Δνikce

(4.28)

where all terms are as previously deﬁned.
Diﬀerencing allows us to examine changes over time, as well as to control for
unobserved household heterogeneity, which, as previously stated, may bias coeﬃcient
16

This is a stronger assumption than used in ﬁxed eﬀects, as I specify the correlation between ci
and my time-variant variables. However, it is a weaker assumption than used in the random eﬀects
model, which assumes no correlation (Wooldridge, 2010).
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estimates.17 As I am interested in how households reallocate labor in the presence
of shocks, it is appropriate to use a diﬀerencing speciﬁcation in order to capture the
changes in labor shares in the various activities across time.
All variables included in the initial labor allocation speciﬁcation with the MundlakChamberlain device are time variant and thus diﬀerencing is straightforward. For
completeness, however, I test two alternative speciﬁcations of the shock variables.
First, I consider the diﬀerenced speciﬁcation of the shock variables, to understand
how changes in the shocked state of the household will impact labor reallocation.
Second, I consider an indicator for a shock in the second year only, to understand
how a shock between the ﬁrst and second year will impact household labor reallocation. While both speciﬁcations consider the impact of shocks, the former considers
changes in the shocked state, while the latter considers the introduction of a shock.

4.4 Country Context and Data
In this section, I give some background on the country context of Zimbabwe,
focused on the most common industries for employment and the impacts of hyperinﬂation on labor markets. I also discuss the sources of data used in my empirical
analysis.

4.4.1 Country Context: Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is a landlocked nation, located between the Zambezi and Limpopo
rivers, in Southern Africa. It has a population of approximately 16.15 million individuals, where about 60 percent of citizens derive their livelihood from agriculture
(FAO, nda). However, agriculture only contributes about 15 percent of gross domestic product, due to the prevalence of more lucrative mining and tourism industries
throughout the country.
17

I use only two years of data, and so this diﬀerence is equivalent to the ﬁxed eﬀect estimator.
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The nation is perhaps best known on the world stage for the period of hyperinﬂation and the ultimate collapse of its currency in the early 2000s. While this era was
largely a result of the Zimbabwean government printing money in order to ﬁnance
its involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Second Congo
War, tremendous self-dealing, government instability, and general unrest also drove
hyperinﬂation.18
The primary consequence of hyperinﬂation was the ultimate collapse of the currency and dollarization of the economy. Due to massive losses in foreign reserves
from the contraction of the economy, combined with the need to import more goods
due to business closure, labor markets in Zimbabwe suﬀered enormously. Shortly
after dollarization, in 2009, Zimbabwe was ranked as having the greatest rate of unemployment in the world: 95 percent.19 In later years, the economy has begun to
rebound, and employment has risen to approximately 75 to 80 percent of the population. Many jobs are in the mining or tourism sectors, although oﬀ-farm agriculture
on large, commercial farms in also common. During this period, migration was reported to increase, a logical movement, given the opportunity to earn foreign, and
thus more valuable at the time, currency abroad. Many legal migrants moved to
developed nations, including the United States, Australia, and Canada, while illegal
migrants tended towards border nations, including South Africa, Zambia, Botswana,
and Mozambique. Throughout this period, on-farm labor remained common, particularly among households which had always been subsistence producers.

4.4.2 Data Sources
I use data from two sources. The ﬁrst is household panel data from the International Crop Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). I supplement
18

This includes many potential contributing events, including the land seizures which occured
throughout the country, the massacres and imprisonments of political rivals, as well as institutionalized corruption. This list, however, is not exhaustive.
19
Although this, as with all measures of unemployment in the developing world, often fails to capture
informal employment, it is generally agreed that the circumstances were quite bad.
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the panel using data from the Climate Hazards Group InfraRed Precipitation with
Station (CHIRPS).
The ICRISAT data were collected in two waves for the 2004/2005 and the 2012/2013
growing seasons. The survey also contains comprehensive information on agricultural
practices, household consumption, and labor behaviors. The survey regions span three
provinces in Zimbabwe: Matabeleland North, Matabeleland South, and Masvingo. In
Figure 4.1 these regions are highlighted in yellow and wards (communities) surveyed
are indicated with triangles. In these communities, key informant interviews were
also held with extension staﬀ and farmers, in order to gain qualitative data on district institutions, local weather and climate, and other relevant community-speciﬁc
information.

Legend

Figure 4.1.: Survey Regions and Locations

I use a balanced panel of 355 households, providing 710 observations total. As
described previously, I estimate the model in two stages: I ﬁrst estimate equations
for shadow wages and then estimate equations for labor shares. Table 4.1 presents
the summary statistics for the variables used in estimating shadow wage equations.
Each equation includes a varied set of control variables as the factors inﬂuencing
prices of on-farm, migration, and oﬀ-farm labor are diﬀerent. Table 4.2 presents the
summary statistics for variables used in the system of equations for labor shares to
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on-farm, migration, and oﬀ-farm labor. I use a set of control variables including
characteristics of the household and participants in various activities. These include
whether the household was female headed, whether the household owned a plough
(a proxy for asset ownership), number of cattle owned20 , whether the household had
multiple migrants or oﬀ-farm laborers, and the community ratios of migration and
oﬀ-farm labor participation.21

20

This serves as a proxy for wealth in my analysis. Various measurements of wealth were considered
in my analysis, all were ultimately strongly correlated. I ultimately select the number of cattle
as my proxy due to the cultural signiﬁcance of livestock for Zimbabwean households (Hoogeveen
et al., 2011). Note that variables which appear in both the shadow wage equation and labor share
equations are not repeated in Table 4.2.
21
Social networks have been shown to be important, for both communities and families (Barnum,
1976; Stark and Lucas, 1988; Cohen and House, 1996). Recent work (e.g. Barr et al. (2012)) further
supports the observations about the cohesive nature of families and villages in risk sharing.

Table 4.1. Summary Statistics: Shadow Wage Equations
2005
Wages: On-Farm Labor
Female-headed Household
Plough
Own Cattle
Receive Free Seed
Intercrop Fields
Quantity of Fertilizer (kgs)
Area Cultivated (hectares)
Number of Full Time Farm Laborers
Number of Part Time Farm Laborers
Wages: Migrant Labor
Average Migrant Gender
Average Migrant Age
Average Migrant Education (years)
Multiple Migrants
International Migrants
Domestic Migrants
International Migrants
Community Migrant Ratio
Distance to Victoria Falls (km)
Distance to Beitbridge (km)
Distance to Mutare (km)
Distance to Plumtree (km)
Wages: Oﬀ-Farm Labor
Average Oﬀ-Farm Laborer Gender
Average Oﬀ-Farm Laborer Age
Average Oﬀ-Farm Laborer Education (years)
Multiple Oﬀ-Farm Laborers
Number of Oﬀ-Farm Laborers
Participants in Informal Labor
Participants in Formal Labor
Community Oﬀ-Farm Participation Ratio

2013

Total

Mean
86.004
0.254
0.630
0.592
0.735
0.234
12.166
1.975
2.667
1.673
45.794
1.515
26.077
7.882
0.110
0.180
0.163
1.147
0.009

St. Dev
211.200
0.436
0.483
0.492
0.442
0.424
31.491
1.689
1.577
1.505
39.957
0.397
14.373
2.866
0.313
0.385
0.370
0.465
0.018

Mean
127.727
0.389
0.783
0.654
0.444
0.234
10.321
1.577
2.690
1.521
44.813
1.459
25.528
7.950
0.090
0.175
0.194
1.167
0.010

St. Dev
312.626
0.488
0.413
0.476
0.499
0.424
30.625
1.459
1.600
1.531
30.111
0.410
13.731
3.258
0.297
0.380
0.396
0.685
0.022

141.993
1.456
41.864
6.672
0.135
0.696
0.454
0.135
0.003

47.806
0.423
14.001
3.557
0.342
0.729
0.499
0.342
0.003

157.747
1.540
27.301
5.185
0.166
0.730
0.411
0.082
0.007

53.139
0.205
12.092
1.937
0.373
0.823
0.493
0.274
0.013

Mean
90.667
0.321
0.704
0.623
0.594
0.234
11.244
1.776
2.679
1.597
45.310
1.481
25.742
7.923
0.100
0.177
0.179
1.157
0.009
543.563
389.726
578.315
273.993
149.870
1.510
32.449
5.714
0.151
0.713
0.432
0.108
0.005

St. Dev
224.615
0.467
0.457
0.485
0.491
0.424
31.053
1.590
1.587
1.519
35.368
0.405
13.939
3.099
0.300
0.382
0.384
0.585
0.020
184.513
148.195
181.349
166.489
51.118
0.304
14.562
2.722
0.358
0.776
0.496
0.311
0.009

Note: Calculations by the author.
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Table 4.2. Summary Statistics: Labor Share Equations
2005
Share: On-Farm Labor
Share: Migrant Labor
Share: Oﬀ-Farm Labor
Adult Equivalents
Average Age
Average Education (years)

Mean
0.570
0.286
0.145
5.621
25.060
5.198

St. Dev
0.164
0.127
0.151
2.601
10.338
1.848

2013
Mean
0.566
0.289
0.147
4.820
27.301
5.185

St. Dev
0.177
0.146
0.161
2.012
12.092
1.937

Total
Mean
0.568
0.288
0.146
5.221
27.301
5.192

St. Dev
0.171
0.137
0.156
2.358
11.297
1.892

Note: Calculations by the author.

Summary statistics for my three shocks are presented in Table 4.3.22 Labor allocation in the presence of the various shocks are reported in Table 4.4. This table shows
the types of labor to which households allocate labor, given the experience of one or
multiple shocks. The two shocks related to death are derived from ICRISAT data.
The rainfall shock is derived from CHIRPS data. First, I derive the idiosyncratic
labor shock from the ICRISAT data. I determine if the household lost a household
member in the past year. In order to control for deaths that may be anticipated, I
omit deaths of those under the age of ﬁve and over the age of sixty-ﬁve.23 Second, as
the death of a single household’s member may have a covariate nature, I also calculate a measure of deaths in the community: for household j, the measure includes the
observed proportion of households in household j’s village c that experience a death,
excluding household j from the calculation. This represents the degree of death in
the village, and thus household j’s neighbors. The beneﬁt of this measure is that, by
construction, the variable is directly correlated with household j’s characteristics. I
use this as my second shock, the covariate labor shock.

22

In order to verify the exogeneity of these shocks, I test that they are not systematically related to
any household traits. The related tables are show in Appendix Table C.1.
23
I use the death of a household member as an idiosyncratic shock, following literature which examines idiosyncratic shocks (Dercon, 2002; Yang, 2003; Dercon, 2004; Yang, 2008). However, I
recognize that this is not a wholly perfect measure as the death of a family member can sometimes
be anticipated because of illness. I attempt to control for this by omitting the old and young.

Table 4.3. Summary Statistics: Labor Share Equations
2005
Death of a Working Family Member
Community Death Ratio
Rainfall Shortage
Rainfall Surplus
Rainfall Shock

Mean
0.096
0.0006
0.424
0.429
0.852

2013
St. Dev
0.295
0.0015
0.483
0.732
0.637

Mean
0.059
0.0008
0.376
0.381
0.768

Total
St. Dev
0.236
0.0022
0.447
0.521
0.428

Mean
0.078
0.0007
0.400
0.405
0.805

St. Dev
0.268
0.0019
0.466
0.635
0.544

Note: Calculations by the author.

Table 4.4. Labor Allocation and Shocks
Observations A: On-Farm Labor B: Oﬀ-Farm Labor C: Migration Labor A and B A and C B and C
2
0
7
1
318
3
None
84
0.000
0.012
0.000
0.333
0.000
X: Household Death
5
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.600
0.000
Y: Community Death
220
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.459
0.000
Z: Rainfall Shock
120
0.000
0.025
0.000
0.483
0.017
X and Y
22
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.227
0
X and Z
3
0.000
0.010
0.000
0.667
0.000
Y and Z
230
0.000
0.009
0.004
0.470
0.004
All
26
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.500
0.000

All
379
0.454
0.400
0.536
0.475
0.772
0.333
0.504
0.500

Note: Calculations by the author.
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Third, I use CHIRPS data to derive my rainfall shock. CHIRPS is a thirty-year
quasi-global rainfall dataset. It spans 50-degree-S to 50-degree-N, with all longitudes.
CHIRPS incorporates 0.05-degree resolution satellite imagery with in-situ station
data to create a gridded rainfall time series (Funk et al., 2015). Following (Ward and
Shively, 2015) the rainfall shock is based on deviations from expectations of observed
weather outcomes. Using community level rainfall, I calculate a rainfall shortage as:

λct =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨

rc,

t−1 −r¯c

σrc

⎪
⎪
⎩0

if rc,

t−1

< r¯c
(4.29)

otherwise

And, similarly rainfall excess can be calculated as:

λct =

⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨

rc,

⎪
⎪
⎩0

t−1 −r¯c

σrc

if rc,

t−1

> r¯c
(4.30)

otherwise

These rainfall measures are a function of rainfall (r) for community c in time
period t and σ is the standard deviation of rainfall for community c. I refer to this
measure as a rainfall shock, though it can also be considered as a Z-score of rainfall.
I use 20 years of rainfall to calculate the mean (r¯c ) and standard deviation (σ). To
calculate the shocks,24 deviations, the distance from the mean scaled by the standard
deviation, are considered for the previous cropping season (t − 1).25
24

Again, I measure the rainfall shock as the rainfall in the current period’s distance from the average,
scaled by the standard deviation, including both low and high rain. This is essential as, is in
Zimbabwe, any excess rainfall can cause damage, as well as a deﬁcit of rain. An example of this is
from the growing seasons around 2016-2017. During this year, the nation received slightly higher
rainfall than average. This was welcome, as this was following 2015-2016 during which the nation
suﬀered from extreme drought. However, this above average rain caused high levels of damage to
roads, causing issues with access to inputs, as well as ﬂooding in the ﬁelds, resulting in direct crop
damage. For this reason, I measure deviations from average rainfall in both directions.
25
For completeness, I test a series of year lengths (5, 10, and 15), as well as a series of lags for
cropping seasons, when calculating my rainfall measures. I select twenty years with a one year
cropping season lag in line with much of the previous literature, as the alternative measures result
in only slight diﬀerences. These results are available from the author upon request.
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4.5 Results and Discussion
This section includes the results and discussion, based on the empirical estimation,
as described in the previous sections.

4.5.1 Labor Allocation
Table 4.5 provides the results of the labor allocation share system, with a MundlakChamberlain device. The results are shown for share of workers in migration labor
(column (1)), share of workers in oﬀ-farm labor (column (2)), and share of workers
in on-farm labor (column (3)). Turning ﬁrst to wages for migration, oﬀ-farm, and
on-farm work, as estimated in my shadow wage equations: although magnitudes are
quite small, signs are as expected by theory (e.g. House and Rempel (1978), Larson
and Mundlak (1997)). I see that greater wages in oﬀ-farm and on-farm work results in
a smaller share of workers in migration, greater wages in migration and on-farm work
results in a smaller share of workers in oﬀ-farm labor, and greater wages in oﬀ-farm
work results in a smaller share of workers in on-farm work. Similarly, greater wages in
oﬀ-farm work results in a larger share of workers in oﬀ-farm labor and greater wages
in on-farm work results in a larger share of workers in on-farm labor. These signs
are all as expected and suggest that households rationally allocate labor, based on
potential earnings available in each respective labor market.

Table 4.5. Allocation of Labor: CRE, without Shocks
Share of Workers in Migration Labor
Migration wages
Oﬀ-farm wages
On-farm wages
Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
Number of cattle owned
Ratio of migration participation in the community

0.00004
(0.00005)
−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00004)
−0.00040∗∗∗
(2.18e − 06)
−0.000
(0.003)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.008∗∗∗
(0.003)
0.028∗∗
(0.012)
−0.048∗∗∗
(0.014)
0.001
(0.001)
−1.850
(1.457)

Household has more than one oﬀ-farm laborer

−0.0001∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
−0.00001∗∗∗
(2.92e − 06)
0.006
(0.003)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.003
(0.016)
−0.029
(0.019)
−0.000
(0.002)

Share of Workers in On-Farm Labor
0.0001∗
(0.0001)
−0.0006∗∗
(0.0002)
0.0001∗∗∗
(2.57e − 06)
−0.005∗
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.011∗∗
(0.003)
−0.031∗∗
(0.014)
0.077∗∗∗
0.017
−0.001
0.001

3.484∗∗∗
(0.819)

Ratio of oﬀ-farm participation in the community
Household has more than one migrant

Share of Workers in Oﬀ-Farm Labor

0.187∗∗∗
(0.020)
0.074∗
(0.040)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Regressions include time averages of explanatory variables as well as year and
natural region indicators. Distances to borders are also included (at the community level), though not included for parsimony.
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Outside of wages, one additional pattern predominates: workers are both pushed
into non-farm labor due to diﬃcult conditions on-farm and are simultaneously pulled
into non-farm labor due to desirable conditions or beneﬁcial networks in the labor
market. In households with a relatively large number of members or a female head,
push factors seem to predominate: each additional adult equivalent worker is associated with a 0.005-point reduction in on-farm labor share and the presence of a female
head is associated with a 0.031-point reduction in on-farm labor share. Additionally,
workers are pulled into oﬀ-farm labor by higher ratios of community participation in
oﬀ-farm work (3.484) and by the presence of other oﬀ-farm workers in the household
(0.074). Similarly, workers are pulled into migration when other migrant workers
are in the household (0.187). However, negative household conditions also precipitate non-farm work: lower asset levels (0.048) and lower levels of education (0.008)
are both negatively associated with migration labor and positively associated with
on-farm labor participation.
Taken together, these results suggest that households are pushed into non-farm
labor, particularly migration, following the non-shocked Case IV. They are driven
by diﬃcult household conditions, including low education, low levels of wealth, large
households, and the challenges presented by female household headship. While wages
are an important draw, other household level factors are also inﬂuential in determining
household labor allocation.

4.5.2 Labor Reallocation
Turning to Table 4.6, which presents the results with the diﬀerenced shock variables: I ﬁrst address the wages for migration, oﬀ-farm, and on-farm work, as estimated
in my shadow wage equations. While magnitudes for all wage variables are still quite
small, signs are as expected, where higher cross prices decrease own labor share allocation and higher own prices increase own labor share allocation. These results are
supported by theory and my model derived above. One exception to this is for the
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share of on-farm workers, which rises with the migration wage. The coeﬃcient on this
variable is very small, however, and I conclude that wages largely follow expectations,
increasing own labor share and decreasing cross labor share, with higher own labor
prices.
Many results are similar to the labor allocation results. Lower education (-0.009
for migration) and lower asset ownership (-0.047 for migration) pull workers in nonfarm labor, while female household headship (0.039 for migration, -0.036 for on-farm
labor) push workers into non-farm labor. I also ﬁnd that having more than one
migrant successfully pulls workers into migration work (0.174).
Considering changes in the household’s shocked state, I ﬁnd no shock variable
to be signiﬁcant. This indicates that if there was a change in the shocked state of
a household between the two periods it does not signiﬁcantly impact the share of
workers allocated to each activity. This is an important result as it indicates that
households do not use labor reallocation to cope with changes in their shocked state,
on average. This result may arise because this measure includes both households
which received a shock between the ﬁrst and second periods, as well as households
which received a shock in the ﬁrst period, but not in the second. This may have the
eﬀect of masking the overall impact of a shock, resulting from analyzing the change
in shocked state, rather than the introduction of a shock itself.
Next, in order to address this possible short-coming I consider whether a household
experienced a shock only in the second year. I again ﬁrst turn to wages for migration,
oﬀ-farm, and on-farm work, as estimated in my shadow wage equations. These results
are presented in Table 4.7. Estimated eﬀect magnitudes are again quite small, though
signs are as expected. Additionally, similar to previous speciﬁcations, lower education
(-0.009 for migration) and asset ownership (-0.0005 for migration) again pull workers
into non-farm labor, while more household members (-0.005 for on-farm labor) and
female headship (0.042 for migration, -0.038 for on-farm labor) again push workers
into non-farm labor.

Table 4.6. Reallocation of Labor: Diﬀerenced, with Shocks
Share of Workers in Migration Labor
Migration wages
Oﬀ-farm wages
On-farm wages
Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
Number of cattle owned
Household has more than one migrant

Share of Workers in Oﬀ-Farm Labor
−0.00016∗∗∗
(0.00004)
0.00091∗∗∗
(0.00025)
−0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00000)
0.00472
(0.00396)
0.00070
(0.00094)
−0.00442
(0.00415)
−0.00268
(0.01789)
−0.03085
(0.02167)
−0.00031
(0.00176)

0.00006
(0.00005)
−0.00016∗∗∗
(0.00004)
−0.00004∗∗∗
(0.00000)
0.00026
(0.00303)
0.00023
(0.00071)
−0.00904∗∗∗
(0.00313)
0.03883∗∗∗
(0.01370)
−0.04691∗∗∗
(0.01671)
0.00134
(0.00135)
0.17404∗∗∗
(0.02269)

Household has more than one oﬀ-farm laborer
Ratio of migration participation in the community

Ratio of deaths in community
Rainfall shock, in millimeters

0.000096∗
(0.000055)
−0.000753∗∗∗
(0.000252)
0.000053∗∗∗
(0.000003)
−0.004986
(0.003279)
−0.000928
(0.000791)
0.013457∗∗∗
(0.003458)
−0.036151∗∗
(0.014813)
0.077760∗∗∗
(0.018020)
−0.001033
(0.001460)

0.04306
(0.04669)
−1.52753
(2.70048)
3.03784∗∗
(1.34465)

Ratio of oﬀ-farm participation in the community
Death in household

Share of Workers in On-Farm Labor

0.00322
(0.01902)
0.31510
(11.07208)
−0.01122
(0.00905)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,
included for parsimony.

0.00557
(0.02487)
3.65462
(13.54491)
0.01382
(0.01174)
∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

−0.008788
(0.020676)
−3.969720
(12.248465)
−0.002604
(0.009780)

p < 0.01). Distances to borders are also included (at the community level), though not
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Table 4.7. Reallocation of Labor: Diﬀerenced, with Year 2 Shocks
Share of Workers in Migration Labor
Migration wages
Oﬀ-farm wages
On-farm wages
Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
Number of cattle owned
Household has more than one migrant

Share of Workers in Oﬀ-Farm Labor
−0.000159∗∗∗
(0.000040)
0.001037∗∗∗
(0.000256)
−0.000010∗∗∗
(0.000003)
0.004398
(0.003884)
0.000616
(0.000933)
−0.004608
(0.004113)
−0.003690
(0.017672)
−0.029525
(0.021323)
−0.000498
(0.001740)

0.000061
(0.000052)
−0.000159∗∗∗
(0.000040)
−0.000043∗∗∗
(0.000002)
0.001051
(0.002973)
0.000221
(0.000698)
−0.009250∗∗∗
(0.003100)
0.041578∗∗∗
(0.013492)
−0.049192∗∗∗
(0.016389)
0.001411
(0.001329)
0.166231∗∗∗
(0.022745)

Household has more than one oﬀ-farm laborer
Ratio of migration participation in the community

Ratio of deaths in community - year2
Rainfall shock - year2

0.000098∗
(0.000054)
−0.000878∗∗∗
(0.000255)
0.000053∗∗∗
(0.000003)
−0.005449∗
(0.003229)
−0.000837
(0.000785)
0.013859∗∗∗
(0.003439)
−0.037888∗∗
(0.014685)
0.0787173∗∗∗
(0.017793)
−0.000913
(0.001449)

0.023068
(0.047229)
−11.083022∗∗
(4.395203)

Ratio of oﬀ-farm participation in the community
Death in the household - year2

Share of Workers in On-Farm Labor

1.321764
(2.264677)
−0.024216
(0.028692)
18.209737∗∗
(7.766053)
−0.038105∗∗
(0.015564)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,
included for parsimony.

∗∗

0.041380
(0.037857)
7.297644
(9.793865)
0.049565
(0.020465)
p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

−0.0171641
(0.031637)
−25.50738∗∗
(11.098667)
−0.114607
(0.017108)

p < 0.01). Distances to borders are also included (at the community level), though not
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Importantly, my results surrounding shocks experienced in the second year show
signiﬁcant eﬀects. Considering the presence of a shock experienced by the household
in the second year, the covariate measure of death in the community increases share of
migration labor, while decreasing share of on-farm labor. This suggests a strategy of
leaving an area during a time of epidemic outbreak or high disease incidence, following
Case Va from my theoretical model. While this may be a successful labor strategy
for households coping with disease and death, it is somewhat concerning with respect
to the possible consequences for the areas into which these individuals migrate.26
Additionally, a rainfall shock will decrease the household’s share of migration labor,
following Case Vb from my theoretical model. This may again suggest a viable
coping strategy to bring labor close to home, which allows households to cope with
the challenges posed by variable precipitation levels.27
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 show marked diﬀerences between my two methods of measuring
shocks. The implications derived from each table are thus quite diﬀerent: while one
suggests that labor reallocation is not a strategy used by households to cope with the
overall experience of shock, the other suggests that labor reallocation, particularly
both in and out of migration markets serves as an important method. However, the
results are diﬀerent enough from one another to conclude that the diﬀerentiation
between the change in shock state and experiencing shock in the second period is
essential to consider. Analyzing only the diﬀerence across time simply tells us how
households cope over the period, while analyzing only the shock in the second year
tells us how households cope with a new shock. Thus, considering both gives us
26

There is a body of literature which explores this, including Ansell and Blerk (2004), Gushulak and
MacPherson (2004), Schmunis (2007), Coﬀee et al. (2007).
27
This echoes the observed increase in urban-rural migration in response to rainfall shortages observed in other literature.Further, these results suggest that households are actually being pushed
out of farm labor. However, it is necessary to verify this econometrically. To do so, I interact the
shock variables with year indicators and regress these variables on the log of yield for three crops
(maize, sorghum, and millet), in a ﬁxed eﬀects regression. The results of this are shown in Appendix Table C.2. These results verify that households are being pushed out of farm labor, by worse
conditions on-farm, particularly in the case of deaths in the community.
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a broader perspective on coping strategies employed by households, when diﬀerent
types of shocks are experienced.

4.5.3 Robustness Checks
I conduct a series of robustness checks, providing regression results in a series of
tables. As a ﬁrst robustness check, I also include in Tables 4.8 and 4.9, speciﬁcations
of my labor reallocation regressions, with interaction terms. As the impacts of each
shock may be experienced diﬀerently by households with diﬀerent characteristics, I
interact: 1) number of adult equivalents, 2) whether the household is female headed,
3) whether the household owns a plough, and 4) number of cattle, with each of
the three shocks.28 I include these variables in the labor reallocation regressions, in
order to examine the potentially diﬀerent impacts of these shocks for households with
diﬀerent traits.
The signiﬁcant eﬀects are somewhat limited, but are still important to consider
due to these potentially disparate impacts. First, considering Table 4.8 with diﬀerenced shocks, I ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the interaction of
a household death and number of adult equivalents with the share of labor allocated
to oﬀ-farm and on-farm labor. This relationship suggests that if the household experiences a death, there is a positive relationship with a larger number of household
members and share of members participating in on-farm labor. Conversely, there is a
negative relationship with a large number of household members and share of members participating in oﬀ-farm labor. This suggests that if the household experiences
the loss of a household member, those households with large families are likely to return to farm labor, while those with smaller families are likely to move larger shares
into oﬀ-farm labor. This relationship in shown in Figure 4.2.29 Additionally, there are
two other eﬀects, related to migration labor: the interaction between a community
28

This introduces 12 new variables.
I consider graphical representations of some of these eﬀects are interpretation of interaction terms
can be diﬃcult. Recent literature, including Ai and Norton (2003), Norton et al. (2004), Williams
(2012) suggest a successful method for considering interaction eﬀects is graphically.

29
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Table 4.8. Reallocation of Labor: Diﬀerenced, with Shocks and Interactions
Share of Workers in Migration Labor
Migration wages
Oﬀ-farm wages
On-farm wages
Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
Number of cattle owned
Household has more than one migrant
Household has more than one oﬀ-farm laborer
Ratio of migration participation in the community

Ratio of deaths in community
Rainfall shock, in millimeters
Interaction: household death and adult equivalents
Interaction: household death and female headed
Interaction: household death and plough
Interaction: household death and number of cattle
Interaction: community death and adult equivalents
Interaction: community death and female headed
Interaction: community death and plough
Interaction: community death and number of cattle
Interaction: rainfall shock and adult equivalents
Interaction: rainfall shock and female headed
Interaction: rainfall shock and plough
Interaction: rainfall shock and number of cattle

Share of Workers in On-Farm Labor
0.000110∗∗
(0.000047)
−0.000917∗∗∗
(0.000252)
0.000051∗∗∗
(0.000003)
−0.004434
(0.004934)
−0.000720
(0.000756)
0.011768∗∗∗
(0.00330)
−0.039798∗
(0.022629)
0.063722∗∗
(0.025370)
−0.000083
(0.002214)

0.002924
(0.046153)
−2.672973
(2.609369)
3.844355∗∗
(1.535757)

Ratio of oﬀ-farm participation in the community
Death in household

Share of Workers in Oﬀ-Farm Labor
−0.000155∗∗∗
(0.000040)
0.001072∗∗∗
(0.000254)
−0.000010∗∗∗
(0.000003)
0.008776
(0.006424)
0.000576
(0.000969)
−0.003284
(0.004260)
−0.012082
(0.029455)
−0.026142
(0.032807)
0.000155
(0.002879)

0.000044
(0.000044)
−0.000155∗∗∗
(0.000040)
−0.000041∗∗∗
(0.000002)
−0.004342
(0.004224)
0.000144
(0.000627)
−0.008485∗∗∗
(0.002769)
0.051880∗∗∗
(0.019369)
−0.037581∗
(0.021804)
−0.000072
(0.001898)
0.176778∗∗∗
(0.019170)

−0.051427
(0.059137)
14.657923
(16.777899)
−0.024500
(0.022481)

0.099657
(0.089959)
−19.582068
(25.440217)
0.026849
(0.034150)

−0.048230
(0.069141)
4.924145
(20.411982)
−0.002350
(0.026274)

0.004914
(0.005801)
0.019873
(0.038352)
−0.006427
(0.051840)
0.002777
(0.001764)
−1.532073
(2.034905)
4.325393
(5.755544)
5.855249
(8.440916)
−2.202104∗
(1.230686)
0.003204
(0.003803)
−0.034841∗
(0.018975)
0.001388
(0.019583)
0.001986
(0.001725)

−0.017088∗
(0.008805)
0.003326
(0.058338)
0.020894
(0.078832)
0.000476
(0.002683)
4.980292
(3.121173)
−2.441419
(8.734185)
−13.950175
(12.924159)
2.428644
(1.859323)
−0.001703
(0.005797)
0.028555
(0.028661)
−0.009201
(0.029912)
−0.000796
(0.002615)

0.012174∗
(0.006774)
−0.023200
(0.033816)
−0.0144672
(0.060518)
−0.003254
(0.002059)
−3.448220
(2.432544)
−1.883974
(6.780731)
8.094926
(10.06011)
−0.226540
(1.456498)
−0.001501
(0.004460)
0.006286
(0.022066)
0.007813
0.023096
−0.001190
(0.002014)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,
for parsimony.

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01). Distances to borders are also included (at the community level), though not included
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death and number of cattle is signiﬁcant and the interaction between rainfall shock
and female headed household is signiﬁcant. This suggests that if there is a large
number of deaths in the community, but the household has a large number of cattle
and thus is relatively wealthy, the household has a smaller share of members participating in migration labor. Similarly, if the household experiences a rainfall shock and
is female headed, it is less likely to have members participating in migration labor.
Together, these results suggest that larger households return to farm labor, while
smaller families work oﬀ-farm, when an idiosyncratic shock is experienced. Wealthier
households experiencing a covariate shock tend to send people away to work in order
to cope, while female-headed households appear unable to do so and thus reallocate
labor shares to farm activities.
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Figure 4.2.: Labor Share: Interaction of Household Death and Adult Equivalents

Next, turning to Table 4.9, which presents the speciﬁcation which considers if a
shock was experienced only in the second year: this regression determines a diﬀerent
set of impacts. First, there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the experience of
the death of a household member and the number of cattle, as well as the share
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of migration labor and the share of on-farm labor. I ﬁnd that if the household
experiences the death of a household member, and has a large number of cattle,
the share of migration labor is greater, while the share of on-farm labor is smaller.
Second, I ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the interaction of a
household death and the number of adult equivalents, with the share of on-farm
labor. Taken together, these results indicate that households with more cattle, and
that are relatively wealthier, tend to return to farm to cope with idiosyncratic shocks,
while poorer households diversify a share of their labor to migration labor. This is
shown in Figure 4.3. Additionally, I again ﬁnd that large families tend to reallocate
labor to on-farm activities after the experience of an idiosyncratic shock. This latter
result aﬃrms the ﬁndings shown in Table 4.8, where, if the household experiences the
death of a household member and has a large number of household members, then
the share of labor on-farm is likely to increase.
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Figure 4.3.: Labor Share: Interaction of Household Death and Cattle

These results suggest some disparate impacts of the shocks by household characteristics. In particular, the behavior response to death diﬀers on dependent on
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Table 4.9. Reallocation of Labor: Diﬀerenced, with Year 2 Shocks and Interactions
Share of Workers in Migration Labor
Migration wages
Oﬀ-farm wages
On-farm wages
llp Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
Number of cattle owned
Household has more than one migrant

Share of Workers in Oﬀ-Farm Labor
−0.000160∗∗∗
(0.000039)
0.001178∗∗∗
(0.000257)
−0.000010∗∗∗
(0.000003)
0.007324
(0.005307)
0.000408
(0.000952)
−0.004084
(0.004204)
0.003284
(0.028868)
−0.024595
(0.031698)
0.000161
(0.002859)

0.000046
(0.000043)
−0.000160∗∗∗
(0.000039)
−0.000041∗∗∗
(0.000002)
−0.001999
(0.003439)
0.000224
(0.000607)
−0.008689∗∗∗
(0.002700)
0.045559∗∗
(0.018812)
−0.039604∗
(0.020838)
−0.000114
(0.001862)
0.171404∗∗∗
(0.019055)

∗∗

−8.539535
(3.709154)

Ratio of oﬀ-farm participation in the community
Death in the household - year2
Ratio of deaths in community - year2
Rainfall shock - year2
Interaction: household death and adult equivalents
Interaction: household death and female headed
Interaction: household death and plough
Interaction: household death and number of cattle
Interaction: community death and adult equivalents
Interaction: community death and female headed
Interaction: community death and plough
Interaction: community death and number of cattle
Interaction: rainfall shock and adult equivalents
Interaction: rainfall shock and female headed
Interaction: rainfall shock and plough
Interaction: rainfall shock and number of cattle

0.000114∗∗
(0.000047)
−0.001018∗∗∗
(0.000254)
0.000052∗∗∗
(0.000003)
−0.005325
(0.004120)
−0.000633
(0.000749)
0.012773∗∗∗
(0.003286)
−0.048843∗∗
(0.022350)
0.064199∗∗∗
(0.024678)
−0.000048
(0.002215)

−0.010814
(0.046507)

Household has more than one oﬀ-farm laborer
Ratio of migration participation in the community

Share of Workers in On-Farm Labor

1.624500
(2.332112)
−0.090258∗∗∗
(0.034535)
15.752969∗∗
(7.572510)
−0.042282∗∗
(0.016968)

0.088484∗
(0.053103)
6.727548
(12.253435)
0.062541∗∗
(0.026195)

−0.000725
(0.005197)
0.051733
(0.035623)
−0.004357
(0.039116)
0.003931∗∗
(0.001758)
−0.377829
(1.507114)
3.032325
(5.658312)
3.719052
(8.447153)
−1.882131
(1.173495)
0.001086
(0.002467)
−0.027068
(0.018285)
−0.002346
(0.018717)
0.002139
(0.001702)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

−0.009454
(0.007969)
−0.007796
(0.054699)
0.046548
(0.059953)
−0.000527
(0.002702)
2.509253
(2.333179)
−1.175081
(8.669745)
−17.297136
(12.983154)
2.049343
(1.797785)
−0.000040
(0.003795)
0.011319
(0.027952)
−0.003884
(0.028755)
−0.000990
(0.002611)
∗∗∗

p < 0.01).

0.001773
(0.041208)
−22.480517∗
(12.014354)
−0.020259
(0.026274)
0.010179∗
(0.006172)
−0.042937
(0.043224)
−0.042191
(0.046403)
−0.003404∗
(0.002090)
−2.131424
(1.834003)
−1.857245
(6.721345)
13.578084
(10.065254)
−0.167212
(1.398366)
−0.001046
(0.002940)
0.015749
(0.021674)
0.006230
(0.022364)
−0.001149
0.002026
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household size and wealth. The response to an idiosyncratic shock is more aﬀected
by household characteristics, although there is also weaker evidence related to the
covariate measures. There are signiﬁcant relationships between deaths in the community and the number of cattle and the experience of a rainfall shock and the number
of adult equivalents. Overall, these results suggest a diﬀerence in the ability of households to cope with shocks, by both levels of human capital and of wealth within the
household. This result is imperative for consideration when making policy decisions
and recommendations, as well as for making predications about how labor ﬂows when
shocks are experienced.

4.5.4 Interpretations
Examining the results described above, I arrive at two conclusions: (1) both push
and pull factors operate in driving households’ labor allocations, regardless of whether
or not shocks were included; and (2) experience of various shocks compound labor
reallocation, although to a relatively small degree. Although the magnitudes of signiﬁcant variables are quite similar in the labor allocation and both of the reallocation
speciﬁcations, the inclusion of the various shock variables ampliﬁes the overall impact
on labor reallocations. Further, these shocks are disparately experienced by households with diﬀerent characteristics, suggesting that actual eﬀects felt by households
will be inﬂuenced by their own characteristics, beyond the shock itself.
These results demonstrate that households move into non-farm labor, particularly
migration, due to negative or diﬃcult household conditions, including large household
sizes, low levels of education, and the challenges often associated and demonstrated
by female household headship. These relationships are demonstrated regardless of
weather a shock is experienced by a household or not. This suggests that adverse,
household-level factors are pushing households to participate in oﬀ-farm labor, rather
than being pulled by beneﬁcial traits to participate in non-farm activities. Oﬀ-farm
labor participation thus may be a distress-push response (Babatunde and Qaim, 2010)
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or a conscious diversiﬁcation choice, made in order optimize labor allocation as part
of an optimal household strategy (Reardon, 1997; Bryceson, 1999; Barrett et al., 2001;
Reardon et al., 2001; Wouterse and Taylor, 2008). But, regardless of mechanism, it
is clear that households that experience a new shock in the period of interest search
for alternative strategies and options that bring labor oﬀ-farm.
Further, the results highlight the importance of wages and suggests that households respond rationally to wage incentives when making decisions to allocate and
reallocate labor. As wages in non-farm labor activities, both migration and oﬀ-farm,
increase, households tend to put larger shares of labor into these activities. Similarly,
as wages rise on-farm, households move more labor into on-farm activities. However,
although households respond rationally to these incentives, the coeﬃcients on all of
the wage variables are quite small. This indicates that although wages are signiﬁcant
in impacting the allocation and reallocation of labor, their actual power to do so is
relatively limited.
Addressing the impact of shocks on the reallocation of labor, it is essential to ﬁrst
reiterate the continued importance of both wages and negative household factors in
driving households into non-farm labor. But, when turning to the shocks themselves,
I ﬁnd mixed results. Although previous literature has observed that in some cases,
shocks force households to return to on-farm labor (Yang, 2006), focusing household
labor on household food security though own production, in other cases households
are pulled into oﬀ-farm labor (Berhanu and White, 2000; Yang and Choi, 2007; Yang,
2008), diversifying income sources in order to cope with the realization of shocks.
However, I do not ﬁnd consistent evidence to support either body of literature, exclusively. For some shocks, such as the covariate measure of deaths in the community, household migration increases, at the expense of labor on-farm. Conversely, for
rainfall shocks, I ﬁnd a decline in allocation of labor resources to migration. Taken
together, this suggests that the experience of a shock by a household does not incite a
standardized response, but rather that the type of shock is important for determining
the households’ coping strategies and labor reallocation activities. In this way, my
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results echo the ﬁndings of Börner et al. (2015) in which idiosyncratic and covariate
shocks elicit diﬀerent responses.
Ultimately, I ﬁnd important evidence to suggest disparate impacts by household
wealth and number of household members, diﬀerentiated by the type of shock experienced. This is particularly evident in the case of the idiosyncratic shock, the death
of a household member. These results indicate that household traits may also be
inﬂuential in driving households’ labor reallocation responses. Households with more
wealth and more members seem to be more prone to participate in on-farm labor
and migration labor, respectively. This suggests that larger households and wealthier
households may be able to cope in ways that are not available to households with
smaller families or lower levels of wealth. Taken in the broader picture of this paper’s
conclusions, households reallocate labor to cope with shocks, but are constrained to
some degree by their household size, wealth level, and other household characteristics. These factors ultimately play an important role in the ability of households to
reallocate their labor to various activities, not only as push and pull factors, but also
when coping with a realized shock ex post.
Finally, it is essential to mention a shortcoming of this study and thus of these
ﬁndings. As is common to much of the literature which examines any type of shock, it
is not possible to measure a counterfactual for the situations examined. It is an unmet
challenge, at this juncture, to appropriately measure what would have happened, were
the shocks not realized by these households.

4.6 Policy Implications and Recommendations for Future Work
My results have relevance for public policy, especially as related to migration and
non-farm employment. Understanding the forces that push and pull rural labor, as
well as how speciﬁc shocks additionally drive labor reallocation will become increasingly important, especially in the context of climate change and environmentallyinduced migration. Most importantly, my conclusion that not all shocks have a uni-
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form impact is crucial: as diﬀerent types of shocks have disparate impacts on household behavior, it is necessary to consider the context of a particular event, rather than
the expected labor impact alone. I ﬁnd that reallocating labor in order to cope with
newly experienced shocks is a relatively important coping strategy for households,
although quantifying the overall impact remains an unmet challenge.30 Therefore,
reducing barriers to immigration and oﬀ-farm labor participation will be important
to ensure that households are able to adapt and respond to shocks experienced by
their household and in their region.
Heterogeneity in household characteristics and conditions further condition household responses to shocks, in particular idiosyncratic shocks. The number of adult
equivalents in the household, and the number of cattle (a proxy for wealth) impact
the way in which households reallocate their labor. For this reason, these characteristics should be given special consideration in any policy recommendations. Of
special concern are my ﬁndings with respect to wealth: results show that households
with a greater store of wealth tend to respond to shocks by reallocating labor back
to on-farm activities. This reinforces previous ﬁndings which indicate that household members tend to return home when the household experiences an adverse shock
(Yang, 2008). Poorer households, in contrast, may be pushed out of farming and
pulled into oﬀ-farm activities by wages that are relatively high – at least high enough
to induce their temporary movement. Although I do not document it here, this could
imply disinvestment in agriculture or have potentially serious repercussions for asset
transfers via “distressed sales.” These factors are worthy of future consideration,
both with respect to their implications for policy, and for their role in precipitating
irreversible changes in the rural landscape of developing countries.
The conclusions of this study highlight the importance of household labor reallocation in coping with the realization of various types of shocks. Diﬀerent shocks
30

In chapter three of this dissertation, as well as in a working paper by Josephson and Ricker-Gilbert
(available from Josephson upon request), the authors ﬁnd that households move into oﬀ-farm labor
in order to cope with an increasingly arid environment, instead of growing sorghum, millet, or other
native, drought-resistant crops.
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elicit diﬀerent labor responses from households. Any policy aiming to address rural
poverty should consider these dissimilar reactions. Additionally, these results show
the importance of household traits in coping with shocks, and conditioning diﬀerential
labor responses according to the type of shock observed. This suggests that all households do not cope in the same ways, regardless of traits, and thus labor allocation
behavior is ultimately dependent on size and relative wealth. These elements must be
considered when policies to assist households in dealing with shocks are considered
and implemented. Understanding the way in which push and pull factors drive labor
reallocation after the realization of shocks will be important in the future for households and countries seeking to for avoiding disruptions in labor markets in times of
crisis.

4.7 Conclusion
I ﬁnd that households are both pushed out of on-farm labor and pulled into oﬀfarm labor. In the absence of shocks, diﬃcult farming conditions push households
toward increasing the share of labor engaging in migratory and oﬀ-farm activities.
Precipitating factors include low education, low wealth, large household size, and
female headship. Simultaneously, higher wages in oﬀ-farm activities and distant labor
markets reached via migration exert a pull. In the presence of shocks, households
reallocate their labor to a greater degree than in the absence of shocks, with covariate
shocks such as deaths in the community and local rainfall anomalies both driving
reallocation of labor away from on-farm labor and into migration labor. Household
traits condition the response: in the case of idiosyncratic shocks I ﬁnd a larger on-farm
labor share in wealthy households, and a larger oﬀ-farm share in large households.
With these results, I make several contributions to the ongoing conversation about
household coping strategies for shocks, as well as to the literature on push and pull
factors and their relationship with household behavior. In particular, this is among
the ﬁrst papers to quantitatively examine the impacts of and coping strategies em-
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ployed to address shocks experienced by rural households, during the already stressful
period of hyperinﬂation and the ultimate currency collapse in Zimbabwe. However,
I also provide further empirical evidence for labor allocation as an essential ex post
mechanism for coping with realized negative shocks, including rainfall shocks and
deaths in the community. With my empirical speciﬁcation and use of panel data
and multiple exogenous shocks, I improve on the identiﬁcation mechanism used in
estimating the impacts of economic conditions on labor allocation activity and participation. My results support the idea that oﬀ-farm and migration labor can serve as
an ex post coping strategy for households coping with idiosyncratic, but particularly,
covariate shocks.
My paper elucidates my understanding of the push and pull factors inﬂuencing
such labor dynamics, in the context of shocks in an already stressed environment.
As a result, my ﬁndings are relevant to public policy related to economic and environmental migration. These phenomena are a widespread feature of our twenty-ﬁrst
century world. Multiple events serve to undermine rural livelihoods and drive rural
households from their communities, changing population dynamics and labor markets throughout the developing world. This will have implications for urban centers
and neighboring countries. This paper seeks to clarify and understand these events
for better addressing their future realizations and mitigation of their potential future
impacts.

REFERENCES

119

REFERENCES

Abegunde, D. O. and A. E. Stanciole (2008). The economic impact of chronic
diseases: How do households response to shocks? Evidence from Russia. Social
Science and Medicine 66, 2296–2307.
Acemoglu, D. and J. Robinson (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power,
Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Business.
Adesina, A. A. and J. Baidu-Forson (1997). Farmers’ perceptions and adoption of
new agricultural technology: Evidence from analysis in Burkina Faso and Guinea,
West Africa. Agricultural Economics 13 (1), 47–53.
Agarwal, B. (1997). “Bargaining” and gender relations: Within and beyond the
household. Feminist Economics 3 (1), 1–51.
Ai, C. and E. C. Norton (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models.
Economics Letters 80, 123–129.
Akobeng, E. (2016). The invisible hand of rain in spending: Eﬀect of rainfall-driven
agricultural income on per capita expenditure in Ghana. South African Journal of
Economics, Forthcoming.
Alderman, H. and C. H. Paxson (1992). Do the poor insure? A synthesis of the
literature on risk and consumption in developing countries. World Bank Working
Papers: WPS 1008, Agriculture and Rural Development.
Ansell, N. and L. V. Blerk (2004). Children’s migration as a household/family
strategy: Coping with AIDS in Lesotho and Malawi. Journal of Southern African
Studies 30 (3), 673–690.
Antman, F. M. (2015). Gender discrimination in the allocation of migrant household
resources. Journal of Population Economics 28, 565–592.
Anyadike, O. (2017). Drought in Africa 2017.
Armah, J., M. Klawitter, and C. L. Anderson (2010). Adoption of improved sorghum
and millet cultivars in SSA. Evans School of Public Aﬀairs, University of Washington: Evans School Policy Analysis and Research.
Babatunde, R. O. and M. Qaim (2010). Oﬀ-farm labor market participation in
rural Nigeria: Driving forces and household access. Contributed Paper for the 5th
IZA/World Bank Conference: Employment and Development: May 3 - May 4, 2010,
Cape Town, South Africa.
Banerjee, A. and E. Duﬂo (2007). The economic lives of the poor. Journal of
Economic Perspectives 21 (1), 141–167.

120
Banerjee, A. V., R. Benabou, and D. Mookherjee (Eds.) (2006). Understanding
Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press, University of Oxford.
Barnum, H. N. (1976). The interrelationship among social and political variables,
economic structure, and rural-urban migration. Economic Development and Cultural
Change 24 (4), 759–764.
Barr, A., M. Dekker, and M. Fafchamps (2012). Who shares risk with whom
under diﬀerence enforcement mechanisms? Economic Development and Cultural
Change 60 (4), 667–706.
Barrett, C., M. Bezuneh, D. Clay, and T. Reardon (2000). Heterogeneous constraints, incentives, and income diversiﬁcation strategies in rural Africa. Mimeo,
Cornell University.
Barrett, C., T. Reardon, and P. Webb (2001). Nonfarm income diversiﬁcation and
household livelihood strategies in rural Africa: concepts, dynamics, and policy implications. Food Policy 26, 315–331.
Basu, K. (2006). Gender and say: A model of household behavior with endogenously
determined balance of power. The Economic Journal 116 (511), 558–580.
Berhanu, B. and M. White (2000). War, famine, and female migration in Ethiopia:
1960-1989. Economic Development and Cultural Change 49 (1), 91–113.
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (2004). Diﬀerentiated products demand systems from a combination of micro and macro data: The new car market. Journal of
Political Economy 112 (1), 68–105.
Bezu, S., G. T. Kassie, B. Shirferaw, and J. Ricker-Gilbert (2014). Impact of improved maize adoption on welfare of farm households in Malawi: A panel data
analysis. World Development 59, 120–131.
Bhaumik, S. K., R. Dimova, and J. B. Nugent (2006). Pulls, pushes, and entitlement
failures in labor markets: Does the state of development matter? IZA Discussion
Paper, No. 2258.
Birch, L. L. (1999). Development of food preferences. Annual Review of Nutrition 19,
41–61.
Blum, A. (2005). Drought resistance, water-use eﬃciency, and yield potentialare they
compatible, dissonant, or mutually exclusive? Australian Journal of Agricultural
Research 56 (11), 1159–1168.
Blum, A. and A. Ebercon (1975). Genetypic responses in sorghum to drought stress.
III. free proline accumulation and drought resistance. Crop Science 16 (3), 428–431.
Blum, A., J. Mayer, and G. Golan (1989). Agronomic and physiological assessments
of genotypic variation for drought resistance in sorghum. Australian Journal of
Agricultural Research 40 (1), 49–61.
Bobonis, G. (2009). Is the allocation of resources within the household eﬃcient?
New evidence from a randomized experiment. Journal of Political Economy 117 (3),
453–503.

121
Börner, J., G. Shively, S. Wunder, and M. Wyman (2015). How do rural households
cope with economic shocks? insights from global data using hierarchical analysis.
Journal of Agricultural Economics 66 (2), 392–414.
Browning, M., F. Bourguignon, and P.-A. Chiappori (1994). Incomes and outcomes:
A strutural model and some evidence from French data. Journal of Political Economy 113 (6), 1277–1306.
Browning, M. and P.-A. Chiappori (1998). Eﬃcient intra-household allocation: A
general characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica 66 (6), 1241–1278.
Bryceson, D. F. (1999). African rural labour, income diversiﬁcation, and livelihoods
approaches: a long-term development perspective. Review of African Political Economy 80, 171–189.
Camerer, C. (1999). Behavioral economics: Reunifying psychology and economics.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States 96 (19), 10575–
10577.
Cavatassi, R., L. Lipper, and U. Narlch (2011). Modern variety adoption and
risk management in drought prone areas: insights from sorghum farmers of eastern Ethiopia. Agricultural Economics 42 (3), 279–292.
Chamberlain, G. (1984). Panel data. In Z. Grilliches and M. Intriligator (Eds.),
Handbook of Econometrics, Volume 2, pp. 1247–1318. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Chamlee-Wright, E. (2002). Savings and accumulation strategies of urban market
women in Harare, Zimbabwe. Economic Development and Cultural Change 50 (4),
979–1005.
Chiappori, P.-A. (1992). Collective labor supply and welfare. Journal of Political
Economy 100 (3), 437–467.
Chiappori, P.-A., B. Fortin, and G. Lacroix (2002). Marriage market, divorce legislation, and household labor supply. Journal of Political Economy 110 (1), 37–72.
Chibwana, C., M. Fischer, and G. Shively (2012). Cropland allocation eﬀects of
agricultural input subsidies in Malwai. World Development 40 (1), 124–133.
Chirwa, E. W. and M. Muhome-Matita (2013). Agricultural growth and poverty
in rural Malawi. Paper prepared for the GND 14th Annual Global Development
Conference on Inequality, Social Protection and Inclusive Growth, June 19-21, 2016,
Manila, the Philippines.
CIA (n.d.). Africa: Zimbabwe. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/zi.html. Accessed at CIA.gov: Publications: The
World Factbook, on January 3, 2017.
Coﬀee, M., M. N. Lurie, and G. P. Garnett (2007). Modelling the impact of migration
on the HIV epidemic in South Africa. AIDS 21 (3), 434–350.
Cohen, B. and W. J. House (1996). Labor market choices, earnings, and informal
networks in Khartoum, Sudan. Economic Development and Cultural Change 44 (3),
589–618.

122
Coxhead, I., G. Shively, and X. Shuai (2002). Development policies, resource constraints, and agricultural expansion on the Philippine land frontier. Environment
and Development Economics 7, 341–363.
Cragg, J. (1971). Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to the demand for durable goods. Econometrica 39 (5), 829–844.
Dai, A. (2013). Increasing drought under global warming in observations and models.
Nature Climate Change 3, 52–58.
de Janvry, A., M. Fafchamps, and E. Sadoulet (1991). Peasant household behaviour
with missing markets: Some paradoxes explained. Economic Journal 101 (409),
14001417.
Deaton, A. (1989). Saving in developing countries: Theory and review. Proceedings
in the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics 1989.
Debela, B., G. Shively, A. Angelsen, and M. Wik (2012). Economic shocks, diversiﬁcation, and forest use in Uganda. Land Economics 88 (1), 129–154.
Denning, G., P. Kabame, P. Sanchez, A. Malik, R. Flor, R. Harawa, P. Nkhoma,
C. Zamba, C. Banda, C. Magombo, M. Keating, J. Wangila, and J. Sachs (2009).
Input subsidies to improve smallholder maize productivity in Malawi: Toward an
African Green Revolution. PLoS Biology 7 (1).
Dercon, S. (1996). Risk, crop choice, and savings: Evidence from Tanzania. Economic Development and Cultural Change 44 (3), 485–513.
Dercon, S. (2002). Income risk, coping strategies, and safety nets. World Bank
Research Observer 17 (2), 141–166.
Dercon, S. (Ed.) (2004). Insurance Against Poverty. New York: Oxford University
Press, University of Oxford.
Dercon, S. and L. Christiaensen (2011). Consumption risk, technology adoption,
and poverty traps: Evidence from Ethipoia. Journal of Development Economics 96,
159–173.
Doss, C. (2002). Men’s crops? Women’s crops? The gender patterns of cropping in
Ghana. World Development 30 (11), 1987–2000.
Doss, C. (2013). Intrahousehold bargaining and resource allocation in developing
countries. World Bank Research Observer 28 (1), 52–78.
Doss, C. and M. Morris (2001). How does gender aﬀect the adoption of agricultural innovations? The case of improved maize technology in Ghana. Agricultural
Economics 25, 27–39.
Doss, C. and T. SOFA (2011). The role of women in agriculture. ESA Working Paper
No. 11-02. Agricultural Development Economics Division, Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations.
Drewnowski, A. (1997). Taste preferences and food intake. Annual Review of Nutrition 17, 237–253.

123
Drewnowski, A., C. Kurth, J. Holden-Wiltse, and J. Saari (1992). Food preferences
in human obesity: Carbohydrates versus fats. 18 (3), 207–221.
Duﬂo, E. (2003). Grandmothers and granddaughters: Old age pension and intrahousehold allocation in South Africa. World Bank Economic Review 17 (1), 1–25.
Duﬂo, E. and C. Udry (2004). Intrahousehold resource allocation in Côte D’Ivoire:
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CHAPTER A. APPENDIX: SHARE AND SHARE ALIKE: THE IMPACT OF
RAINFALL ON GENDERED INCOME ALLOCATION IN MALAWI

A Unrestricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests
Table A.1 presents the unconstrained estimates of the relationship between expenditure and rainfall. For each regression, nine rainfall variables, are included, as well as
location indicators. These results are not disaggregated by gender and hence cannot
address the potentially gendered nature of income earning and expenditure.

Table A.1. Unrestricted Overidentiﬁcation Tests: Log of Consumption
(1)
Aggregate
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
Joint Signiﬁcance - F-Test
R2

(2)
Food

(3)
Cigarettes and Alcohol

(4)
Clothing

(5)
(6)
Recreation Education

(7)
Health

(8)
Housing and Utilities

−0.001
(0.003)
0.006
(0.005)
−0.036
(0.069)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.001∗
(0.001)
0.024∗
(0.014)
−0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.091∗∗
(0.037)

−0.002
(0.004)
0.005
(0.006)
−0.182∗∗
(0.081)
0.000
(0.001)
−0.001∗
(0.001)
0.043∗∗∗
(0.016)
−0.001∗∗
(0.001)
0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
−0.092∗∗
(0.042)

−0.044
(0.033)
0.036
(0.053)
1.349∗
(0.713)
0.011∗
(0.006)
−0.014∗
(0.008)
0.116
(0.137)
−0.007
(0.006)
0.010∗
(0.006)
−0.114
(0.388)

−0.002
(0.024)
−0.002
(0.047)
−0.334
(0.677)
−0.002
(0.005)
−0.000
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.140)
−0.000
(0.005)
0.002
(0.005)
−0.096
(0.362)

−0.000
(0.020)
0.058∗
(0.033)
0.841∗
(0.453)
−0.001
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.005)
0.056
(0.090)
−0.006∗
(0.003)
0.006∗
(0.003)
−0.154
(0.237)

−0.004
(0.018)
0.012
(0.029)
−0.604
(0.402)
0.005
(0.003)
−0.008∗
(0.004)
0.070
(0.076)
−0.004
(0.003)
0.003
(0.003)
0.093
(0.187)

−0.054∗
(0.033)
0.085
(0.053)
0.264
(0.592)
0.008
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.007)
−0.080
(0.129)
0.000
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.005)
−0.683∗∗
(0.335)

−0.003
(0.004)
0.011∗
(0.006)
0.163∗
(0.091)
−0.000
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.026
(0.019)
−0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
−0.041
(0.048)

3.58∗∗∗
(0.000)
0.065

2.51∗∗∗
(0.008)
0.051

1.97∗∗
(0.040)
0.029

0.22
(0.991)
0.008

2.08∗∗
(0.029)
0.038

1.03
(0.385)
0.029

2.456
(0.417)
0.052

2.74∗∗∗
(0.004)
0.040

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

p < 0.01). Regressions also include agro-ecological zone indicators.
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A First Stage Results: Robustness Checks
First stage results for the robustness checks are reported in the following pages.
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Table A.2. First Stage: Rainfall Estimates - Matrilineal
Joint Income

Female Income

Male Income

Non-Matrilineal
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
R2

−0.081
(0.060)
0.146∗
(0.082)
−0.330
(1.032)
0.002
(0.009)
−0.006
(0.012)
0.115
(0.208)
−0.002
(0.011)
0.001
(0.010)
0.597
(0.671)

−0.012
(0.032)
0.002
(0.066)
−0.046
(0.715)
−0.000
(0.005)
−0.003
(0.008)
0.234∗∗
(0.111)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.009
(0.006)
0.093
(0.323)

0.062
(0.047)
−0.113
(0.075)
−0.985
(0.968)
−0.005
(0.008)
0.009
(0.011)
−0.092
(0.187)
0.005
(0.009)
−0.002
(0.008)
−0.506
(0.602)

0.075

0.056

0.072

0.011
(0.063)
0.027
(0.102)
2.891∗∗
(1.130)
0.012
(0.011)
−0.004
(0.013)
0.011
(0.245)
−0.000
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.009)
−0.843
(0.596)

0.027
(0.035)
−0.098∗
(0.054)
−1.605∗∗
(0.690)
0.010∗
(0.006)
−0.013∗
(0.007)
0.194
(0.135)
−0.011∗∗
(0.005)
0.013∗∗∗
(0.005)
−0.173
(0.352)

−0.016
(0.058)
0.055
(0.094)
−1.884∗
(1.042)
−0.017
(0.010)
0.010
(0.012)
−0.288
(0.228)
−0.000
(0.008)
0.004
(0.009)
1.110∗∗
(0.531)

0.050

0.066

0.050

Matrilineal
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
R2

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses. (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01). Regressions also include agro-ecological zone indicators. Blank spaces indicate omissions due
to collinearity.
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Table A.3. First Stage: Rainfall Estimates - Female-Headed
Joint Income

Female Income

Male Income

Male-Headed
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter

R2

−0.078∗
(0.043)
0.130∗∗
(0.062)
1.128
(0.791)
0.010
(0.007)
−0.010
(0.009)
0.026
(0.168)
−0.005
(0.006)
−0.001
(0.007)
−0.370
(0.430)
(0.671)

0.008
(0.025)
−0.040
(0.045)
−0.649
(0.524)
0.006
(0.004)
−0.010∗
(0.005)
0.209∗∗
(0.092)
−0.009∗∗
(0.004)
0.010∗∗∗
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.244)
(0.323)

0.070∗∗
(0.035)
−0.098∗
(0.056)
−1.337∗
(0.728)
−0.013∗∗
(0.006)
0.014
(0.009)
−0.117
(0.155)
0.004
(0.006)
0.000
(0.006)
0.557
(0.394)
(0.602)

0.028

0.046

0.033

0.146
(0.103)
−0.196
(0.183)
2.056
(1.969)
0.004
(0.017)
−0.009
(0.022)
0.189
(0.375)
−0.014
(0.018)
0.012
(0.020)
0.526
(1.083)

0.014
(0.044)
0.016
(0.093)
−3.181∗∗
(1.343)
−0.003
(0.009)
−0.001
(0.011)
0.291
(0.211)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.005)
0.203
(0.748)

−0.173∗
(0.097)
0.280∗
(0.165)
−0.704
(1.493)
0.004
(0.016)
−0.003
(0.019)
−0.404
(0.326)
0.014
(0.015)
−0.016
(0.017)
−0.253
(0.913)

0.125

0.148

Female-Headed
Average total rainfall
Average rainfall of wettest quarter
Average start of wettest quarter
Past year’s total rainfall
Past year’s rainfall of wettest quarter
Past year’s start of wettest quarter
Current year total rainfall
Current year rainfall of wettest quarter
Current year start of wettest quarter
R2

0.129
∗

∗∗

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses. ( p < 0.10,
p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01). Regressions also include agro-ecological zone indicators. Blank spaces indicate omissions due
to collinearity.
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CHAPTER B. APPENDIX: DROUGHT RESISTANT CROPS AND RAINFALL
VARIABILITY: A STUDY ON THE INFLUENCES OF SORGHUM CROP
TRAITS AND SMALLHOLDER FARMER PREFERENCES

B Robustness Checks
In this section I include several robustness checks, including a parsimonious regression (Table B.1), an OLS linear probability model regression (Table B.2), and Tobit
regression (Table B.3).
Table B.1. Parsimonious Regressions

preferred staple: sorghum
average rainfall
coeﬃcient of variation of rainfall
rainfall shock

(1)
Grow Sorghum

(2)
Share Sorghum

0.49089∗∗∗
(0.10086)
-0.00001
(0.00004)
-0.01092
(0.00688)
-0.00627
(0.01769)

0.20463∗∗∗
(0.04133)
-0.00000
(0.00001)
-0.00508∗∗
(0.00243)
-0.01173∗
(0.00600)

(3)
(4)
Grow Maize Share Maize
-0.18632∗∗∗
(0.04059)
0.00006∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.01623∗∗∗
(0.00421)
0.02090∗
(0.01081)

-0.06106
(0.04216)
0.00007∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.00418∗
(0.00251)
0.00892
(0.00976)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,
p < 0.01). Average partial eﬀects are reported in column (1) and (3).

∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗
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Table B.2. OLS LPM and Probit Regressions
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Grow Sorghum Share Sorghum Grow Maize Share Maize
preferred staple: sorghum
average rainfall
coeﬃcient of variable of rainfall
rainfall shock
female headed household
age of head of household
education of head of household

0.46732∗∗∗
(0.11018)
-0.00003
(0.00004)
-0.02978∗∗∗
(0.00873)
-0.00398
(0.01891)
0.05259
(0.05002)
-0.00121
(0.00161)
-0.00749
(0.00687)

0.20799∗∗∗
(0.04462)
-0.00000
(0.00002)
-0.00396
(0.00506)
-0.00766
(0.00660)
0.01413
(0.01977)
0.00029
(0.00068)
0.00020
(0.00304)

-0.04733
(0.04004)
0.00008∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.01193∗∗∗
(0.00406)
0.01376
(0.01001)
-0.00676
(0.02736)
0.00092
(0.00090)
0.00356
(0.00370)

-0.13717∗∗∗
(0.04216)
0.00018∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.05374∗∗∗
(0.00743)
0.02009∗∗
(0.01006)
-0.03605
(0.02508)
0.00102
(0.00087)
0.00974∗∗∗
(0.00371)

-0.00606
(0.00447)
-0.03547
(0.05282)
-0.03297
(0.04340)
0.04121
(0.04410)
0.01626
(0.02056)
0.03563∗
(0.02031)
0.01612
(0.01985)
0.00908
(0.01198)

-0.00293∗∗
(0.00140)
-0.02790
(0.02281)
-0.01356
(0.01754)
0.00781
(0.01653)
0.00160
(0.00718)
-0.00244
(0.00672)
0.00460
(0.00773)
0.00925∗∗
(0.00431)
-0.04111∗∗
(0.01743)
-0.00034∗
(0.00018)

-0.00012
(0.00323)
0.04165
(0.02655)
0.00841
(0.02407)
0.03938
(0.02627)
0.02077
(0.01287)
-0.00067
(0.01078)
0.01099
(0.01058)
-0.00132
(0.00601)

-0.00135
(0.00257)
0.02037
(0.02746)
0.01049
(0.02319)
-0.00282
(0.02226)
0.01503
(0.00982)
-0.00401
(0.00976)
0.00071
(0.01031)
-0.01720∗∗∗
(0.00577)
0.06661∗∗∗
(0.02385)
0.00061∗∗
(0.00030)

wealth index
number of cattle owned
own plough
received extension services
sold crops at market
number of participants in oﬀ farm labor market
number of adult female members
number of adult male members
number of child members
manure used
fertilize used

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Average
partial eﬀects are reported in column (1) and column (3). A year indicator is also included, as well as natural region indicators,
though these are not reported.
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Table B.3. Tobit Regressions

preferred staple: sorghum
average rainfall
coeﬃcient of variable of rainfall
rainfall shock
female headed household
age of head of household
education of head of household

(1)
0.54872∗∗∗
(0.14959)
-0.00006
(0.00008)
-0.05402∗∗∗
(0.01675)
-0.00838
(0.03503)
0.09332
(0.09195)
-0.00213
(0.00297)
-0.01492
(0.01259)

(2)
-0.05727
(0.04702)
0.00008∗∗∗
(0.00002)
0.01254∗∗
(0.00493)
0.00708
(0.01038)
-0.01145
(0.02737)
0.00112
(0.00088)
0.00415
(0.00375)

-0.01272
(0.00892)
-0.06288
(0.09791)
-0.05815
(0.08006)
0.08394
(0.08056)
0.02752
(0.03801)
0.06237∗
(0.03672)
0.03083
(0.03614)
0.01455
(0.02218)

-0.00063
(0.00255)
0.04660
(0.02926)
0.01462
(0.02367)
0.03731
(0.02389)
0.01434
(0.01130)
-0.00035
(0.01095)
0.00645
(0.01079)
-0.00141
(0.00661)

wealth index
number of cattle owned
own plough
received extension services
sold crops at market
number of participants in oﬀ farm labor market
number of adult female members
number of adult male members
number of child members

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). Average partial eﬀects are reported in column (1)
and column (2). A year indicator is also included, as well as natural region indicators,
though these are not reported.
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Table B.4. Decision to Grow and Area Allocated for Maize, Wealth and Labor Interactions
(1)
(2)
Grow Maize Share of Maize
interaction: sorghum pref. staple * wealth index
interaction: average rainfall * wealth index
interaction: rainfall coef. of variation * wealth index
interaction: rainfall shock * wealth index
interaction: sorghum pref. staple * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: average rainfall * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: rainfall coef. of variation * oﬀ-farm labor
interaction: rainfall shock * oﬀ-farm labor

-0.324
(0.268)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.002
(0.006)
0.020
(0.064)
omitted
(omitted)
0.00016∗
(0.0001)
-0.007∗∗
(0.003)
0.006
(0.036)

-0.254
(0.182)
-0.00001
(0.0001)
0.001
(0.003)
-0.033
(0.032)
0.029
(0.128)
-0.00004
(0.0001)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.011
(0.031)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01). All regressors from previous regressions are included, though not reported for
parsimony. Average partial eﬀects are reported in column (1).
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CHAPTER C. APPENDIX: THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS DRIVING
LABOR ALLOCATION AND REALLOCATION IN ZIMBABWE

Table C.1. Exogeneity of Shocks
Death of Household Member
Number of adult equivalents
Average age of household members
Average education of household members
Female headed household
Own plough
=1 if hh owns cattle
Average: Number of adult equivalents
Average: Average age of household members
Average: Average education of household members
Average: Female headed household
Average: Own plough
Average: Cattle ownership
Constant

Ratio of Deaths in Community

0.024328
(0.021211)
−0.001105
(0.001346)
−0.000191
(0.004747)
0.069511∗
(0.029148)
0.087298
(0.059118)
−0.047304
(0.030359)
−0.029819
(0.015641)
0.000937
(0.002172)
−0.007258
(0.006972)
−0.030674
(0.044404)
−0.013990
(0.078403)
0.056994
(0.057310)
0.081423
(0.062695)

Note: Fully robust standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10,

0.000019
(0.000013)
0.000003
(0.000003)
0.000002
(0.000009)
0.000144
(0.000163)
−0.000058
(0.000061)
0.000194
(0.000166)
−0.000029
(0.000017)
−0.000006
(0.000007)
0.000225
(0.000191)
0.000202
(0.000165)
−0.000116
(0.000283)
−0.000457
(0.000402)
−0.000193
(0.000301)
∗∗

p < 0.05,

∗∗∗

Rainfall Shortage or Surplus
0.014775
(0.011886)
0.005202
(0.006022)
−0.004833
(0.007187)
−0.172099
(0.107409)
−0.023142
(0.088941)
−0.128751
(0.075846)
−0.005078
(0.021261)
−0.003248
(0.006140)
0.036747∗∗∗
(0.008446)
0.086147
(0.112823)
−0.034056
(0.110165)
0.039004
(0.078178)
0.664348∗∗∗
(0.072659)

p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered at the district-level.
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Table C.2. Circumstances of Farm Production
Log of yield
Maize
Indicator: Second year
Interaction of year indicator and experience of rainfall shock
Interaction of year indicator and experience of death
Interaction of year indicator and community death
Constant

0.938
(0.574)
1.723∗∗∗
(0.659)
0.478
(0.982)
−216.391∗
(129.333)
1.770∗∗∗
(0.267)

Pearl Millet
Indicator: Second year
Interaction of year indicator and experience of rainfall shock
Interaction of year indicator and experience of death
Interaction of year indicator and community death
Constant

1.265∗∗∗
(0.474)
−0.220
(0.544)
−0.063
(0.809)
−228.614∗∗
(106.604)
3.997∗∗∗
(0.220)

Sorghum
Indicator: Second year
Interaction of year indicator and experience of rainfall shock
Interaction of year indicator and experience of death
Interaction of year indicator and community death
Constant

0.383
(0.571)
0.924
(0.655)
1.316
(0.975)
20.283
(128.448)
1.736∗∗∗
(0.265)

Note: Standard errors clustered at the household are in parentheses (∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗
p < 0.01). Standard errors are clustered at the district-level.
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